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I. INTRODUCTION
OST oil and gas is discovered by independent operators who
sell shares in their projects to outside investors and then admin-
ister the process of drilling and development.' Nonoperators,
the investors in oil and gas programs, need more protection than they
currently receive from industry customs and legal standards. Market dis-
tortion occurs because oil and gas operators usually do not tell their in-
vestors how past programs have done. By not distributing this
information, operators deprive investors of the information they need to
judge an operator's ability to perform its promises.
This Article is a companion to an already published article on the
places where the industry contract fails to give investors necessary ac-
counting information. 2 Taken together, the two articles give a compre-
hensive picture of why it remains too easy for operators to exaggerate the
economic value of their proposals.
Several common types of investors sign up in oil and gas programs.
The traditional investor is a working interest owner who puts up cash in
return for an equity interest.3 Other investors buy shares in drilling pro-
grams, which may be incorporated as separate entities, or become limited
partners in drilling partnerships. They receive partnership or stock inter-
1. In the broadest definition, an operator is "a person (natural or artificial (e.g., cor-
porate)) engaged in the business of drilling wells for oil and gas." HOWARD R. WILLIAMS
& CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 842 (8th ed. 1991) [hereinafter
WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL].
The operator's duties in drilling a well are defined in an operating agreement, which is
"[ain agreement between or among interested parties for the testing and development of a
tract of land. Typically, one of the parties is designated as the operator .... The authority
of the operator, and restrictions thereon, are spelled out in detail in the typical agree-
ment." Id. at 837.
One of the surprising facts about the oil business is that even major oil companies, com-
panies with years of industry leadership, impressive technical staffing, and hundreds of
millions of dollars in annual investments, often do not drill their own wells. In many in-
stances they leave the risk-taking to independent operators and wait until at least initial
wells have been drilled before purchasing interests. The trade organization of independent
producers, the Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA), estimates that in-
dependent producers drill eighty-five percent of all new wells and produce as much as
sixty-four percent of the natural gas in the United States. Natural Gas Gathering Services
Performed by Interstate Pipelines and Interstate Pipeline Affiliates-Issues Related to Rates
and Terms and Conditions of Service, Before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 5
(Docket No. RM94-4-000) (Jan. 14, 1994) (comments of the Independent Petroleum Asso-
ciation of America). (This is not true in the most expensive ventures, which often only the
majors can afford to finance.).
2. John B. McArthur, A Twelve-Step Program for COPAS to Strengthen Oil and Gas
Accounting Protections, 49 SMU L. REV. 1447 (1996).
3. The "working interest" includes the operator's interest and is, in a somewhat over-
lapping definition, the "operating interest under an oil and gas lease," the interest of those
who have "the exclusive right to exploit the minerals on the land." WILLIAMS & MEYERS
MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1377. Working interests in a well often are stated as a single
interest, with the costs to be borne and revenues to be shared stated as a percentage of that
interest. See id. at 1378. These interests include any equity interest that the operator may
own in the property.
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ests in legal entities that, in turn, hold title to the ventures' wells. These
recommendations apply to these investments as well.
The operator-nonoperator relationship is vital to the health of this in-
dustry. The prevalence of joint operations in a free market suggests that
joint projects can be more efficient than single-owner drilling on many
properties. 4 Yet the efficiency of any legal form, including joint opera-
tions, must include its potential costs. Efficiencies can be outweighed if
joint operations too heavily encourage fraud and opportunism. If the
contracts are structured too loosely, they encourage operators to pursue
short-term advantages even if this destroys the long-term utility of the
joint format.
In considering remedies, obviously no contract will prevent all forms of
fraud and sharp dealing. Nor does the existence of fraud necessarily
prove that a contract is inefficient. Contract reform is al ays a question
of what feasible reforms, what cost-effective measures, can reduce dis-
putes and clarify the relationship. This Article argues that plugging cer-
tain easily remediable gaps in the current investment contract, the Joint
Operating Agreement (JOA), would reduce common forms of fraud.
The improvements urged here would bring about a closer alignment be-
tween the investors' decisions and the product they thought they were
purchasing, all with few additional transaction costs. And they would
provide clearer remedies against companies that do cheat investors.
There are several reasons for improving the standard oilfield invest-
ment contract. The traditional arguments used in law review articles to
4. The theory that in a free market, in which participants can experiment with legal
forms, the pattern of legal relations will reflect the most efficient forms over time, is most
identified with the new economic institutionalism of Oliver Williamson. See generally OLI-
VER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
John E. Jolly and Jim Buck have suggested a few reasons why joint operations can be
more efficient in oil and gas projects than separate operations. The parties may achieve
economies of scale in operations; they may be able to pool information, geologic or other-
wise; and they may be able to raise enough capital together, even if they couldn't do so
separately. JOHN E. JOLLY & JIM BUCK, JOINT INTEREST ACCOUNTING PETROLEUM IN-
DUSTRY PRACTICE 2-3 (1988). See also Lewis G. Mosburg, Jr., An Introduction to the
Model Form Operating Agreement, in THE PETROLEUM EXPLORATIONIST'S GUIDE TO TI-
TLES, LEASES & CONTRACTS 405 (Lewis Mosburg ed., 1984):
Current conditions in the oil and gas industry are leading to an increased
emphasis on the conduct of operations on a 'joint' basis. Restricted drilling
budgets, and less attractive prices and demand, make companies more reluc-
tant to accept farmouts, even to increase their acreage position in existing
prospects.
The same pressures may make landowners more eager to enter farmouts rather than drill
themselves. The company that farms-in the acreage then needs to figure out how to fund
its drilling. Farmout motives are not that different from those spurring joint operation,
primarily the spreading of risk:
[T]he owner of such leases may not be in the position currently to develop
them, due to budgetary limitations, a need to spread the costs and risks of
drilling, or a belief that such leases possess insufficient economic potential
compared with other available drilling opportunities.
Mosburg, Basic Concepts of the Farmout Agreement, in Mosburg (ed.), supra, at 387-88. In
addition, many nonoperators have no more interest or experience in drilling wells than the
average car buyer has in building cars.
1997] PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURE IN THE OILFIELD 667
justify reform are the familiar doctrinal arguments of language, purpose,
structure, history, and precedent. Some of the arguments this Article ad-
vances fall into this closed circle of legal reasoning. In addition, the re-
forms further two policies that transcend legal doctrine: enhancing the
freedom of contracting parties and improving economic efficiency.
Accurate information is a necessary ingredient if market participants
are to choose freely. Truth telling increases freedom in market systems.
It is in this sense that Charles Fried describes the moral element of con-
tracts: "In order that I be as free as possible, that my will have the great-
est possible range consistent with the similar will of others, it is necessary
that there be a way in which I may commit myself. ''5
The corollary of contract freedom is the assurance that others will com-
mit themselves in return. It is trust in the future performance of un-
known others that releases the bounty of capitalist production. This is
why well-functioning markets can so enhance individual possibility. One
no longer needs a personal commitment that others will do as they say.6
The other reason for concern that investors receive all material infor-
mation is that accurate choices based on the best available information
are necessary to maximize efficiency. 7 Efficient contract practices are
5. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 13 (1981).
6. Perhaps the most persistent American advocate of the private-contract-exchange-
as-freedom theory is Milton Friedman, who has long sponsored the argument that eco-
nomic freedom is necessary for individual freedom, both because diffusion of economic
power prevents the concentration of political power and because voluntary exchange bene-
fits each individual. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 8-9, 13-14 (1962).
Friedman emphasizes the role of government (and presumably he would add, lawyers) in
enforcing contracts as essential to a free society. The major functions of government in-
clude "to preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, to foster competitive mar-
kets." Id. at 2.
A working model of a society organized through voluntary exchange is a
free private enterprise exchange economy-what we have been calling com-
petitive capitalism .... The basic requisite is the maintenance of law and
order to prevent physical coercion of one individual by another and to en-
force contracts voluntarily entered into, thus giving substance to 'private'.
Id. at 13-14 (emphasis omitted). "[Gjovernment is essential both as a forum for determin-
ing the 'rules of the game' and as an umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided on."
Id. at 15.
The significance of contract as an instrument of freedom should be old hat to lawyers.
Karl Llewellyn stated the same thing as well as anyone since, more than half a century ago:
[lit is trite that bargain is a tool of change and of growing individual self-
determination, as is also any property regime which by increasing individual
control increases the scope of experiment, the differentiation of holdings, and
the factual effectiveness of the bargains of the wealthy ....
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions on Economics, 15 AM. ECON. REV. 665,
716 (1925).
7. Economists are gradually coming to integrate these social factors, including the
legal system, into market analysis. Douglas North, for instance, the 1993 Nobel Prize win-
ner in economics, argues that economists have too long assumed that "institutions do not
matter." Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time 1 (1993 Nobel Prize
lecture) (on file with the author). North argues that in a world of transactions costs, con-
tracts and the other institutions the law creates matter a great deal. A legal framework
that creates the incentive to acquire new knowledge is "the essential underpinning of mod-
ern economic growth." Id. at 15. North lists such legal institutions as private property, the
joint stock company, insurance, and financial markets as critical innovations supporting the
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necessary for healthy economic growth. It still stands as true, albeit tau-
tological, that utility maximizing decisions result when investors make
their own exchanges if reasonably full information is available and trans-
action costs are fairly low. 8
Contracting practices that hide information subvert the efficiency and
trust essential for a functioning free market system. Relaxation of anti-
fraud measures may lead to a short-term boom9-as "successful" false
expansion of the Western world. "Sustained economic growth in the Western world re-
quired the creation of institutions and property rights that served to bring the private rate
of return that the individual achieves more nearly in line with the social rates of return."
Id.
North writes in a tradition that has roots in Ronald Coase's analysis of the firm and in
Coase's criticism of classical economists for ignoring the institutional environment within
which firms and markets function. See, e.g., RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET,
AND THE LAW 3 (1988) (criticizing neoclassical views that "exchange takes place without
any specification of its institutional setting"); see also id. at 5 ("In mainstream economic
theory, the firm and the market are, for the most part, assumed to exist and are not them-
selves the subject of investigation. One result has been that the crucial role of the law in
determining the activities carried out by the firm and in the market has been largely
ignored.").
For Coase, firms exist to cover those circumstances when the cost of contracting for
market exchanges would be too great. Id. at 7. Firm size itself is correspondingly limited
as the cost of organizing a firm approaches the cost of carrying out transactions in the
market. Id. at 7, 44-45. In essence, firms are ways of avoiding "the cost of using the price
mechanism." Id. at 6. Firms are important to the theory of contract because they "greatly
reduce[ ]," if not eliminate, the need for contracts. Id. at 39. Coase argues that the longer
the period of contracting, the harder to predict contract exigencies, and the likelier a firm
is to emerge. Id. at 40.
While Coase's concern with the institutional structure of market and firm transactions
may be unfamiliar to the legal ear, it is very relevant. A focus on the institutional structure
of an industry means a focus on its legal organization. Once one decides that the cost of
conducting transactions is an important factor, "what becomes immediately clear is the
crucial importance of the legal system in this new world." Ronald Coase, The Institutional
Structure of Production, reprinted in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM 227, 232 (Oliver William-
son & Sidney Winter eds., 1993) (1991 Nobel Prize lecture). The rights to be traded are the
ones created by law. "As a result, the legal system will have a profound effect on the
working of the economic system and may be said in certain respects to control it." Id. at
233.
8. See, e.g., BRIAN BINGER & ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS WITH
CALCULUS 366-67 (1985).
9. One can imagine circumstances in which poor information would increase effi-
ciency, but only if people's perceived preferences did not fit their actual preferences-if
they would process accurate information the wrong way, or if the best available informa-
tion is not accurate. For instance, the investors lucky enough to put their money with Doc
Joiner and end up with a piece of the East Texas field might never have spent a dime had
he told them the truth and had they known how little basis he had for drilling. See infra
note 16. In retrospect, they must have thanked their lucky stars that they were tricked into
making the investment.
In the short run, frauds may raise more money than honest disclosure. Thus, ironically,
they harbor the potential to serve as engines of economic progress. Many successful entre-
preneurs are part huckster. It is an open empirical question whether the successful owe
their fortune to their deep foresight (which is always their ex post theory), or whether they
just happen to hold the winning ticket in a very unpredictable lottery.
The problem with building a theory of economic welfare on the unpredictable outcomes
of distorted decisions is that there is no reason to believe that decisions based on the wrong
information will on average be better than those based on accurate information. Our com-
mitment to economic freedom dictates that each individual be allowed to make his or her
own decisions, mistakes and all.
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promises lead to an influx of funds-but the long-term effect is predict-
ably negative. Over time the victims suffer losses that only the wrong-
doer could foresee. A contract induced by fraud or misinformation is the
law's label for welfare minimizing choices.
The utility maximization that is the promise of classical and neoclassi-
cal economics rests upon the assumption that informed parties can iden-
tify and make many trades beneficial to both sides. The seemingly trivial
central welfare theory of neoclassical economics (that trades in which at
least one person is better off and no one else worse off are a significant
category of potential exchanges) has been an important theory for one
reason: The world contains a large number of trades that yield just this
kind of welfare gain. This is an empirical assertion, not a theoretical ne-
cessity, but the extraordinary flowering of capitalist production seems to
prove it true. Fraud threatens this abundance.
As a remedy, standard form contracts do more to enhance utility than
just enabling people to trade an existing set of goods and services. In
addition, the process of standardization creates its own savings. Model
forms impose a regular structure on oii and gas investments. They lower
the cost of investing by removing the need to negotiate each deal from
the ground up.10
Moreover, efficiency in open markets relies in good part on learning from mistakes. The
market teaches people to make better choices. This education never comes, or is never
clear, if investors can't get accurate information on the choices they do make. Otherwise
they may suffer losses but not even enjoy the consolation of having received a capitalist
education.
10. See Granville Dutton, Accounting Procedures: Contracts or Controversies?, 19
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 117, 118 (1974) ("Through the use of these model forms, the
productivity of those industry employees engaged in negotiating and conducting joint oper-
ations is greatly enhanced in that the number of items which must be negotiated and moni-
tored are reduced to a feasible level." Dutton adds that "fin addition to diminishing
decisions and detailed checking, the model procedures provide a basis for a common ver-
nacular and a uniform connotation of the terms and jargon used in joint interest account-
ing."); cf C.M. Kennedy, Joint Venture Accounting d la COPAS-1962, 1964 NAT'L INST.
PET. LANDMEN 157, 159 (describing "accounting nightmare" and "chore" that would result
"if you were required to originate this detail for each operating agreement").
Part of a standard form's efficiency effects may occur simply because everybody uses the
same form. Transaction costs can fall sharply because everyone relies on the same operat-
ing procedures. Companies orient their services to the accepted standard. Certain issues
drop from discussion. Thus there is a social value to having most or all parties use the
same forms and channel their needs into the same practices. In this sense, the first technol-
ogy or contract form to arrive on the scene may be chosen simply because it enjoys increas-
ing returns to scale. See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns,
and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989); W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feed-
backs in the Economy, 262 Sci. Am. 2, 92 (1990). The savings do not mean that the parties
chose the form that would most reduce costs. "[Oince random economic events select a
particular path, the choice may become locked-in regardless of the advantages of the alter-
natives." Id. at 92.
Organizational theorists as well have noted that organizational forms may spread be-
cause new organizations imitate forms already in use. As particular forms of organization
spread, other institutions adjust to deal with the known institutional pattern. The organiza-
tional form spreads because it is the most common, not because it is the most efficient. The
more embedded it becomes, the greater the sunk cost of commitments to the first standard
and the greater the cost of innovations (including those that might have been far better if
adopted first).
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Economies that have no effective means of deterring and punishing
those who trade on lies, deception, and careful omission of necessary in-
formation put this market mechanism in jeopardy. Trades no longer en-
sure joint gains. If information has good odds of being untrue and
wrongdoing is likely to go unpunished or can only be ferreted out at great
cost, it becomes imprudent to trust the contract mechanism. Many will
shun the market and turn to much higher-cost procedures, including pro-
viding goods or services internally even if it is less efficient. The cost of
doing business in such economies will rise sharply; the economy will ac-
quire a new layer of transaction charges to fund protection against the
risk of falsehood. 1
Increasing disclosure as a remedy will only be more efficient, of course,
as long as the benefits exceed their costs. An industry never gets to
choose among perfect institutions: faced with limited knowledge and
contract structures whose results can only partly be predicted, it has to
choose among imperfect solutions.'2 Do the benefits of these reforms
Paul Dimaggio and Walter Powell argue that instead of organizational forms spreading
for their efficiency, "we contend, bureaucratization and other forms of organizational
change occur as the result of processes that make organizations more similar without nec-
essarily making them more efficient." Paul J. Dimaggio & Walter Powell, The Iron Cage
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 64 (Walter Powell & Paul J.
Dimaggio eds., 1991). Only one of their four reasons for organizational imitation (compet-
itive isomorphism) involves efficiency.
11. Protection may be purchased in fairly dull ways, like performance bonds, or
through exotic suppliers like organized crime. Cf. Amaryta Sen, Moral Codes And Eco-
nomic Success 19-21 (Paper Delivered At Annual Meeting Of The British Association,
Keele) (Aug. 30, 1993) (discussing the Mafia as "outside organization [that] can deal with
breach and provide a socially valued service in the form of strong-armed enforcement").
It is so obvious that it nears tautology that an essential assumption of competitive sys-
tems, in the extreme of the "environment of perfect competition," is that "each deci-
sionmaker has full information about the nature and consequences of his choice. If
information is incomplete rather than full, a decision that appears to be rational may prove
to be irrational if the decisionmaker could only have viewed the decision with full informa-
tion." ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 235 (1988) (emphasis
added). The informational basis of fraud, familiar to lawyers as misrepresentation and
fraudulent omission, is twofold: "Fraud is a violation of the negative duty not to misinform
the other party to a contract. Besides the negative duty, there are circumstances in which
the parties have the affirmative duty to disclose information." Id. at 239.
Fraud is particularly pernicious because it allows the tortfeasor to control the choices of
both parties. "Misrepresentation and fraud are also problems that arise because of asym-
metric information." Id. at 264. The party who lies uses its lying to take control of the
exchange, to provide a code in which the apparent exchange will have undisclosed attrib-
utes and translate into something quite different after the fact.
12. The awareness that reforms must be practical is why Williamson grounds his analy-
sis on "bounded rationality," with choice occurring in circumstances where thought and
attention are scarce resources and no one can gather perfect information. WILLIAMSON,
supra note 4, at 45-46.
Ronald Coase proposes a different agenda, one that has received increasing attention
recently. "Without some knowledge of what would be achieved with alternative institu-
tional arrangements, it is impossible to choose sensibly among them. We therefore need a
theoretical system capable of analyzing the effects of changes in these arrangements."
COASE, supra note 7, at 30; see also Lee Friedman, Public Institutional Structure and Re-
source Allocation: The Analysis of Adjustment, 2 PUB. POL. ANAL. & MGM'T 303, 304, 306
(1981) ("The primary limitation of existing theory is the failure to model satisfactorily the
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exceed their costs?
The reforms urged here should satisfy a cost-benefit test. Their returns
should be significant because they provide the most basic kind of material
investment information. The costs, on the other hand, should be rela-
tively low. Meaningful economic calculations of past performance can be
instituted using existing information and with little added labor in today's
computer age. This Article does not propose that investors or courts be
allowed to micro-manage operators. It just asks the operators to let in-
vestors know what they are really buying. Is it a pig or a poke? Most of
the proposals require just a little more data compilation.
To establish the need for effective performance disclosure, Part II of
the Article analyzes investment problems in a number of major industry
programs. It discusses false or at least very misleading practices about
reserves, successes, and expected economics that have flourished because
operators did not have to discuss the results of their prior work. The
section analyzes what went wrong in some of the largest operations in
American oil and gas history, including the Oklahoma-based Home-
Stake partnerships; the John King operations in the sixties; the wide-
spread programs of Marvin Davis and his Denver-based Davis Oil Com-
pany; the activity of Longhorn Oil and Gas, whose failure felled Penn
Square Bank and Continental Illinois National Bank; and the recent elab-
orate fraud committed by Prudential Insurance Company and its partner
Graham Energy.
Parts III and IV consider remedies, explaining how the Standard Joint
Operating Agreement can be modified to make operators disclose prior
results. Operators should have to publish the rate of return in each of
their prior programs. In addition, COPAS, the industry organization for
petroleum accountants, should take the lead in establishing an industry
clearinghouse to disseminate accurate, fair, and comparative data on the
economics of oil and gas companies.
Part V considers the coverage of investor protection. The discussion
urges the industry to prepare modified contracts for partnership and drill-
ing-fund investors. These investors do not make well-by-well decisions
on completion, reworking, and subsequent wells, so they do not need pro-
visions for joint-account voting. However, they need just as much protec-
tion, if not more, against operator manipulation of reserve estimates,
project results, and costs. The industry must incorporate protection over
these items into a form that can be attached to drilling partnership agree-
ments, so that all investors come closer to receiving the same standard of
care.
Part V also explains why industry investors should have the same rights
as nonindustry investors. Some courts seem to think that it is just fine for
phenomenon of organization as a response of boundedly rational decision makers to the
uncertainties they perceive ... Traditional economic advice rests on inadequate concep-
tions of market possibilities, on the one hand, versus unmitigated speculation about the
efficacy of nonmarket arrangements, on the other.").
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operators to indulge in the harshest forms of bargaining as long as exper-
ienced oil and gas companies are the only victims. Many industry compa-
nies seem to agree, feeling that they need no help protecting their
interests. Yet the disclosures recommended here concern information
that is uniquely in the operator's possession. The omissions they remedy
can cheat any investor, sophisticated or not. There is no reason industry
companies, most of whom have responsibilities to stockholders and other
interest owners of their own, would not benefit-and need-the same
rights as nonindustry investors.
Because opponents of case-method analysis often try to dismiss the
problems it unearths by arguing that the cases are selective and not repre-
sentative of their industry, Part V also discusses structural reasons for
believing that the oil and gas industry is likely to have problems with
fraud. These reasons include the difficulty of measuring quality, the need
for large fixed investments, and the lack of a ready market for many pro-
ject interests. The discussion shows why there is good reason to believe
that the problems revealed in public disputes are a legitimate indicator
that this industry needs new remedies.
II. SOLICITATION BY MISREPRESENTING PAST
PERFORMANCE IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN THE
OIL AND GAS BUSINESS
The disclosure of past economics should be the focus of great attention
in the oil and gas industry. This is a point where industry standards suffer
a glaring omission. The industry contract lacks any place for the operator
to disclose its prior results.
Virtually no oil or gas investment is sold without the operator making a
variety of representations about its past and what it portends for the fu-
ture. Yet operators have no duty to back up their version of history with
facts, in writing.
Fraud and incomplete information have flourished in this vacuum.
This section studies some of the more troubled investments in an effort to
understand what went wrong in the structure of these investments, as well
as to illustrate the damage flowing from incomplete standards. The ex-
amples lead to the recommendation that the industry force operators to
distribute more information about their prior work before the investment
begins. In addition, they must distribute ongoing economic information
as a project moves through the phases of exploration and development.
A. RESERVE AND PRODUCTION MISREPRESENTATIONS IN THE
TRADITIONAL EQUITY INVESTMENTS
Misrepresentations about reserves and expected success are the most
visible and colorful cases of oilpatch fraud. This Article uses "misrepre-
sentation" in its broader sense, to include not just fraud but also incom-
plete and unsupported statements, for instance, a projection of success
wholly at odds with a company's prior experience. Even hardened busi-
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nessmen can suspend their better judgment when confronted with the
magic of summoning liquid wealth from beneath the earth. Reserve mis-
representations have ranged from specific misrepresentations about pro-
duction in neighboring wells to broader falsehoods about success rates
and distributions. They include assurances of sharing the same risk as
investors, and the very particular lie of one operator who told investors
that he shared their risks by stating that "he made a sacrifice to enter the
deal himself, because his wife had to sell her fur coat and Cadillac in
order for Jones to raise his half of the money."' 13 The truth was that Jones
had more than covered his cost by doubling the lease prices before selling
interests to investors, and on top of that was overcharging for the cost of
drilling. 14
1. Some Operators Make False Analogies to Nearby Areas
One of the most common reserve manipulations occurs when operators
sell interests prospect-by-prospect. It is also one of the simplest, accom-
plished by asserting that an undrilled well is sure to produce from the
same formation, in the same quantities, as a nearby successful well and
disguising significant differences between the wells. The Securities and
Exchange Commission sued Columbus "Dad" Joiner based on this kind
of fraud. Joiner had discovered the massive East Texas field on October
3, 1930.15 As it turned out, that was about all Joiner discovered. To lure
investors into new projects, he circulated promotional letters claiming
that:
'Dad' Joiner has gone right into the heart of one of the largest
producing areas in all Texas, in his endeavor to make this the
supreme achievement of his career. Take a good look at this map-
notice how in most every direction-you'll find not just a few, but
literally hundreds of producing areas.
16
13. Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1095 (5th Cir. 1993).
14. Id. at 1095-96.
15. The story of Joiner's discovery, and the way it produced the Hunt oil dynasty, is
told in DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE 244-48 (1991).
16. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 133 F.2d. 241, 244 n.6, rev'd, 320 U.S. 344
(1943). Putting aside for the moment the remote chance of surpassing what will always
remain one of the world's major discoveries, it turns out that Joiner had his problems even
in his supreme accomplishment: He had sold interests in his East Texas discovery several
times over. YERGIN, supra note 15, at 247. And in a double irony, Joiner's one great
discovery appears to have been based on the bizarre theories of Doc Lloyd, a "trendolo-
gist" who chose Joiner's drilling location by mapping all of the major fields in the United
States and showing trend lines from them converging on Joiner's site in East Texas. Id. at
245. Joiner's successful well had no better theory behind it than his later failures.
Another interesting facet of Joiner is the scope of the solicitation. Advertising materials
were mailed to at least 1000 people. The majority of the purchases were for $25 or less,
with many of these paid on an installment basis. 320 U.S. at 346.
The classic oil pitch may be those written by C.C. Julian for his Los Angeles-based Julian
Petroleum Company in the twenties. Julian used the risk and unreliability of many compa-
nies as a means of trying to distinguish his company from others. One of his ads was
headed, in bold-faced capitals, "Julian Refuses to Accept Your Money Unless You Can
Afford to Lose! Widows and Orphans, This is No Investment For You!" JULES TYGIEL,
THE GREAT Los ANGELES SWINDLE 41 (1994). Another included the disclaimer, "If You
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Unfortunately, as is too often the case with reserve comparisons, there
was little substance to Joiner's analogy. The trial court would find that
"what they said was not true, that this particular county was in the center
of or in the heart of the highest production area in Texas, it was rather
remote from it, though contiguous to a shallow and a smaller produc-
tion."'17 Conspicuously, Joiner did not give investors any economic
information.
2. Some Operators Make False Analogies to Specific, Particularly
Impressive, Wells
Misleading comparisons to surrounding production tempt many opera-
tors who sell programs prospect-by-prospect. A more painstaking misuse
of well analogies than Joiner's injured out-of-state investors in Gilbert v.
Nixon. 18 The falsity centered on individual wells rather than fields. The
operator, Nixon, sent a package of data to investors on each project.19
Nixon's lies were of two types, one of omission and one of misrepresen-
tation. First, his maps omitted nearby dry holes or pretended they were
farther from the drill site when they described the project's geologic justi-
fication.20 As the number of drilled fields increases-and there are very
few new fields discovered in the United States-honest analogies to ex-
isting, neighboring production should become an increasingly reliable
predictive mechanism. The active market in dry and bottom hole infor-
mation shows how valuable new drilling information can be. By hiding
the bad results of nearby wells, Nixon distorted this data. He prevented
investors from learning what Nixon already knew.
Second, Nixon misstated a variety of characteristics of nearby produc-
ing wells, even when he put them in the right place on his maps. Depend-
ing on the well, he altered the depth of producing formations, the amount
of production, and the amount of water in the well. Each distortion con-
cealed negative information while making a new prospect look better
than it was.2'
Can't Afford to Take a Chance, You Can't Afford to Play With Me." Id. at 53. Julian
mixed this message with promises that made it sound crazy, flooding area newspapers and
then the radio with his message.
17. Joiner, 133 F.2d. at n.4.
18. 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970).
19. Id. Nixon had been selling shares in mineral leases in Kansas to the plaintiffs, two
wealthy investors who lived in Connecticut, for six years. Id. To solicit each sale, Nixon
sent a package of information to a petroleum engineer the investors had hired in Denver.
The engineer screened the properties. The package Nixon furnished included a geological
map, which listed the supposed production of nearby wells. Id. at 357. After losing money
on 18 prospects in Kansas, the plaintiffs sued, claiming that Nixon had fed them false infor-
mation. Id. at 348.
20. For instance, Nixon failed to show an abandoned, noncommercial producer on one
of his maps. Id. at 363. On another map, a dry hole was moved half a mile from its actual
location, making the proposed site look better than it was. Id. at 359.
21. Nixon failed to mention that a "good" producing sand he described as a "direct
offset," an immediately adjoining well to a prospect, had declined to a level that no longer
was commercial. Id. at 359-60. A well he described as a good well was producing salt
water and was not likely to be commercial. Id. at 360-61. The depth of one dry hole was
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3. Some Operators Overemphasize Early Results and Completion
Statistics
Comparisons to nearby wells occurred on an even larger scale in the
case of Denver's Marvin Davis and his Davis Oil Company. Davis Oil
wielded two other popular solicitations. It reported incomplete and ten-
tative geological information before wells had a reliable production his-
tory, and it treated the number of wells it completed as a good indicator
of economic success. One of the company's primary sales techniques was
to tout "completion" ratios that included wells that had lost money. In
most companies, a completion is a sign of success. For some unsuccessful
companies, however, a completion-based success ratio disguises failure.22
misstated, so that it would not appear to be from the same formation that Nixon was test-
ing. Id. at 361-62. And Nixon used false production reports from an adjoining well to
make another of his prospects look better than warranted. Id. at 363.
The court remanded each of these problems for the trial court to determine whether the
misstatement or omission was material, but it issued a bad decision in another area. It
agreed that misrepresentations about the operator's collecting discounts were "not signifi-
cantly related to the basis on which the transactions were consummated." Id. at 358.
The court should have considered the difference these secret profits made in the opera-
tor's incentives. It should have let the investors argue that individual well misrepresenta-
tions poisoned all of the wells. Instead the court announced a contrary holding:
[Aippellants must establish more than a general atmosphere of favorable but
misleading reports in order to recover their consideration for leases individu-
ally submitted on the basis of data directly relating to them when there is
found to be no direct geological connection between the leases subject to
false reports and those for which recovery is sought.
Id. at 358-59. The problem with this holding is that specific misrepresentations about the
high value of certain prospects may induce investors to take shares in many other invest-
ments. The specific misrepresentations make all prospects look better. It should be a fact
question whether specific misstatements cloaked all of a multi-part investment with fraud.
This issue is not as clearly raised in Gilbert v. Nixon as might appear, because trial was to
the court, so the trial court's conclusions may be conclusions of fact rather than law.
For another example of well-specific misrepresentations, see Anderson v. Vinson Explo-
ration, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied) (Plaintiff alleged,
in claim under Texas Securities Act, that operator overstated per-well production in the
field; that operator almost doubled the average by combining two fields, rather than just
citing the less productive field where it was proposing to drill, as well as omitting that only
3 of 13 wells in field had projected production; that all wells in an offsetting field had been
plugged and abandoned; that the operator had drilled a dry well between the only two
good wells in the field; and that four or five oil companies had rejected the project. The
nonoperators also alleged that the operator deliberately understated expected costs. Id.).
For a brazen way to manipulate results, there is the driller who told investors they had a
discovery well when all he was reporting was recaptured frac oil. The driller bought the
frac oil and injected it into the well to stimulate production. Donohoe v. Consolidated
Operating & Prod. Corp., 982 F.2d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1992). The frac oil apparently
stimulated reserve reporting more than the well.
Sometimes the misrepresentation will concern the category into which a well falls. Dur-
ing the boom years, the Bache brokerage house marketed a series of oil and gas projects as
being "[piredominately low risk development drilling." Exhibit 7, Bache Tax Investment
Group Fact Sheet at 2, Invoil Sec. (No. MDL 585). Even before the project disintegrated,
an outside consulting firm retained by Bache would determine that at least six of the eight
programs operated by Wells-Battelstein "were, in my view, already destined to be marginal
before a bit was ever put into the ground." Exhibit 4, Petro-Enterprises Report at 24,
Invoil Sec. (No. MDL 585).
22. Completion success ratios are a long-time industry problem.
Many areas in the United States can be drilled by an oil man with productive
wells resulting in almost every case. However, many of such fields are char-
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Davis Oil was completing many wells that would not even pay the costs of
completion. In the case of Davis Oil, using this "success" ratio was
misleading.
The details of these practices would come out when one of Davis's ma-
jor investors, the oil and gas subsidiary of Aetna Life Insurance Company
(Aetna), sued the company, its principal Marvin Davis, and two other
company officers. Marvin Davis and his Denver-based company were a
major oil and gas presence for many years. Davis Oil was selling hun-
dreds of prospects a year by the late seventies and early eighties.. At its
peak, the company was drilling more wells in the domestic United States
than any other company except Amoco and Exxon.23
To solicit Aetna's investment, Marvin Davis personally had approached
the top officers of the insurance company. He promised Aetna's chair-
man and its chief financial officer that his "track record" was substantially
acterized by drilling which will never result in a profit. Such fields are a
bonanza for the unscrupulous oil promoter, who can impress an investor with
his marvelous productive-well 'track record,' and even provide a quick distri-
bution of cash flow, while knowing that such wells will never pay out. [The
'SEC box score' using completion statistics] is informative not as an indica-
tion of the success of such drilling, but merely to provide information con-
cerning the scope of the sponsor's prior operations. It is for this reason that
the SEC requires that such wells be labeled 'productive' rather than
,successful'.
Institute for Business Planning, Analyzing an Oil and Gas Investment, in 1I OBTAINING
DRILLING CAPITAL FROM TAx-ORIENTED INVESTORS 568 (Lewis Mosburg ed., 1981).
"The real success of the partnership, however, will not be judged on the success ratio of
wells discovered, but on the reserves found." National Tax Shelter Digest, Anatomy of a
Partnership: Oil and Gas Drilling Programs, in Mosburg (ed.), supra, at 13. This may be
obvious to careful industry participants, but success ratios will continue to mislead many
investors until the industry requires operators to publish the economic results of the wells
that make up their success ratios.
23. In information supplied to investor A.E. Investments, Davis claimed to have
drilled more wells in the United States than anyone but Amoco and Exxon. Defendants'
Ex. 24, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 2,
Davis Oil (No. 85-M-1821). Although most case records were destroyed when the case
settled on the first day of trial, many documents became public earlier when the defend-
ants moved for summary judgment. These documents remain available through the federal
court archives in Denver. The exhibits used in the summary judgment briefing are still part
of the court record. [Depositions used in the summary judgment briefing will hereafter be
cited by deponent name; affidavits by the affiant's name; and exhibits by Plaintiff's or De-
fendants' exhibit number. All exhibits cited are on file with SMU Law Review.]
By the time Marvin Davis left the oil business in the late eighties, he had become a
billionaire several times over. He was to buy successively Twentieth Century Fox, the Bev-
erly Hills Hotel, the golf mecca of Pebble Beach, and Spectravision. He also made at-
tempts to acquire such leading American institutions as CBS and Northwest Airlines.
Davis's investor list was a who's who of business, politics, and show business. Investors
included major oil companies; show business figures like Lucille Ball and George Lucas;
politicians like Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford; businessmen like Bill Siegel, Marc Rich,
and John Gutfreund; and corporations like Northwest Industries of Chicago and Aetna.
For a representative listing of the nonindustry investors that Marvin Davis "put in" his
wells, see Plaintiff's Exhibit 147.
As the boom crested in the late seventies, Davis began taking more nonindustry inves-
tors. Both the size of Davis Oil's operations and the prominence of its investors seemed
good reasons to invest. Who would worry about trusting someone whose investors in-
cluded the former President and Secretary of State, or think that a company could find
investors to drill so many wells unless they were making a lot of money?
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better than the industry average and that Aetna could do better with Da-
vis Oil than in its other oil and gas investments.24 His chief geologist
supplied Aetna with statistics that, he claimed, put Davis Oil ahead "of
the top 20 industry performers" in finding new fields, "perhaps the most
meaningful measure of an exploratory company's success." '25 The statis-
tics were the number of wildcat (new exploratory) wells that Davis com-
pleted, compared to the ratios of other big industry companies.
Marvin Davis assured Aetna that he shared their interest by indicating
that he would be investing $150 million of his own money in what he
described as an $800 million program in 1981. This promise that one of
the major producing companies in the United States would take the same
risks as Aetna was a crucial factor in Aetna's investment decision.26
Aetna soon got a taste of Davis's second selling method. In spite of the
scale of his operations, Marvin Davis sold interests well-by-well. To
maintain investor commitments, he waged a marketing campaign based
on his best wells. He used these wells as examples of investment quality
before they generated enough production history for engineers to test his
calculations. He issued pronouncements before wells were completed
and, on occasion, before they had been spudded. Davis Oil claimed a
special ability to read the signs from early production. As actual produc-
tion disproved the early predictions, the company shifted its predictions
of great value to a new set of unfinished or even undrilled wells.
Marvin Davis used the appearance of good early returns to persuade
Aetna to give him more money. Aetna's initial commitment to Davis Oil
was for $15 million in the 1981 program. A few months later, Davis ac-
24. Donald Conrad Deposition at 67-68, 103, 122; Roy Hood Deposition 90.
25. The data was compiled by geologist Ed Lafaye and sent to Aetna by Gerald Gray,
Davis Oil's chief financial officer. Gerald Gray Deposition at 46-48. The defendants ad-
mitted that at an initial investment meeting, they had told Aetna that they had a "good
track record"; that they "discussed success rates"; and that they told Aetna they had a
"strong technical staff." Defendant's Answer to Third Amended Complaint §§ 13-16.
They also admitted that, at a later meeting, Aetna's early wells (the vast majority of which
lost a lot of money) "were 'successful' as that term is used in the industry." Id. § 28.
It is true that many companies use the number of completed wells as a measure of suc-
cess. Rational companies should be trying to complete only wells that will pay more than
the cost of completion. Most of the wells that Davis Oil completed for Aetna did not even
pay the completion costs. A sizable minority of the completed wells had no production at
all. See infra note 36.
Marvin Davis would agree that the real measure of success is economic success. In his
deposition, he admitted that he understood "success" to mean a well that generated more
money than it cost to drill and that he was looking for a return of at least 7:1 or 8:1, not just
2:1 or 3:1, when he thought of success. Marvin Davis Deposition at 57-58, 357. By this
measure, not one of the several hundred wells Davis Oil drilled for Aetna was successful.
26. The president of Aetna's oil and gas subsidiary had received this message at a
start-up meeting with the Davis people. Roy Hood Deposition at 74. As Aetna's chief
financial officer put it, "I understood that we were going to be investing with Mr. Davis'
participation alongside us." Donald Conrad Deposition at 66. Because Davis would be
paying his share of completion and development wells, Aetna basically accepted all pros-
pects submitted by Marvin Davis, even a few that had been drilled and turned out to be dry
holes before being offered to Aetna, because given Davis's agreement to share the risks, "it
would be very unusual for us to somehow decide not to put up money." Scott Katzmann
Deposition at 134-35.
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cepted a standing invitation to visit Aetna's chairman in Hartford. Find-
ing that Aetna had not spent all the money it had allocated for 1981
oilfield investments, he suggested that Aetna give him another $100 mil-
lion. When Aetna's management met to discuss increasing its commit-
ment soon thereafter, Davis phoned Aetna's chief financial officer, had
him called out of the meeting, and announced the welcome news of a
million-barrel discovery in Wyoming.2 7 Aetna then raised its commit-
ment by $60 million.
Marvin Davis's projection on this Dugout Draw well, and a ten-million
barrel projection for the field by Davis's chief geologist, would turn out to
be based on an initial "drill stem" test. Davis's chief reserve engineer
later testified that drill stem tests are not "meaningful" sources of reserve
estimates. This measure is unreliable because production ordinarily de-
clines during the early days of a well.28
As Aetna's program went forward, Davis Oil completed many wells.
Marvin Davis and his staff presented completed wells as successful dis-
coveries. Company officers repeatedly used completion ratios as a pri-
mary measure of success. 29 This emphasis diverted attention from what
27. Defendants' Exhibit 98. Marvin Davis worked with his chief geologist Edward
Lafaye to distribute projections. The Dugout Draw prospect is one example of this
method of operation. A few days after Aetna upped its commitment, LaFaye spoke with
Roy Hood, the president of Aetna's oil and gas subsidiary. LaFaye repeated the results of
the drill stem test, with Hood reporting back to Aetna that "[t]he indicated potential of this
well, based upon this 1,000 barrel per day test, is roughly 1 million barrels of crude oil." Id.
at 1. Hood would tell his board of Davis's estimate that the play could contain up to 10
million barrels of reserves, with a net pretax value of $56 million. Id.
28. Stephen Smith Deposition at 178.
29. In February 1981, before Aetna had participated in a single well, Davis's chief
financial officer Gerald Gray wrote Aetna the background letter on Davis Oil's "success"
cited in note 25 supra. Gray boasted about Davis's prior results, using the number of wells
completed as the measure of success. After arguing that "perhaps the most meaningful
measure of an exploration company's success is the statistics on new field wildcats," Gray
proceeded to provide Aetna statistics on Davis Oil's recent drilling. He said that Davis Oil
completed about 17% of these wells, while "[in 1980 the top 20 Industry performers com-
pleted less than 15%." Plaintiff's Exhibit 38 at 2. The next sentence of Gray's letter called
this statistic "the percentage of success." Id.
Gray argued that the fact that Davis's completion ratio did not fall as it drilled more
wells "indicates the quality of prospects is not being reduced even with extensive industry
activity." Id. What Davis Oil never told Aetna was that it completed many wells that
would not even pay the cost of completion. A completed Aetna well generally would
augur an additional loss, not a gain, in the Davis Oil system. See infra note 36.
Marvin Davis took steps to reinforce Aetna's belief that a Davis Oil completion was
good news. In July 1981, AEI president Roy Hood reported to his directors about the
number of "discoveries" based on defendants' completion statistics. Defendants' Exhibit
135 at 1. In August 1981, a contingent from Aetna visited Davis Oil to discuss concerns
over inconsistent documentation. They met with, among other people, Marvin Davis, Ed
LaFaye, the chief landman Paul Messinger, and senior accounting officer John Aylsworth.
Both Davis and LaFaye assured Aetna that Marvin Davis had enough good prospects to
invest Aetna's full $75 million. Davis reassured the group that "Marvin Davis values long-
term relationships and he and his people view us as a significant partner." Defendants'
Exhibit 41 at 1.
In September, Aetna staff reported to its board about "successful wells" and its "success
ratio" based on the Davis measure of completed wells. Defendants' Exhibit 76 at 1. Even
in January 1982, when Aetna was considering additional investment, Aetna still was report-
ing "successful" wells to its board based on Davis reports of completions. Defendants'
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would turn out to be the much more important question: Would com-
pleted wells make money?30
At first, the Davis Oil completion ratio seemed to document a wonder-
ful investment.31 In 1982, Aetna agreed to commit an additional $30 mil-
lion. It believed, as any reasonable investor would, that a high
percentage of completed wells meant that the decision to invest with
Marvin Davis had been a wise decision. Aetna did not know that almost
sixty percent of the wells Davis completed for Aetna would not even pay
the cost of completion.
Marvin Davis continued to mix high completion ratios with news on his
best wells. He repeatedly phoned Aetna's chairman and its chief finan-
cial officer with news of million-dollar "successful" discoveries. When
Aetna staff began questioning why the completed wells were not begin-
ning to produce a positive return and started receiving negative evalua-
tions from its independent engineers, Ryder Scott, Davis Oil's chief
geologist would claim that its experience gave it a better understanding of
the industry than overly cautious reserve engineers. 32 Discovery uncov-
ered a pattern of predictions that Marvin Davis gave certain other major
nonindustry investors that never came true either.33
Exhibit 75, at 2. Aetna was using Davis's recommended measure of its results, but that
measure would not turn out to be a good predictor.
30. Marvin Davis and his chief geologist, Ed Lafaye, personally made these calls to
Aetna and, as described in note 33 infra, to at least certain other investors. In spite of
active participation in the dissemination of this information, the defendants would argue as
their sixth and seventh affirmative defenses to Aetna's lawsuit that "Itihe individual de-
fendants did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not have known of any
untruths or omissions of which the plaintiff now complains." They added that "[tihe indi-
vidual defendants did not know and could not have known of the existence of facts by
reason of which liability is alleged to exist." Defendant's Answer to the Third Amended
Complaint, supra note 25, at 2, Davis Oil (No. 85-M-1821).
31. It is no mystery to operators with poor track records that investors, particularly
nonindustry investors, will associate high completion ratios with success even if the com-
pleted wells have little chance of paying off their costs. Compare MARK SINGER, FUNNY
MONEY 107 (1985) (describing how Oklahoma drillers used Sooner Trend as an area
[W]here you punched holes if you were less eager to accumulate oil-and-gas
reserves than you were to impress potential investors with your 'success' ra-
tio. The local geology rendered it virtually impossible to drill and not run
into oil, but the geology was such that few Sooner Trend wells were truly
worth the trouble.)
For additional discussion of the use of completion ratios, see supra note 29.
32. For instance, chief geologist Lafaye claimed that "his geologists and geophysicists
were of a higher caliber than ... [the] consulting geologist for Ryder Scott and, therefore,
we should have a lot more trust and credence in their own work." Scott Katzmann Deposi-
tion at 261.
33. Aetna uncovered evidence that at least some other investors got the same kind of
calls that Aetna received from Marvin Davis and geologist Lafaye. Davis and Lafaye
called these investors to discuss the latest wells and ask for more money. Had Aetna's
lawsuit gone to trial, Aetna would have submitted evidence of such calls through Ben
Heineman, the chairman of Northwest Industries and a major investor in many of the same
wells as Aetna, and its chief financial officer Richard Newberry; Barrington Parker, an
attorney in New York City who invested in Davis Oil properties through an intermediary
company, Vale and Company; Pincus Green, one of the managers of Marc Rich and Com-
pany when it was one of Davis's largest investors; and William Spencer, the former presi-
dent and chief administrative officer of Citibank, who had been consulted by another
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Davis Oil investor, Greek billionaire Stavros Niarchos. Niarchos also lost money with Da-
vis Oil. Summaries of the upcoming trial testimony of each witness are attached under
their own name in Plaintiff AEI's Pretrial Notebook, Pretrial Factual Summary, Davis Oil
(No. 85-M-1821).
Perhaps most interesting among the other investors was Marc Rich and Company be-
cause it maintained written documentation of the calls by Marvin Davis and geologist
Lafaye. Davis phoned the highest officers of his corporate investors. These executives
generally did not write detailed memos of these calls. Nor did they have an expertise in oil
and gas matters that would let them interpret the results reported by Davis. Marc Rich
was a fortunate exception to the general lack of documentation.
The following is a summary, quoted from Aetna's pretrial factual statement and based
on Marc Rich memoranda, of calls Davis and Lafaye made to Marc Rich and Company.
The inside look at one of the industry's best-marketed operations is important because it is
one of the few times that this so-often oral industry sales process was captured on paper:
1. October 9, 1980. Lafaye calls Shell Island sensational, the type of dis-
covery "Marvin Davis dreams about," projects "conservatively" 25 BCF (bil-
lion cubic feet) of gas, but up to 35 BCF and 1.5 million barrels of oil from
the first well... Lafaye says the total reserves would be 70 BCF to 100 BCF
of gas. In addition, the discovery will set up a substantially deeper zone.
With this and one other discovery, Lafaye says that Marc Rich had more than
paid out its entire investment.
2. November 5, 1980. Peter Ryan, a Marc Rich executive, visits Marvin
Davis and Ed Lafaye in Denver on October 29, where they tell him that his
$13 million expenditure has already resulted in reserves worth between $100
and $125 million with just 40 percent of his money spent. On Shell Island....
Davis says he feels the reserves and field have a potential of 200 BCF. Davis
says the cash flow will be "tremendous at approximately $60,000 per day."
3. November 19, 1980. Davis speaks with Rich executive Green on No-
vember 17, projecting $85,000 a day for the first Shell Island well and approx-
imately $300,000 a day including the development wells. Davis "kept
referring back to Ed [Lafaye] to get confirmation."
4. December 4, 1980. Rich executives Green and Ryan have lunch with
Marvin Davis, in which he again gives the $85,000 a day projection. Davis
projects three more wells on the property, now with a per diem cash flow of
$340,000 a day .... Davis estimates the Shell Island reservoir at $150-200
million, $300-400 million if an additional test is successful.
5. December 18, 1980. Davis estimates Shell Island's value at $700 mil-
lion, a value that could double if the second zone is found.
6. March 23, 1981. A second Shell Island well comes in and Davis calls
Rich to say it is "greater than foreseen."
7. April 1, 1981. Rich, Green, and Ryan all meet with Marvin Davis the
day before in Denver. They go over a Davis reserve analysis which shows
reserves of $148 million from Marc Rich's $15 million 1980 investment. Da-
vis says these numbers could "double or triple upon complete development
of the prospects in question." The first Shell Island well is just going on line.
Davis lets Marc Rich know that the numbers he is discussing are conserva-
tive, use generally accepted accounting methods, and have been accepted by
his bankers.
8. April 20, 1981. Marc Rich receives a Davis Oil reserve analysis on its
wells, which Marvin Davis had sent and which Marc Rich has discussed with
Ed Lafaye. Lafaye says the analysis was done from a "completely independ-
ent" point of view and does not include development potential. Although
the numbers on some of the wells are down, Lafaye repeatedly states that he
feels that the true numbers will be higher and Marvin Davis' prior reserve
numbers will hold up. On Shell Island, which had been estimated at 6 million
barrels and 150 BCF by Marvin Davis, the report still shows 5.1 million bar-
rels of oil and 71 BCF of gas.
9. May 14, 1981. In a conversation on this date, Davis discusses Shell
Island "and it was remarkable to see the enthusiasm." The deep well has
already found 26 feet of pay dirt, Davis says, and has 600 feet to go.
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10. September 14, 1981. Peter Ryan sends a memo to the file on Septem-
ber 11 on Davis' observations on certain wells. Davis says the drilling results
of Shell Island indicate reserves of 100 BCF. This memorandum also marks
the appearance of the Logan Federal well. Davis reports that an Amoco well
next to the Logan well has hit 5500 [sic] feet of pay dirt, and contains a bil-
lion dollars of product. Davis revises his estimate on the Logan Federal up-
ward from $240 million to $1 billion. Davis notes that his well will be drilled
on the same structure as the Amoco well.
11. November 3, 1981. Marvin Davis calls Marc Rich directly to report
that the Shell island No. 4 is a very big well. "It is the biggest since he started
in the business. It will yield well over one billion dollars worth of crude and
gas."
12. December 3, 1981. Peter Ryan receives another Davis reserve analy-
sis. The numbers for the Shell Island wells are down, and when Ryan asks
Lafaye why, Lafaye says not to believe even the Davis engineer: "the upper
zones contain substantially more than the amounts contained in the Novem-
ber estimates and that these figures would probably be adjusted upward as
time goes along." The Shell Island wells are almost half of the reserves, but
the report does not include the Logan Federal.
13. December 3, 1981. Marvin calls and reports among other things dis-
covering an unexpected pay sand in the Shell Island No. 3.
14. April 5, 1982. Marc Rich talks to Lafaye, who reports one of the
Shell Island wells producing and says that the Overthrust (Logan Federal)
well is drilling and "still looks sensational." Now the Sweetlake well in Sec-
tion 28 is also moving to the fore. Lafaye says that this new prospect is "two
times as good as Shell Island and what Marvin has said about it is not an
exaggeration." Lafaye estimates reserves of 50 BCF of gas and 6 or 7 million
barrels of oil as reasonable for the first well and estimates that Davis will be
able to drill five or six more wells like this first well. A note of the memoran-
dum indicates that Marvin visited on April 6 and "mentioned that the Sweet
Lake property is the biggest he has ever hit. He estimates that at $1 billion
$250 million."
15. July 13, 1982. The Overthrust well, still drilling, is described as having
400 feet of pay with another 350 feet to go in a call from Marvin. "He has
never seen anything like it in 35 years in the business." By now Marc Rich
wants to know when the revenues will begin coming from the phenomenally
successful program, just as Aetna was starting to have the same question
after a year of investing with Davis Oil. Davis is quick to provide reassur-
ance. "We mentioned to him that we did not see income at the rate one
would expect based on his indications and he said that some of the big things
are only coming in now. We assume he refers to Sweetlake and Overthrust."
16. July 28, 1982. Marvin Davis calls and reports the Logan's log as "sen-
sational." Davis says it only had 500 rather than 700 feet of pay, but he
describes the quality as better than expected so the reserves stay the same.
Plaintiff AEI's Pretrial Notebook, supra, at 30-33. The final result was that Marc Rich lost
$47 million by investing with Davis Oil. Plaintiff's Exhibit 183, cited in Summary of Testi-
mony of Preston Moore. Some of the same prospects figured in Edward Lafaye's May
1982 letter to Aetna, see infra note 34, in which Lafaye sought to persuade Aetna to stay in
the program by showing it how successful it ultimately would be. For some other views of
why Marc Rich lost this money, see Summary of Testimony of Preston Moore, supra, at 11-
14; Peter Ryan Deposition at 116.
Marvin Davis's reports may sound implausible, but not so much when one asks what
investor would have doubted their great fortune had it been Exxon, Shell, or Mobil's top
management on the phone reporting these successes. Davis portrayed himself as perform-
ing better than these top companies. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. The size of
his operations and the prominence of his investors seemed to confirm this status. Davis
almost certainly was correct that he ran the second or third largest drilling operation in the
United States. His investors included a former President, a former Secretary of State, and
a roster of business and show business stars. Small wonder that investors did not suspect
that their programs would not pay out.
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By May 1982, about a year after Davis Oil had drilled the first well with
Aetna as a partner, Aetna decided to suspend its funding. Its program
still appeared wildly successful by the measure of completed wells, but
Aetna was troubled by the lack of revenue. Davis Oil mounted a last
ditch effort to keep the money coming. The chief geologist met the head
of Aetna's oil and gas subsidiary in Denver and argued that just 6 of
Aetna's more than 100 prospects were worth nearly two billion dollars,
an estimate he put in writing. 34 Anything like this would have been a
34. The two billion dollars were gross returns for all interests, but the clear message
was that Aetna's interest in these wells already was worth vastly more than Aetna's total
investment. Geologist Lafaye's letter combines several archetypal forms of oilpatch re-
serve representations, including the discounting of contrary information, very high reserve
projections, and claims of certainty for what could only have been estimates.
Lafaye started out by encouraging Aetna to continue ignoring its more cautious outside
engineering consultants at the Denver office of Ryder Scott, a firm of reservoir engineers.
He wrote:
I want to summarize the potential that the more successful prospects in
your program could have. Obviously Rick Marshall, or any consulting firm
supplying reserve numbers after only the initial discovery well would not
provide these numbers, because it [is] too early in the development of the
fields. However, our geologists who have experience and expertise in the
respective areas can generate the upside potential based on analogies to ex-
isting developed fields and calculations from the discovery and surrounding
wells.
Plaintiff AEI's Summary Judgment, Exhibit 143 at 1, Davis Oil (No 85-M-1821).
Lafaye then launched into his estimate for Aetna's six "examples." A deep Louisiana
gas well, which he analogized to a nearby field, "is worth $546 million for Oil and $261 for
gas, a total of $807 million." Id. (emphasis added). In a second Louisiana well, Lafaye
estimated the value based only on gas, "even though there is a very high probability we will
encounter oil as Amoco did, obviously making the prospect more attractive." The con-
servative gas values "translate[] to a value of $166 million for the prospect. The number
could easily double if we find more oil." Id. (emphasis added).
In West Texas, Lafaye claimed to be putting Aetna into a field where "[w]e have five
wells and will drill at least fifteen more .... [T]he gross value is $60 million." Id. at 2
(emphasis added). In a field Davis was developing in Oklahoma, Lafaye spotted an "antici-
pated reserve of 20 BCF and 4 million barrels of oil [that] is worth $195 million." Id.
(emphasis added). In Utah, seeing a discovery next door to an Aetna prospect, Lafaye
prophesied "[rieserves of 22.5 million barrels is not unreasonable.... The value is poten-
tially $728 million." Id. (emphasis added). And in Wyoming, Davis was completing a sec-
ond well in a field where it "could drill 8 more" and the wells "should yield" 150,000
barrels of oil apiece. "The value of this field is $48 million." Id. (emphasis added).
As the italicized quotations show, Lafaye stated most of his predictions as facts about
what a property "is" worth, presumably available to him from his greater expertise, rather
than as projections or statements of opinion.
Lafaye summed up: "I hope these six examples will put into perspective how successful
your program, when fully developed, will be." Id. (emphasis added).
At trial, Aetna expert Preston L. Moore would have explained his view that Lafaye
greatly overstated the reserves on each of these wells. See Summary of Testimony of Pres-
ton Moore, at 8-16, attached to Plaintiff AEI's Pretrial Notebook, supra note 33.
The Davis defendants tried to ensure that the jury never heard about the LaFaye letter.
They asked the court to exclude it from evidence. They argued that LaFaye's letter came
after Aetna had made its investment commitments, and that in any event Aetna really
relied on the reservoir engineers of Ryder Scott (whose advice Lafaye had downplayed,
and whose recommendations he urged Aetna to ignore, even in the letter just quoted).
Davis Oil Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Pertaining
to May 12, 1982 Letter from Defendant Lafaye at 1-6, Davis Oil (No. 85-M-1821). The
trial problem for the defendants, of course, was that the Lafaye letter corroborated
Aetna's testimony about their oral representations.
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tremendous success, even for a company Aetna's size.
Aetna eventually lost over $100 million. It received little more than
$60 million in revenue after spending over $180 million.35 This included
Aetna's revenues from the six wells the chief geologist had praised so
heavily. Had Marvin Davis been selling quality prospects, Aetna's sam-
ple of 200 wells was big enough to enable him to show it. Instead,
Aetna's investment with Davis Oil Company was a disaster.
In spite of its occasional big discoveries (a result that the law of aver-
ages would guarantee for any company that drilled hundreds of wells a
year), Davis Oil was strikingly unsuccessful for investors like Aetna. Had
investors received a record of results like Aetna's (and Marvin Davis
claimed to put Aetna into his best prospects), they would have known
that the wider their sample of Davis Oil wells, the more likely they were
to lose money. The average result in this period was a loss. Diffusion of
interests was spreading losses, not risks.36
B. MISREPRESENTATIONS IN DRILLING-FUND AND
PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS
The operator sales strategies described thus far used a traditional oil
investment vehicle, the joint-project equity interest. Other operators sell
shares in partnerships and drilling funds. This type of investment ordina-
rily is directed at outside investors rather than "industry partners." The
funds may buy interests in dozens or hundreds of wells.
35. Michael Zeeb Affidavit §§ 2-3 (July 6, 1990).
36. Completions of Aetna's wells generally meant losing more money. Of Aetna's
Davis-operated completed wells, fully 58, or 62%, did not bring in enough money to pay
their completion cost. Id. § 5. A full 26 of these completed wells grossed less than $5000;
22, almost one in four, made nothing. Id. § 6.
The quality of these prospects can be measured in a variety of ways. None of these
emanate from Marvin Davis's calculations, because it turned out that in spite of his claim
of being more successful than even major industry companies, Marvin Davis kept no
records of finding cost or other economic measures of performance. Marvin Davis Deposi-
tion at 266. Thus Davis had no way to measure whether investors in his wells were making
money or losing money. Accordingly, he could not know whether his programs were
successful.
One way to show how unsuccessful the programs were is to compare Davis Oil's finding
cost per equivalent barrel of oil with those of the industry, including the companies with
whom Davis compared himself. The major industry companies with whom Davis Oil com-
pared itself in an early letter from his chief financial officer Gerald Grey (and whose
records Davis had promised to beat) had finding costs of roughly $15 a barrel. The costs
on Aetna's wells were $53 a barrel. Supplement to the Summary of Testimony of Donald
Hockaday, at 4 (Dec. 26, 1990).
Aetna's drilling expert examined the 135 Davis Oil-operated wells in which Aetna had
invested. Of these, 88, more than half, were dry holes; 15 were completed but produced no
revenue; 30 produced revenue but did not pay out; and only 2 out of 135 paid back more
than their total costs. Supplement to the Summary of Testimony of Preston L. Moore,
Table 9 (Dec. 25, 1990). Not one of the 24 Oklahoma prospects operated by Davis on
Aetna's behalf, the 6 North Dakota prospects, the 3 Utah prospects, the 61 Wyoming pros-
pects, the 5 Colorado prospects, the 18 Louisiana prospects, or the 3 Montana prospects
ever paid back its costs. Id. Tables 1-8. Only 2 of the 15 Texas prospects generated more
money than they cost. Id. Table 3.
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The investors never receive title, billings, revenue statements, or other
information on individual wells. The investment papers they do receive,
prospectuses, subscription agreements, partnership statements, or share-
holder reports, are much more general than equity investors' papers. The
lack of detail makes it easy for unscrupulous operators to raise large
amounts of cash quickly from many investors. Fraud has flourished as
misrepresentations about overall programs replace claims about individ-
ual wells.
Oil and gas partnerships and drilling funds became very popular over
the past few decades because they enable operators to raise large
amounts of money through national broker networks.37 The structure
solves at least three problems that limit prospect fundraising: (1) it per-
mits the pooling of thousands of investors who have relatively small
stakes; (2) it lets operators extend a program beyond a single drilling
area; and (3) the larger partnerships offer investors some hope of liquid-
ity because large programs may be big enough to support markets for
their shares. 38
37. As described by Louis Loss and Joel Seligman:
The last few decades have seen the development of a new method of financ-
ing, the 'oil program,' in which the security is not an undivided interest in one
well but an interest, under a variety of contractual arrangements, in a joint
venture or limited partnership whose function is to develop a number of
profitable drilling prospects. These programs are sold for the purpose of
raising funds to acquire leases on prospect acreage and to drill wells,
although producing properties are sometimes acquired as well... Customa-
rily the programs are created at annual or more frequent intervals ....
Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 182 (3d ed.
1994).
38. Jane Romanov and James Irish, experienced oil and gas transaction lawyers, note
that "[tihe 1970s and early 1980s were marked by the emergence of such mechanisms as
income and drilling funds, the short-lived penny stock market, the royalty trust, and the
master limited partnership." Jane F. Romanov & James L. Irish, An Overview of Sources
of Capital and Structuring Investments in Oil and Gas, 34 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13-i,
13-3 (1988). The "typical" partnership, one structured on JOA-lines, has financial
limitations:
[It] is hampered by the minimum investment typically required. The tradi-
tional oil and gas partnership requires a sizable investment by the individual
partnership, severely narrowing the pool of investors and hence the flow of
available capital. Traditional oil and gas partnerships have been project-ori-
ented and short-term, seldom expanding into any exploration and develop-
ment activities which were not originally the focus of formation. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly such partnerships lack liquidity, the investor's
partnership interest generally being difficult to sell.
Id. at 13-10. Master limited partnerships, in contrast, could be "structured like a partner-
ship but function as a corporation, enjoying corporate management flexibility and liquid-
ity.... Because the units are publicly traded at relatively low prices per unit, the number of
investors can be vast. As a result, the MLP has the ability to enjoy a steady flow of capital
for acquisition, exploration, and development activities." Id. at 13-12.
Writing in 1988, Romanov and Irish were able to write that "despite the recent decline in
oil and gas prices, the success of certain drilling fund syndicators reveals that a significant
number of individuals continue to desire to participate in exploratory and/or development
drilling activity." Id. at 13-22.
Of course, these features can create agency problems. When there are a large number of
small investors scattered around the country, rather than a few large investors, the investor
pool may not have enough cohesion to monitor the operator. When the drilling program is
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In spite of differences in structure, partnership investments share the
shortcomings of traditional equity investments. The industry has not re-
quired partnership operators to disclose their past results. Partnership
and fund operators with poor records are free to lure investors with un-
founded promises of success.
1. Longhorn Oil and Gas: Fabricating a Track Record, Concealing
Losses, Inflating Reserves
A good example of the problem, and one of the most famous partner-
ship disasters, was sired by Longhorn Oil and Gas (Longhorn). Long-
horn was the operator of a series of partnerships launched by Oklahoma
oilman Carl Swan and his sidekick, J.D. Allen. Longhorn was one of the
many companies that floated into the industry on the high tide of the late-
seventies and early-eighties boom.
Carl Swan had been in the oil business for a long time before he and
J.D. Allen brought Longhorn into the big time. By 1977, when he and
Allen founded Longhorn Oil & Gas Company, he had twenty-five years
of experience in the industry.39 Allen and Swan raised funds throughout
the country. They borrowed at least $90 million in loans originated by
Penn Square Bank and farmed out to Continental Illinois National Bank
& Trust Company (Continental Illinois), Seattle's Seafirst Bank, and sev-
eral other banks. The failure of Longhorn and other Penn Square oil and
gas fundings ultimately would destroy some of the largest banks in the
United States.40 Oklahoma-born New Yorker staff writer Mark Singer
ongoing, rather than just a few pre-agreed wells, it becomes harder to determine how the
project is doing. An operator may plow all of the early revenues back into drilling and it
may be years before the investors can draw a bead on their results.
Romanov and Irish catalog a number of other innovative, often short-lived investment
packages, including royalty trusts, id. at 13-19; acquisition funds, id. at 13-24; lease inven-
tory funds, id. at 13-25 to -26; and completion funds, id. at 13-26.
39. LONGHORN OIL & GAS Co., 1981 PRIVATE DRILLING PROGRAM OFFERING CIR-
CULAR 23 (1981).
40. When Penn Square Bank failed, it was the costliest bank failure in United States
history. SINGER, supra note 31, at 179. But Penn Square was only the tip of the iceberg.
The young bank never had much capital of its own. Its President, Bill Jennings, realized
that even without its own funds, Penn Square could generate millions of dollars in fees if it
packaged loans for more substantial participating banks. In many of these loans, the banks
might buy 100% of the participation, with Penn Square having no risk but still earning a
handsome handling fee. Id. at 19-20.
Such no-capital lending permitted extraordinarily rapid business development. Penn
Square began its oil and gas department in 1976. It would arrange over $2.5 billion in loans
in a three-year period, only to fail (that is, be declared insolvent by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation) on July 6, 1982. Id. at 4-5, 15-16, 143.
As the originating bank, Penn Square was supposed to handle most of the documenta-
tion, but its screening was often nonexistent. The list of its shoddy practices explains how a
bank with virtually no oil and gas experience could source billions of dollars in loans in just
three years.
Lending money in the absence of a formal loan application; asking a cus-
tomer, for the sake of expediency, to sign several blank notes; lending addi-
tional funds to meet interest payments; looking a customer in the eye but not
looking closely at his financial reports; failing to require borrowers to have
their mortgaged oil-and-gas production income sent directly to the bank each
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has detailed the Penn Square story in his book Funny Money.4 1 To most
observers, the Penn Square bankruptcy signaled the end of the boom
years.
Longhorn exploited the absence of effective past performance docu-
mentation in several ways. First, even though its principals had only had
a few unsuccessful prior programs, they were able to pretend to have a
"successful track record" because they did not have to publish the eco-
nomics of their prior wells. Revealing even the most minimal facts about
their early programs would have disproven their claim to a successful
track record.
These efforts to conceal Longhorn's inability to find commercial levels
of production were matched by repeated distortions in reserve reports on
existing programs as the fraud continued. Longhorn had sponsored two
other programs, the 1977 and 1978-1 programs, before the programs that
wound up in litigation. Longhorn's offering circulars cited these two
prior programs and their completion ratios as evidence of success. Omit-
ted was any indication that these programs had lost money and had no
chance of turning a profit for investors.42 The results of the 1978-1 pro-
month; advancing interest payments to upstream banks on behalf of custom-
ers who had not yet sent the interest payments to Penn Square ....
Id. at 123.
Penn Square was a domino falling in a line of weak banks. Abilene National Bank failed
six weeks after Penn Square. Id. at 153. Next was United American Bank of Knoxville.
The following year came First National Bank of Midland, Texas, with triple the assets of
Penn Square. Id. A ripple of preservative acquisitions would sweep the oil producing
states in the years that followed.
Disaster befell the major "participating" banks who had shared Penn Square's deals.
Penn Square fed its debased loans to some of the largest banks in the country. Continental
Illinois National Bank & Trust Company, the eighth largest bank holding company in the
United States, took a billion dollars in Penn Square loans as it increased its total oil and gas
lending from $833 million to $2.3 billion between December 1980 and June 1982. It ended
up risking half of its equity in oil and gas ventures. Id. at 55-56, 125, 154. Soon after Penn
Square's failure, Continental Illinois took a $530 million loss. It classified another $200
million in loans as nonperforming. Id. at 207-08. The bank's assets fell from a peak of $47
billion in 1981 to $17 billion in 1984. Id. at 208. It survived, in much diminished form, only
because the government took over its worst assets. Id. at 210.
Seafirst, the Seattle bank, had taken oil and gas loans equal to two-thirds of its equity. It
invested $400 million in Penn Square loans, above and beyond numerous other oil and gas
loans. Seafirst survived economically but not corporately; it was acquired by the Bank of
America. Id. at 154-57.
Two other banks suffering major losses from their Penn Square involvement were Chase
Manhattan, with over $200 million in participation, and Michigan National, with somewhat
less than $200 million. Id. at 155-56.
41. See generally SINGER, supra note 31.
42. The settlement of the Longhorn litigation prevented full development of the rec-
ord and kept many documents from entering the public domain. Fortunately, the plaintiffs'
pretrial brief, which includes a 150-page statement of facts, cites many of the core docu-
ments produced by Longhorn and the other defendants. Plaintiffs' Pretrial Brief 1-157, In
re Longhorn Sec. Litig. (W.D. Okla. 1984) (No. MDL 525) [hereinafter Longhorn Plain-
tiffs' Pretrial Brief]. The brief explains quite clearly what went wrong.
As far as prior programs, the plaintiffs alleged that when Longhorn initiated its 1978-11
partnerships, it hid from investors the fact that the limited partnerships its principals had
sponsored in 1977 and 1978 "had not produced sufficient oil and gas reserves to repay the
limited partners the amount of their investments." Id. § 76(b). Longhorn did not mention
that the results had been so bad that "Swan, Allen and [Longhorn] agreed to reduce the
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gram were so poor that investors had complained and Swan and Allen cut
their own interests to keep those investors happy; these payoffs were con-
cealed from new investors.43
Second, when Longhorn's banks realized that the programs were not
paying their costs, they ignored their lending requirements and continued
to loan Longhorn money. The loans sustained Longhorn's image as a
going concern as it returned to the market for new investors.
Brochures on Longhorn touted Swan's "successful track record." 44
This assurance was bolstered at investor meetings with promises that
Longhorn had a "favorable track record" and was "one of the best in the
business."'45 Progress reports listed the number of "producing" wells
without saying whether any were commercially productive. 46
When investors complained in litigation that they had not been told
that earlier investors lost money, Swan and Allen hid behind the indus-
try's inadequate standards. They argued that "[t]he prior success ratio of
the Longhorn partnerships was adequately disclosed in the offering circu-
lars. '" 47 Perfectly replicating the absence of effective reporting standards,
they claimed that "the financial statements adequately reflected the prior
success ratio of previous Longhorn partnerships to the extent generally
accepted accounting principles would warrant including such information
in the financial statements of the corporation.'48
Swan and Allen may have been right about the sorry state of industry
standards, but they were wrong whether their statements "adequately"
reflected their prior failures. Translated from legalese, what they meant
was that they, like Marvin Davis, were reporting as a "success" ratio the
percentage of completed wells out of all wells drilled. The ratio was af-
firmatively misleading when used by an operator that routinely completes
uneconomic wells. It hid the fact that Longhorn was not finding enough
reserves to make anyone money. Yet investors got no better information
amount of their revenue-sharing interests and increase the interests of the limited part-
ners." Id. § 76(e).
43. Id. § 76(e).
44. Id. Exhibit D, prod. no. 178, Longhorn (No. MDL-525) (biography of Carl Swan
in Longhorn company brochure, citing his "successful track record," which he allegedlyjoined with "another outstanding independent producer, J.D. Allen"). One statement that
was true is from Allen's biography on the following page: "He joined Carl Swan in form-
ing Longhorn and together, they formed a unique company." Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
Longhorn certainly was unique, given its role in the demise of Penn Square Bank and
Continental Illinois National Bank, but not unique in the way the defendants represented.
45. The plaintiffs later would complain that "[a]lthough representing that Longhorn
had a favorable 'track record,' no disclosure was made of the above-described lack of suc-
cess in the prior Longhorn programs." Longhorn Plaintiffs' Pretrial Brief, supra note 42,
§ 8b(d). The Company was portrayed as well run, "one of the best in the business," with-
out any mention of its burgeoning problems. Id. § 86b(e).
46. For instance, progress reports on the 1978-11, 1979-I, and 1979-1I programs alleg-
edly "referred to producing wells without regard to whether they were commercially pro-
ductive." Id. § 79(l). "[Mlany" wells were described as "'waiting on pipeline construction'
when in fact they were known to be dry holes or not commercially productive." Id.
§ 79(m).
47. Defendants' Pretrial Brief at 151-52, Longhorn (No. MDL 525).
48. Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
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because the industry does not require operators to disclose the economics
of completed wells.
Misrepresenting past results was only part of the Longhorn problem.
Because the company didn't know how to find commercial quantities of
oil and gas, it faced the problem of hiding its losses. Longhorn and its
lenders worked hand in hand to solve this problem. The Company was
lucky because Carl Swan was a director of Penn Square. The bank, which
often originated loans without taking a participation in them (thus avoid-
ing any risk for itself), had turned into the most go-go of lenders in the
easy-money boom years.
One of Longhorn's allures to investors had been letter-of-credit financ-
ing. Investors could put just twenty-five percent down on their unit price
and sign a letter of credit for the rest of the money.49 Longhorn assured
investors that it "had never had a letter called since the previous wells
always produced enough oil and served as 'in the ground reserves' against
which the bank would loan money thereby returning the letters of
credit."'50 Because banks ordinarily require reserves to be verified by in-
dependent engineers and to exceed the amount of the loan-for instance,
on paper Penn Square required reserves with a present value of twice the
loan amount 51-the fact that banks had not called any letters of credit
seemed to confirm Longhorn's ability.
Had the banks called the letters of credit, investors would have smelled
trouble. The bad news would have spoiled the market for future inves-
tors. Thus the banks had an interest in continuing credit because once
the first programs faltered, the banks' only chance to recover their direct
loans to Longhorn was if some future program made a large discovery of
new reserves, or if extending credit kept the company in operation long
enough for prices to rise sharply.
Continental Illinois knew by the summer of 1980 that the 1978-Il pro-
gram did not have the reserves to support its $1.7 million production
loan. Yet Continental issued the loan after Swan and Allen personally
guaranteed the borrowing, and the bank released the letters of credit.
Longhorn predictably mailed this good news to its investors.52 The same
thing happened on the 1979-I and 1979-I programs.
49. Longhorn Plaintiffs' Pretrial Brief, supra note 42, § 7.
50. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Summary Judgment Motions of L. Fred Smith and Robyn
Fulton, Exhibit H, Affidavit of Investor Paul Lichter at 2, Longhorn (No. MDL 525).
51. Longhorn Plaintiffs' Pretrial Brief, supra note 42, § 143.
52. The plaintiffs alleged that Gary Brednich, a Continental petroleum engineer, told
Ken Wilson, Penn Square's Vice-President, about this revenue shortfall in the summer of
1980. Id. § 800). Later in the summer, Longhorn's Vice-President of Finance, John Lang,
would determine that the 1978-It program also would not qualify for loans and discussed
this troubling problem with Continental Illinois and Penn Square Bank. Id. § 80(k). Yet
Penn Square sent Longhorn a letter on September 15, 1980 agreeing to "release the ...
letters of credit" [though the banks now knew Longhorn had not discovered the reserves
needed to replace the letters]. Id. § 80(m). 'Tvo days later, Longhorn circulated the letter
to 1978-1I investors. Id. Investors naturally would assume that the program was doing just
fine.
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Finally, Longhorn had the problem that it had promised reserve re-
ports. Honest reports would have revealed the coming losses. The com-
pany's solution was to inflate its reserves. Longhorn's Vice-President of
Finance, rather than a reservoir engineer or geologist, prepared its re-
serve reports.53 He dramatically overstated results.54 This is why the in-
dustry needs continuing disclosure of economic performance, not just an
operator's current reserve estimates.
2. Home-Stake: Running the Ponzi Scheme
If not calling letters of credit is one way for an oil company to conceal
failure, another is to pay distributions with new investors' money. This is
the classic Ponzi scheme. The operator takes money contributed by the
most recent investors and uses it to pay returns to earlier investors. The
operator points to the high returns as signs of success, but the returns are
not coming from oil or gas. They are just a measure of how quickly the
operator has tapped into a producing field of new investors. The opera-
tor needs more and more investors to feed its ever-growing hunger for
cash.
The Ponzi scheme relies on a common industry practice, commingled
accounts. The commingling of investor dollars was critical to the most
blatant Ponzi scheme in the industry's history, one run by Tulsa-based
Home-Stake Production Company. Like many operators, Home-Stake
placed its investors' money in one account. It combined one year's capi-
tal with another year's and mixed investor money with its own.5 5 Be-
cause the industry has rejected attempts to require operators to escrow
each project's money 56 (the treatment one would expect when one party
entrusts its money to another for a specific purpose), Home-Stake was
able to use new investor money to keep old investors happy for at least
nine years. It did almost no drilling during this period. The company did
53. Id. § 89(c).
54. A report on the 1979-I program based almost six million dollars (one-third of the
total reserves) on a well that had not earned any reserves from the company's independent
reservoir engineers. Id. § 88. The misreported well was the Ball No. 6. This report was
dated May 15, 1979, but apparently "[was] intended to have been dated May 15, 1980." Id.
A May 15, 1980 report on the 1978-I1 program assigned two-thirds of the reserves, over
$8 million out of $12.5 million, to a well that gave no indication of being a viable producer.
Id. § 87 (a)-(c) (discussing Clark Sain No. 8 well). Within a month, the drilling operator
would indicate that the well "would not be commercially productive" and "should be
plugged and abandoned." Id. §§ 79(k), 87(d).
One excuse Longhorn gave for the delay in receiving revenue from what really were
marginal wells was that the wells were "waiting on pipeline connections." Id. § 92. In
reality, the properties didn't have enough gas to produce.
55. Home-Stake's President testified that he was entitled to use investor funds for any
corporate purpose, which in his mind included buying an apartment house and a lime
plant. Robert Trippet Trial Transcript at 1490, In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. (N.D.
Okla. June 30, 1988) (No. MDL 153). [Trial exhibits and transcript pages hereinafter will
be cited by, respectively, trial exhibit number and trial transcript page. All exhibits are on
file with SMU Law Review.]
56. The AAPL considered but rejected a requirement of separate escrow accounts
during the 1989 amendments. The industry opposition to the initial amendments to the
JOA is discussed in text accompanying note 248 infra.
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indeed find gushers, but from an eruption of investors, not a stream of oil
or gas.
Home-Stake began selling programs in 1960.57 Its sales continued into
the early seventies, when the government finally brought the enterprise
to a stop. The company presented its programs as conservative opportu-
nities. Beginning in 1965, it focused on the secondary recovery of proven
oil reserves in California. 58 Home-Stake described its waterflooding and
stearnflooding techniques as established, low-risk procedures. 59 In fact,
Home-Stake had no experience with what were very risky technologies.
Its chief engineer later testified that he never believed secondary recov-
ery was a low-risk proposition.60
Home-Stake matched its optimism about methods with unqualified
promises about reserves and economics. Prospects were listed by barrels
of oil, recoverable sands, and percentage of reserves in place.61 Inserting
57. Home-Stake, 76 F.R.D. at 341.
58. Plaintiffs' Consolidated Opposition to the Motions of Defendants for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, For a New Trial, at 8, Home-Stake (No.
MDL 153) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Opposition to JNOV or New Trial].
59. Home-Stake's 1963 Black Book, in a section titled "General," characterized its
properties as "low risk and [with] excellent profit potentials" and claimed that these views
were shared by "our neighbors," whom it identified as a number of major oil companies.
Exhibit RD 9, 1963 Waterflood Program Investor brochure, "General," at 1-2.
A nine-page section that followed on "description and explanation of waterflooding"
gave no indication that the procedure was risky and concluded that, "[i]n recent years, due
to advances in design, engineering and construction, Home-Stake has used the system very
successfully." Id. at 9.
In 1969, when Home-Stake had shifted to steamflooding, the company's Black Book
brochure contained four pages on this new technique. The description did not mention any
risk. Instead, the company claimed that, "[i]n general, steamflooding imposes no particular
hardships and presents no unusually difficult operating problems. This is especially true if
it is incorporated into a company whose background contains waterflood experience." Ex-
hibit RD 3, 1969 Program, "Physical Aspects of Steamflooding," at 8.
60. The real thinking at Home-Stake about the steamflood process that the company
described as established and low risk appeared in an internal memorandum by its chief
engineer. Memorandum of Frank Sims, Chief Engineer, to Robert Trippet (Aug. 25, 1970),
Home-Stake (No. 153-R).
Sims had a message investors never would receive:
Gloom is my feeling too .... I never can report anything good. If I'm
anything but gloomy, it's frustration.
I would really feel bad if I honestly thought we had a chance and blew it.
My only consolation is that the steamflood idea in Cat Canyon, as far as our
properties were concerned, was a high-risk gamble to start with. In other
words, the fact that it was mismanaged cost us time and money but I really
don't believe it was in the cards to make a killing anyway.
Id. at 1-2.
The plaintiffs' experts were more blunt. They testified that the California properties
Home-Stake acquired for secondary oil recovery could not develop commercial production
"through any form of existing steam recovery technique." Appellees' Brief at 7, Home-
Stake (No. 153-R) (citing Trial Transcript at 597-609, 620-24) [hereinafter Home-Stake Ap-
pellee's Brief].
61. The first prospect in the 1963 program, the Searight Waterflood Project, was listed
with a[P]rimary recovery from the Seminole sand calculated at 300 barrels per
acre-foot, which is 41% of the oil in place, with the waterflood recovery to be
135 barrels per acre-foot. In developing all of our productive acreage the
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unreasonably certain reserve estimates into rate of return formulas pre-
dictably led to extraordinarily high projected returns. The 1963 Pro-
gram's brochure promised "per annum profit not considering taxes at
24% per annum. In other words, the changes raise the total ultimate
profit from 289% to 292% .... The per annum profit after considering
taxes is reduced slightly from 64% to 62%."62 In the 1969 Program, with
Home-Stake never having had a year of successful production, the com-
pany listed a total-life profitability of 302% before taxes, 764% after
taxes.63 A company vice-president claimed that the after-tax numbers
were the "only realistic view." 64
Home-Stake was phenomenally successful in prospecting for investors.
Ironically, even as the company failed year after year to find reserves, its
pool of investors grew. But Home-Stake did only the slightest amount of
drilling. In its later years, while raising tens of millions of dollars a year,
it basically was not drilling at all. 65
secondary recovery for the 85.5% working interest is calculated at 3,655,000
barrels of oil for the Hunton reservoir and 2,065,000 barrels of oil for the
Seminole Sand Reservoir.
Exhibit RD 9, supra note 59, at 2 ("Searight Waterflood Project, Engineering Report").
In 1969, just before the SEC became reinvolved, the 1969 program issued similar materi-
als. Home-Stake had moved from waterflooding to steamflooding, but its optimism was
unabated. For the first prospect in the later program, the engineering report reassured
investors that "[f]rom the present wells, sufficient data are available to establish good geo-
logic control on the Project reservoir." Id. at 2. "The combined mechanisms have demon-
strated overall oil recoveries in excess of 55 percent of the original oil in place in various
applications of the pattern steamflood technique." Id. The report claimed that "it has
been determined that the Upper Pliocene Sand Reservoir can be developed over 1,247
surface acres with 136,864 acre-feet of net sand, having an average thickness of 110 feet.
The oil reserves obtained from the Los Coches Project and attributable to the 1969 Pro-
gram are calculated at 30,327,840 barrels of oil." Id. at 3.
62. Letter from R. S. Trippet, President, Home-Stake Prod. Co., to "Our Participants"
3-4 (Sept. 16, 1963) (on file with SMU Law Review).
63. HOME-STAKE PRODUCTION Co., BUDGET, NET COST AFTER TAX SAVINGS AND
PROFITABILITY 16 (1969).
64. Id. at 15.
65. A chart submitted by the plaintiffs showed that the 1965-1969 prospectuses pro-
jected 895 wells, but Home-Stake drilled only 80. The magnitude of the disparity indicates
just how far Home-Stake was from the viable operator it pretended to be:
PREDICT
No. OF ACTUAL No.






Nor did the wells Home-Stake actually drilled do much to help-a number were spud-
ded just to make a show of progress, not to find oil. See infra note 67 and accompanying
text.
Of the more than $20 million subscribed to the 1968 and 1969 Programs, Home-Stake
spent only $500,000 on oil and gas activity. Plaintiffs' Opposition to J.N.O.V. or New Trial,
supra note 58, at 15 (citing Chief Engineer Frank Sims Trial Testimony at 414-16 and Ex-
hibits RDs 666, 667 (1968 and 1969 prospectuses)).
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Investors fared little better when Home-Stake did spend their money
on industry activity. The 1968 program acquired California leases that its
engineers had rejected in 1967; in 1969 Home-Stake acquired leases it
had rejected in both 1967 and 1968.66 Some of the wells the company did
drill were just drilled to 500 feet, even though the target producing zones
lay between 2700 and 3200 feet.67
As the years went on, there was less and less money for drilling.
Home-Stake diverted ever more cash to pay distributions to its spiraling
number of investors. None of its programs were generating significant
revenue.
68
Home-Stake's California engineer, Charles Greer, grew so sick of soliciting money for
oil recovery but not spending the money on oil that he resigned. Greer wrote President
Robert Trippet to say that he was resigning because of the company's business ethics. But
his baby-splitting solution was to submit a bid for the office equipment and offer to con-
tinue doing exactly the same job as a consultant. In other words, his resignation was
designed to shield him from responsibility, but protect his income. His comments went to
the heart of Home-Stake's problem:
1) I have not been able to rationalize the morality of soliciting funds for a
turnkey development contract, such as the fifty or sixty million dollars solic-
ited for the California Projects, and not actually devoting the appropriate
fraction of this amount for the intended purpose, or some acceptable substi-
tute therefor.
2) In the face of the overwhelming evidence indicating that the California
Project funds evidently, either are not available, or are not going to be de-
voted for the intended purpose, the California effort obviously can only at-
tenuate into a dead end, to which effort I am not now prepared to exclusively
relegate myself.
3) In view of the fact, that I do not possess legal expertise, nor do I have
access to the records, I cannot be sure that these problems are not serious.
In the event they are, I would presume that I would sustain personal liability,
as an officer of the Corporation.
Resignation Letter of Conrad Green to Robert Trippett 1 (Ex. 958, Sept. 28, 1971) His
letter ended with a bizarre flourish reiterating his ethical solution: "To finally summarize:
I am physically sick; morally depressed; fearful of uncontrollable legal liability; but enam-
ored with my task. My best judgment dictates that I resign as an officer of Home-Stake but
it allows me to perform my previous services on a contract basis." Id. at 4. Greer's com-
promise gives "contracting out" a new meaning.
The 1970 and 1971 programs, designed to develop oil in Venezuela, did little better.
Home-Stake spent only $4.3 million of the $18,820,000 1970 budget and barely $2 million
of the $13,949,000 1971 budget. Home-Stake Appellees' Brief, supra note 60, at 8 & n.4
(citations omitted). A company engineer calculated that Home-Stake spent only 6.83% of
the funds budgeted for 1968 and 1969. Memorandum from Conrad Greer, chief engineer,
Home-Stake Prod. Co., to R.S. Trippet, president, Home-Stake Prod. Co. (Nov. 24, 1971).
Of three projects in the 1968 and 1969 programs, Greer calculated that Home-Stake had
spent only 6.67% of the budget on one, 9.8% on a second, and nothing on a third. Id. at 1-
2.
66. Plaintiffs' Opposition to J.N.O.V. or New Trial, supra note 58, at 11, Home-Stake
(No. 153-R).
67. Id. at 15-16. Not only did the chief engineer claim he did not know why the com-
pany drilled these shallow wells, he could not even explain why they set casing before the
wells reached target depths. Frank Sims Trial Transcript at 464-65 (June 22, 1988). Sims
somewhat poetically called the wells "commencements of wells." Id. at 465.
68. The cash flow problem was exacerbated because Home-Stake, like Longhorn in
later years, required investors to pay only part of the equipment costs (in Home-Stake's
case, just 30%). The remainder would be funded by nonrecourse borrowing on program
properties. Id.
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To maintain the fiction that cash payouts reflected real wealth, and not
rerouted investor dollars, Home-Stake juggled its books. Home-Stake
had the opposite problem of operators who pad overhead expenses. It
had to absorb operating expenses so that it could pretend investors were
being paid from revenues. The bookkeepers prepared accurate schedules
that invariably showed a loss. Chief executive officer Trippet would re-
classify many expenses and write in enough production revenue so that
the projects would appear to pay out.69 In this way Home-Stake con-
verted five years of operating losses, $3.2 million in all, into $11.2 million
in paper gains.70 Later programs included a "previous program" table
that listed distributions on earlier programs as evidence of how successful
the company had been. 71
69. For instance, Trippet had written onto one quarterly schedule: "Make this a plus
by absorbing $40,000 of operating exp. Then add enough pro. rev. to bring total pay per
unit up to $175.26 per unit .... Re-classify all absorption plus all add-on as development
exp." Exhibit 3413/1 at 2, Home-Stake (No. 153-R).
Trippet admitted that he started making "arbitrary reclassifications as early as 1966."
Robert Trippet Trial Transcript at 1403. He argued that it was "arbitrary as to the particu-
lar dollars and cents but not the concept and not the general amounts." Id. at 1510.
Trippet's excuse was that someone in his accounting department was "miscoding" devel-
opment costs as operating expenses, quarter after quarter. Id. at 1615. He "fixed" this
problem "every quarter." Id. at 1616. He claimed that he knew these operating expenses
really were development costs "[b]ased upon my detailed knowledge of our California op-
erations and my 27 years of experience in the oil industry" and that his reclassifications
were designed to prevent investors from being double-billed. Id. at 1617.
Trippet never explained why, if he believed expenses were being miscoded, he didn't
have the problem corrected at once. His inaction was like a bank knowing funds are being
embezzled but not bothering to look for the thief. Nor did Trippet explain the fact that the
recoding just happened to push Home-Stake from a loss to a gain in every quarter.
70. Home-Stake Appellees' Brief, supra note 60, at 10.
71. Id. at 80-81. The list of necessary misrepresentations goes on and on. Home-Stake
took advantage of accounting regulations that permit some companies to claim an asset
value from certain expenditures, if the expenditure is supported by expected reserves.
Home-Stake was able to hoist its books into the black by listing millions of dollars in
"equipment installation receivables." Unfortunately, the company had not discovered
reserves to pay for these expenditures. The details of this accounting fraud are explained
in Plaintiffs' Opposition to J.N.O.V. or New Trial, supra note 58, at 54-59, 68-69, Home-
Stake (No. 153-R).
Home-Stake had to misstate its level of activity. Though it was not performing the
steamflooding promised, it would list inactive properties as being "operated." Trippet ex-
plained that this fiction "[d]epends on your definition of the word 'operated.' Whoever
wrote this had a broader definition than just the operation of wells on the property. I
presume ... what he meant was that development work outside the boundaries of the lease
was being carried on which would later be applied to the lease." Robert Trippet Trial
Transcript, at 1472, Home-Stake (No. 153-R). "Operated" meant that the company was
doing "research work." Id. at 1530.
Investors received periodic reports on the percentage of their program "completed."
Engineer Sims estimated the percentage completed-"l did not compute them; I just esti-
mated them"- without looking at accounting or other records. Frank Sims Trial Tran-
script, at 541, Home-Stake (No. 153-R). He "just picked it out of the air." Id. at 569. He
had quite a free hand: "Nobody quarreled with me on them very often except the auditors,
and they would say what they had to say, and then they would turn around and leave." Id.
at 546-47.
To conceal the dismal failure of the original properties, Home-Stake added five more
properties to supplement revenues. This shift was referred to as "the old switcheroo."
Robert Trippet Trial Transcript, at 1532, Home-Stake (No. 153-R). The company kept this
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Because his need for cash was so urgent, Trippet divided investors into
classes. He paid each class on a different basis, depending upon how
likely he thought they were to invest money in the future. Each received
a different percentage of the "full pay" amount.72 By the end of 1971,
three of the early programs had, respectively, nineteen, twenty-one, and
twenty-three classes of investors. Investors who discovered that they had
been paid less than other investors were told the difference was a com-
puter error and would be corrected. 73 Investors were paid to keep them
shift in properties secret "[b]ecause it would have jeopardized our participants' tax deduc-
tions, which was the last thing they wanted us to do." Id. at 1570.
In 1970, the SEC forbid Home-Stake from using 1970 funds to pay prior program distri-
butions, requiring that the company instead put its funds in escrow. This put an end to the
Ponzi structure on which the company had relied. Home-Stake tried to borrow more
money, but had to shut down its California operations, which it never resumed. Yet the
rescission offer prospectus listed the California properties as still being operated. Plain-
tiffs' Opposition to J.N.O.V. or New Trial, supra note 58, at 39, Home-Stake (No. 153-R)
(citing Exhibit RD 659).
Some of the deception is hilarious. Home-Stake knew that investors like to touch the
merchandise, They respond well to tangible evidence. On-site promotion is a time-
honored and successful marketing strategy for many companies. But with virtually no op-
erations, Home-Stake did not have the normal indicia of a successful oil company. The
company came up with a solution: "Home-Stake went to the extreme extent of purchasing
a large volume of irrelevant engineering logs, maps, charts, and other accouterments of a
real oil company in order to stock their offices in California." Id. at 45-46. To give inves-
tors that hands-on experience, it constructed a well with a special "squirter" that would
emit oil so investors could have their picture taken next to their production. Id. at 45; see
Frank Sims Trial Transcript, at 475. Surface irrigation pipes were repainted to look as if
they were moving oil and markers were scattered on the ground to pretend that they sat on
top of large (but in fact nonexistent) underground facilities. Plaintiffs' Opposition to
J.N.O.V. or New Trial, supra note 58, at 45-46, Home-Stake (No. 153-R). Engineer Sims
proposed the tromp d'oeil to Trippet in Exhibit 3036, a memorandum dated February 5,
1969. Rather than paint irrigation pipes, he proposed erecting drilling rigs on various parts
of the property:
Our 1968 Program locality shows up as almost devoid of anything of inter-
est. And due to the flatness of the terrain, it is perfectly obvious we have
done practically nothing .... One idea that occurred to me would be to take
four of the old derricks ... and set them on four corners which are a mile or
two apart so that it will define the area. The trouble is that it would make it
even more obvious that little work has been done actually. Perhaps we could
put the derricks one half mile apart.
Frank Sims Trial Transcript, at 480, Home-Stake (No. 153-R). The ultimate solution was to
ask farmers "if they could paint their irrigation standpipes that were scattered throughout
the pepper fields." Id. at 482. This made the area look as if it had production. Investors
were told that much of the production was underground. Id. at 482-83. Home-Stake also
trucked production from lease to lease. Id. at 493-94.
72. See Plaintiffs' Opposition to J.N.O.V. or New Trial, supra note 58, at 22-24, Home-
Stake (No. 153-R) (summarizing this testimony).
73. It proved impossible to keep some investors from learning that they were not get-
ting the same payment as others. One investor found out because there were two
"Tausigs" and Home-Stake got them mixed up. Robert Trippet Trial Transcript, at 1428-29,
Home-Stake (No. 153-R). Home-Stake paid charitable groups less than investors "who
might invest more." Id. at 1429-30. Trippet tried to explain this practice as based on equip-
ment suppliers not viewing charities as good credit risks. Trippet peddled this rationaliza-
tion to a donor who had donated his interest to Harvard. Id. at 1430-31. Putting aside the
detail that investors were not to provide collateral for equipment in the first place, Trippet
had the problem that Harvard was, and is, the most heavily endowed university in the
United States and one of our more substantial corporations, public or private. It is not
going to fail in a dozen lifetimes.
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happy or if they appeared likely to invest more money.74
A requirement that operators calculate and disclose the projected eco-
nomic returns might not have caught the Home-Stake fraud in its first
year or two, when most of the projection necessarily would have turned
on future reserves. As the failure of the older projects became clear,
however, not even haphazard projections could have obscured the cer-
tainty of loss. Moreover, if Home-Stake had been required to list results
for each of its programs, not just the investors' own programs, by the late
sixties it would have had to list dismal losses on projects that were largely
completed (including the projects in which it secretly settled claims).
It is of course theoretically true that any operator can make up reserves
and so defeat disclosure requirements, even under tighter standards. But
it could only do so by producing clear written evidence of fraud. More-
over, the fact that some operators might unlawfully subvert any new re-
quirement would not prevent the majority of operators from preparing
and distributing honest, meaningful information. The honest companies
would share the industry's incentive to make sure that operators who do
misuse performance standards are identified.
3. Prudential: Converting the Ponzi Scheme into a High Art Form
A current example of an operator who exploited the absence of per-
formance standards comes from the recent fraud involving one of the
most respected companies in American business, Prudential Insurance
Company. Both in number of investors and dollars invested, Prudential
ran one of the largest operations in industry history.75 It shared its man-
agement duties with Graham Energy, a Metarie, Louisiana operator.
The two general partners had extraordinary success with a series of oil
and gas partnerships in the mid and late eighties. They lured over 150,000
investors into their thirty-seven oil and gas partnerships.76 The investors
74. Trippet said he was entitled to restructure distributions because once the money
came in, it was company money. "I believed that I was entitled to pay it out any way I saw
fit .... " Id. at 1630. He claimed he had advice of counsel supporting his position. Id.
And he paid more to people who might invest more:
People that we wanted to keep happy and to some extent some other sub-
jective standards, for example, some participant whom I know needed the
money or they were going to help us or not. So there were a number of
subjective factors. There weren't really any objective standards. We just
played it by ear quarter to quarter.
Id.
75. The Petro-Lewis investments described later in this section concerned a larger to-
tal investment than Prudential's, but during most of the years of investment the Petro-
Lewis programs seem to have given investors what they were promised. It was only in the
last year or two, as the market declined, that Petro-Lewis concealed the true state of its
operations. Prudential, in contrast, never had the success that it claimed for years in oral
and written statements.
76. For the number of investors, see Memorandum, Prudential-Bache Direct Invest-
ment Group 1 (Aug. 8, 1988) (on file with the SMU Law Review). [Note: All Prudential-
Bache documents cited from the Graham Energy litigation are on file with SMU Law
Review.]
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spent more than $1.5 billion. 77 Yet the projects as a group never came
close to turning a profit. 78
In a fitting end, Prudential paid what may have been over a billion
dollars in penalties. 79 Graham has been fined and expelled from the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers for not disclosing its fees.80 Why
the Securities and Exchange Commission has allowed Prudential to stay
in the securities business is not at all clear.
Prudential and Graham bought proved reserves. In this way, the part-
nerships supposedly avoided the risks of exploratory drilling. Prudential
and Graham claimed that they could drive hard bargains with cash-poor
operators who had to sell out.81 The fire sale of proven-already discov-
ered-reserves supposedly would minimize risk.
77. Id.
78. The programs have not yet turned a profit, strictly speaking, but some might do so
someday if interest discounting is ignored. Oil and gas reserves can dribble in for a long
time.
By 1993, the $1.5 billion invested had produced $650 million back, less than half of the
initial investment. Scot J. Paltrow, Partners in a Troubled Venture, L.A. TIMES, June 22,
1993, at A16. One expert estimated that the overall "return," though obviously varying by
program, will be a 40% "profit" after 25 years. Id. As the present value of a dollar re-
ceived 25 years later is discounted to almost nothing by the unpleasant side of the mystery
of compound interest, it would be hard for the general partners to contend with a straight
face that this should be counted as a positive return. It certainly is not a return that would
have snared a single investor (unless they happened to find a profit-averse, utility minimiz-
ing investor, who treated investments like variations on Giffen goods: the more it costs the
better it sells) had it been predicted at the start of the programs. Demand would be low if
not nonexistent.
79. Government To Defer Prosecution Over PSI Limited Partnership Sales, 26 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1468 (Nov. 4, 1994).
The full cost of the settlement was much greater than the penalties assessed. Prudential
finally agreed to pay $110 million to settle the consolidated class lawsuit, on top of $491
million the investors received when the partnerships were sold. Prudential Agrees to Pay
$110 Million to Resolve Class Action by Investors, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1447
(Mar. 15, 1995). In addition, Prudential agreed to an open-ended $330 million settlement
fund that encompassed its over 700 limited partnerships (not just oil and gas partnerships),
plus a $10 million civil penalty, $26 million to the states, and $5 million to the National
Association of Securities Dealers. Id. The initial agreement was for Prudential to put up
$330 million, but with the agreement that it would add more money if needed as claims
were filed. By late 1994, almost all of the initial $330 million had been spent and the
company had put in "an equivalent amount." Karen Donovan, Prudential's Victims Hit
Roadblocks, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 5,1994, at Al. And Prudential paid yet another $120 million
to investors not covered by the prior settlements. Prudential Agrees to Pay $100 Million to
Resolve Class Action by Investors, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1447 (Mar. 15, 1995).
One of Prudential's spokesmen estimated the cost of its overall partnership litigation as
$1.5 billion. Id.
80. Scot J. Paltrow, As Energy Funds Stumbled, Companies Reaped Benefits, L.A.
TIMES, June 23, 1993, at A13.
81. Prudential and Graham marketed at least 37 partnerships. All 37 shared the same
purpose and structure. As an example of their goals, the internal "Fact Sheet" designed to
give brokers information on the Series VI "Prudential-Bache Energy Income Fund" ex-
plained how many oil and gas companies "found themselves saddled with debt and short of
capital." PRUDENTIAL-BACHE DIRECT INVESTMENT GROUP, PRUDENTIAL-BACHE EN-
ERGY INCOME FUND SERIES VI P-23 FACT SHEET 7 (Aug. 1988). These companies were
selling off their assets. "This capital crunch in the oil and gas industry is creating special
opportunities for investors who bring new capital to the 'oil patch."' Id. It was the "rela-
tively low cost of entry" by buying these properties that "can help create the potential for
attractive cash distributions." Id.
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Prudential and Graham said they had three more reasons why the in-
vestments might be an even better deal. First was the march of technol-
ogy. Advances in recovery methods were likely to let the partnerships
extract more oil and gas than planned when they bought the properties.
Second, development drilling might turn up more reserves. Finally, be-
cause the general partners allegedly bought properties by basing offers on
existing oil and gas prices, any price increase supposedly would produce
another windfall gain.82
The prospectuses included the pro forma disclosure that the investment
was risky.83 The instructions given to brokers, however, were very differ-
Prudential's 1986 Broker Guide, distributed over the signature of Prudential-Energy's
President James Darr, hyped the same claim. "Reduced product prices and lower fuel
consumption has placed tremendous economic pressure on many energy companies, creat-
ing a severe liquidity squeeze and causing many of them to sell their properties at distress
prices." PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY INCOME PARTNERSHIPS, BROKER GUIDE 4 (Apr. 7,
1986 draft) [hereinafter BROKER GUIDE]. The happy result was that "it's become cheaper
to acquire existing reserves than to go out and discover new reserves." Id. at 26.
82. Prudential listed each of these reasons in the internal "Broker Guides." Not only
was risk supposedly spread by avoiding exploratory properties and buying proven reserves
in many geographic areas, but the investment had good "growth potential" for the reasons
mentioned in the text. The partnerships allegedly "pay for only a fraction of the proven
reserves [in] a field when a property is first acquired, [but] a great deal more of the oil
trapped below may be ultimately drawn out." Id. at 6. Improved enhancement could oc-
cur because "industry scientists and engineers are constantly searching" for improved tech-
nologies. Id. And, of course, prices were likely to rise "based on historical cycles." Id.
(Prudential did not explain why these advantages had not been incorporated into the price
they paid for the properties.).
A brochure Graham Securities Corporation prepared for brokers, titled, tellingly, "How
To Prospect And Sell" but referring to prospecting for investors rather than oil and gas,
hummed the same tune. It gave the same three reasons for brokers to reel off to investors:
"potential price escallation [sic]"; "enhanced recovery-new technology in recovering
more reserves"; and "field development-adding more reserves than we initially paid for."
GRAHAM SECURITIES CORPORATION, How TO PROSPECT AND SELL 2 (undated brochure).
Prudential's investor pamphlet for its Energy Income Partnerships II described the
"[a]cquisition of what we consider to be undervalued producing oil and gas properties .....
[s]haring in any upside potential that may arise from technical advances which improve the
recoverability of oil and gas reserves," and "[b]enefit from any energy price increases" as
reasons to buy into the partnerships. PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY PRODUCTION, INC.,
ENERGY INCOME PARTNERSHIPS, SERIES It at 2 (undated brochure). Price increases and
future field developments were two ways, "beyond the immediate income from current oil
and gas production," that investors "could" profit. Id. at 3.
Regarding price, the kind of thinking that Prudential popularized is represented by the
space given to one of its Vice-Presidents, John Corbin, in the Graham Royalty Summer
1987 "Energy Digest" broker circular. Corbin explained that "reserves are selling near
what appears to be the bottom of their market cycle." GRAHAM ROYALTY, INC., ENERGY
DIGEST BROKER/DEALER CIRCULAR 6 (Summer 1987) [hereinafter GRAHAM CIRCULAR].
Asked to sum up what he would emphasize to investors, he argued that the critical point
was timing: "It isn't essential to invest at the very bottom of the market in order to make a
profit, but you want to get as close as possible .... " Id.
83. Even the partnership brochures would footnote their page-long lists of what gener-
ally were 10% plus distributions with the disclaimer that "[t]his is historical information
only and no assurance can be given as to the level of annualized cash distributions to be
received by investors in these or any other oil and gas income partnerships in the future."
PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY PRODUCTION, INC., PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY INCOME
PARTNERSHIPS, SERIES III at 9 (undated). When this disclaimer appears after a listing
showing program after program paying a high return year after year, with no indication
that the programs were not generating the payments, that a great deal of the money was
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ent. They were to present the partnerships as essentially risk-free. The
party line included assurances that "[i]t is currently anticipated that
properties acquired by the Partnerships will return, at the property level,
15% to 20% of their purchase price annually-thus returning their
purchase price within ... the first five or six years." 84 These aggressive
returns were to begin flowing within ninety days of a partnership's clos-
ing.85 High returns looked even better because of low costs. Depending
on the program, between 91% and 93-94% of partnership funds would go
directly into "property acquisitions and the payment of property acquisi-
tion fees."' 86 The general partners would get only "1%" of cash distribu-
tions until the initial investment had been paid back, and then only
20%.87
Prudential and Graham designed their message to appeal to the most
vulnerable. They pinpointed retired people.88 A secret broker guide de-
fined the pool of buyers "[w]ho should invest" as including "[c]lients
borrowed internally, and that some of the remainder was simply returning the investors'
capital contribution, one can hardly be surprised that investors assumed the chance of suc-
cess was high. That is what Prudential and Graham worked hard to make them believe.
Investors received periodic "partnership profiles" that did provide the future net cash
flow and the return per $10,000 investment. To give an example, the May 1991 report on
the P-25 partnership showed that the total discounted value of a $10,000 investment would
be only $14,331, and $10,725 if discounted at 15%. PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY INCOME
PARTNERSHIPS P-25, PARTNERSHIP PROFILE 11 (May 1991). This was not much of a return
on an investment with an expected payout life of 39 years, id. at 2, with 92% of the reserves
remaining to be produced, id. at 5, but Prudential overshadowed these numbers with its
message about the apparently high returns in virtually every partnership.
The prospectuses listed some information on prior projects, but the listing was not com-
plete, and the returns listed only what had been paid out to date, see infra note 112 and
accompanying text, leaving investors without information on the true economic value of
the programs. They did not list the value of projects that already had terminated, nor did
they project the lifetime returns of the projects that were included. Prudential and the
plaintiffs disputed whether investors even received the prospectuses before investing. Pal-
trow, supra note 78, at A16.
84. BROKER GUIDE, supra note 81, at 17; see also id. at 13 (listing investment objec-
tives as "[t]o acquire properties that are capable of returning 15% to 20% annually at the
property level and will return the purchase price to the Partnership within the first five to
six years.").
85. PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY INCOME PARTNERSHIPS, SERIES III, supra note 83,
at 5.
86. Id. at 8.
87. Id. at 5. This point was illustrated with a chart showing "0% to Managing General
Partners [until] [rieturn of [i]nvested [clapital." Id. Some later programs allowed a 1%
payment before payback of initial capital, with a bump-up at that point to 20%. See, e.g.,
PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY INCOME PARTNERSHIPS, Series VI, at 9.
88. In later litigation, a number of brokers would claim that they too were victims
duped by the false information flowing from Prudential and Graham. Some brokers in-
vested, put family members into the partnerships, or both. Paltrow, supra note 78, at A16.
The problem with treating brokers as equal victims is that it assumes that a broker has
no responsibility for his or her sales pitch. The broker is the flesh-and-blood person who
makes the sale. Many of these brokers exploited the programs. Their fees of 5% and up,
and Prudential and Graham's total take which may have been as much as 27% of the
nearly $1.5 billion invested, were higher than the 3% to 5% collected on ordinary stock
and bond sales and the 1% commission on municipal bonds. Paltrow, supra note 80, at
A12 (describing fees). Brokers collected these fees by parroting what Prudential told
them. This was easy money. Brokers who later claimed they did not know what was going
on were, if that was true, milking the program in conscious ignorance of its value.
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seeking regular income," "[m]unicipal bond investors," and "Keogh and
IRA investors." 89 Brochures emphasized the involvement of Prudential's
staff and signaled that this "may be a suitable investment for retirement
programs." 90 A few pages later, under the enlarged caption "For Inves-
tors Planning Their Retirement," one brochure showed a happy, relaxed
couple enjoying a secure golden age as they strolled on a beach. 91
Investors may not have needed this much assurance because of Pru-
dential's involvement. Sales materials stressed the direct role of the
"largest nongovernmental insurance company in the world," a company
"providing insurance and annuity coverage to more than 50 million peo-
ple in the United States and Canada," a company that was the "largest
money manager" in the United States with $112 billion in assets.92 Inves-
tors could rest comfortably on the written promise that Prudential was
putting its expertise at their disposal.93
And Prudential unleashed the shared risk promise: the company sup-
posedly was risking its money, not just its name. Prudential said it was
putting up ten percent of the total investment capital. 94 The appearance,
89. BROKER GUIDE, supra note 81, at 13. An August 8, 1988 "DI Sales Action Work-
sheet" included "CD Buyers" in the list of people "Who Should Buy This Product." PRU-
DENTIAL BACHE ENERGY PRODUCTION, INC., DI SALES ACTION WORKSHEET 2 (Aug. 8,
1988) [hereinafter DI SALES ACTION WORKSHEET].
90. PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY PRODUCTION, INC., ENERGY INCOME PARTNER-
SHIPS, SERIES II at 6 (undated brochure).
91. PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY PRODUCTION, INC., ENERGY INCOME PARTNER-
SHIPS, SERIES III at 4 (undated brochure). By Series V, another relaxed couple was sitting
in lawn chairs, barefoot and fishing. They presumably were funding their leisure with loot
earned by the efforts of hard-working Prudential agents slaving away in Newark skyscrap-
ers to maximize investor returns. PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY PRODUCTION, INC., EN.
ERGY INCOME PARTNERSHIPS, SERIES V, at 5 (undated).
Another broker guide asked, "How's it look out there prospecting the pension mar-
ket?", gave detailed reasons why "once you get in, it's great," and explained the selling
points to emphasize to a "medium-sized pension fund." GRAHAM RESOURCES, ENERGY
DIGEST 4 (June/July 1985).
92. PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY PRODUCTION, INC., ENERGY INCOME PARTNER-
SHIPS, SERIES III, supra note 83, at 7 (undated). The caption on the bottom of the cover
read, "For Investors Concerned About Their Financial Future."
The Broker Guide added that "Prudential-Bache is very experienced with oil and gas
investments" and had "more than $500 million of direct investments in the oil and gas
industry." BROKER GUIDE, supra note 81, at 18. Prudential-Bache Energy Production,
Inc., the company running these partnerships along with Graham, was peopled by a staff
"of professionals" from both Prudential and Prudential-Bache. Id. The oil and gas invest-
ments were managed by Prudential's capital market group in Newark, which "currently has
oil and gas holdings of over $5 billion." Id. Those investments were "evaluated and struc-
tured" by the capital markets' professional staff. Then they were submitted to "the Senior
Management of the Group and the Finance Committee of Prudential's Board of Direc-
tors." Id. Investors were promised that the same procedure was followed when Prudential
put its own money into this program. Prudential's "expert staff" personally was managing
the properties. Id.
93. Id.
94. The general partners stressed this form of insurance carefully. As one of three
reasons why the program was low risk, they gave brokers the talking point that "Prudential
Insurance is the largest investor in their own program-they are investing 10% or poten-
tially $20,000,000 [in one program] of their own money in their own program-wouldn't
you agree Pru is putting their money where their mouth is?" GRAHAM SECURITIES CORP.,
How To PROSPECT AND SELL 2 (undated) (emphasis added). After the broker noted that
SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
false as it turns out, was that Prudential would be taking the same front-
line risks as the investors.95
The general partners restricted the flow of risk information. One of
their early scripts appeared in an internal June/July 1985 Energy Digest,
which listed "15 Ways to Improve your Selling Technique."' 96 Among the
pressure tactics were standard backroom methods: "Ask for the order-
quick and often"; "Use the ABC technique: Always Be Closing"; "Con-
dition the client to say 'yes.' 97 The advice systematically steered clients
away from questions about the investment, away from their concerns, and
toward the salesman's single-minded goal of closing the deal.98 The fo-
cus was on "benefits" rather than "features" because "benefits appeal to
the emotions; [thus,] you're likely to strike a more responsive chord." 99
The final recommendation captured the overall tone:
15. Play off the hot button. Everyone has a hot button, i.e., one
thing that will really light them up. As soon as you spot it, start
pushing. If a client keeps mentioning friends who have hit it big in
the investor had to receive its initial investment back before the general partner "shares in
the revenues," he or she was to ask, "Wouldn't you agree that's a commitment from Pruden-
tial?" Id. (emphasis added).
95. For more assurance, investors were told that Graham, the experienced energy
manager and a co-general partner with Prudential, had a staff with over 500 years collec-
tive experience in the industry, had raised at least $500 million in separate programs, and
would supply one percent of the investment funds itself. BROKER GUIDE, supra note 81, at
18. Partnership brochures would tout Graham as "one of the nation's largest oil producers
based on production managed." E.g., PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY PRODUCTION, INC.,
ENERGY INCOME PARTNERSHIPS, SERIES VI, supra note 87, at 13 (undated). They noted
that "it is significant that some of the world's leading financial institutions have made a
substantial investment in the Company." Id. They did not mention that Graham had not
been successful in prior programs.
96. GRAHAM RESOURCES, ENERGY DIGEST 5 (June/July 1985).
97. Id. The "[c]ondition the client to say 'yes' tactic claimed that "[a] series of little
confirmations can lead to the big yes. Example: 'You're interested in income, aren't you?';
'We do agree that 12% is attractive, am I right?'; 'I'm impressed with this company, aren't
you?' and so on. Id.
This item followed one of the allegedly joking suggestions, which was "4. Learn hypno-
sis." Id. Prudential certainly hoped for a hypnotic effect: repetition continued until the
mark took the deal to reduce tension. All of the techniques aimed at turning listeners into
investing fools, committing asset after asset to Prudential's offerings.
A slightly more sophisticated version of the same recommendation was "10. Probe,
question and confirm." Id. at 6. The client defined his or her need, then the broker would
aggressively confirm the client's stated goals (irrespective of what they were) in terms Pru-
dential used to characterize its investment and use these sorties to "keep [the conversation]
on track and moving toward the close." Id. The chase was on.
98. Not only were brokers taught how to push clients toward "yes"; in addition, they
manipulated sales discussions to avoid client concerns. Brokers stressed only features that
the client liked. In item 6, "Look for areas of agreement," brokers were told to "[b]uild
your presentation on areas of agreement. Stress points where you and your client share
the same opinion, play down areas of conflict and work the positive aspects through to
closing." Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
To further reduce client concern, brokers were to "14. K.I.S.S. Keep It Simple Stupid.
Don't complicate a subject. Keep your discussion on the most basic level possible. Never
try to impress people with your expert knowledge and always talk in terms that they can
understand." Id. at 6 (that is, hide life's pesky little complexities like risk, losses, and
failure).
99. Id.
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the market, stress profit. If a client talks about friends who've man-
aged to hold on to a profit despite really bad conditions, stress safety.
Play off the hot button and you'll close faster. 100
Other broker literature gave instructions on how to push investors for
more money at their most susceptible time, just after they received distri-
bution checks. 101
To encourage brokers, the general partners used investor money to
shower salesmen with gifts, including hunting trips to Louisiana and bo-
nus trips to Europe, Hawaii, and other exotic destinations.10 2 Some of
the material designed to encourage aggressive selling, like the "$uper-
Broker" cartoon about a broker who shifts a conservative grandmotherly
investor into oil and gas programs, are such caricatures that they could
have been written by plaintiffs' counsel.
100. Id.
101. A broker document bearing production number 005061 urged calling customers
just after they had received a distribution check. Brokers were to seize the moment to
pitch for new funds. Under a heading titled "CAN YOUR INVESTORS HANDLE
GOOD NEWS?", the text read that "As soon as you've stopped congratulating each other
on how smart you both were, take the opportunity to a) recommend an additional invest-
ment in a Prudential-Bache Energy Income Fund or b) recommend an investment in an-
other product to balance out their portfolio." The rest of the page was covered with
testimonials from brokers on how they used distribution checks to generate more sales.
SALES MEMORANDUM OF PRUDENTIAL-BACHE I (undated) (on file with SMU Law
Review).
A May 9, 1987 letter from Graham bearing production number EG-022815 continued
the happy theme. It instructed brokers to "Find out What [sic] rate of return would make
him happy." Sales letter of Graham Resources I (May 9, 1987) (on file with SMU Law
Review). These instructions were a far cry from the proper broker function of explaining
the rate of return the investment is likely to bring, its accompanying risks, and then letting
the investor decide if the parameters are acceptable. Investors were to be told that $10,000
meant they were buying about 2000 barrels of oil which "is worth $36,000 at today's price."
Id. (emphasis added). Their partnership "is going to distribute 13% on an annualized ba-
sis." Id. (emphasis added).
Investors were urged to sell any bonds and put the proceeds into energy partnerships.
And, of course, Graham sang the same boisterous refrain: "Hit your client's hot button
when you sell. .... You better have some enthusiasm in your voice or you won't sell any-
thing." Id.
Graham Securities Corporation's undated "How To Prospect and Sell" brochure re-
duced the investment to what Prudential called "WMTY: Which Means To You." GRA-
HAM SECURITIES, supra note 82, at 1. The bullet points included telling investors that
"Your $10,000 is safe"; "Your $10,000 will generate approximately $1600 in cash flow [an-
nually] .... Wouldn't you like to have an additional $1600 a year to spend?" Id. at 3
(emphasis added).
When this kind of risk-obliterating representation was added to the fact of Prudential's
participation, its alleged willingness to acquire 10% of the investment, and its apparent
patience to wait for returns until investors had their capital back, see supra notes 93-94 and
accompanying text, it is small wonder that over 150,000 investors put their money, over
$1.5 billion of it, with Prudential.
102. The rewards included a four day trip if brokers sold $250,000 in interests within a
short bonus period; a longer trip if the sales totaled $300,000; and two trips if sales ex-
ceeded $500,000. See, e.g, GRAHAM RESOURCES, ENERGY DIGEST 2 (June/July 1985). Ap-
parently no expense was spared on the trips. Excess-maximizing Prudential-Bache Energy
President James Darr spent $34,000 on a London trip, including $15,000 for seats on the
Concorde for his wife and daughter, a chauffeured car at $1500 a day, and $11,500 (more
than many investors' capital payment) for two suites at the Berkeley Hotel. Paltrow, supra
note 78, at Al. The total cost for the trip, which included 100 brokers, was $1.2 million. Id.
at A12. This was only one of five foreign incentive trips. Id.
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The significance of the Prudential programs is that the lack of applica-
ble disclosure standards allowed Prudential to flourish so easily and for so
long. It let Prudential portray a dramatically unprofitable program as
successful. For its part, Graham apparently had a perfect record of fail-
ure when Prudential picked it to operate the programs. Graham had
been unable to make money for its prior investors.' 0 3 Prudential's selec-
tion of Graham could not have been inadvertent; Prudential had been
sued in and lost a lawsuit over an early eighties oil and gas investment in
which the claims had turned in good part on Prudential's failure to screen
and monitor operator quality.104
103. In a 1985 SEC filing, Graham had to admit that it had not been able to generate
profits for investors in prior drilling. Paltrow, supra note 78, at A16. One of Graham's
former executives would testify that "[tihey had as bad a record in the exploration business
as there was in the industry." Id.
Far and away the likeliest conclusion that investors would have drawn from looking at
Graham's prior record, had it been available, was that they would lose a great deal of
money. This certainly was a conclusion that Prudential would have drawn if it had done
any real due diligence. This brings to center stage the obvious question, "Why, when the
results from the existing partnerships were so poor, did Prudential-Bache continue to sell
the program so enthusiastically?" Id. at A12. At least for the reporter posing the rhetori-
cal question, the answer lay in the extraordinary fees that Prudential, its brokers, and Gra-
ham reaped from their investor harvest. It is hard to find any other reason for their
persistence in soliciting more money even after they knew that the initial programs were
sure to fail. For an extended argument that personal greed was the motivation that de-
graded Prudential's Oil and Gas investments, as well as its other direct-equity investments,
see KURT EICHENWALD, SERPENT ON THE ROCK (1996).
104. Prudential had been put on notice of its failure to monitor oilfield operators in
litigation arising out of its sale of 11 partnership units between 1979 and 1982. The invest-
ment was "managed" by Invoil Securities and operated mainly by Welles-Battlestein, Inc.
of Houston. Invoil had 26 partnerships in all. Of these, most failed: 19 went into bank-
ruptcy, one was dissolved, and one had no assets. Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference State-
ment at 1, Invoil Sec. (No. MDL 585). [All exhibits from the Invoil cases are cited by their
exhibit number to the settlement conference statement and are on file with SMU Law
Review.]
Prudential's later conduct with Graham is more egregious because it was already operat-
ing beyond the pale during the Invoil investments. In an Invoil broker document cap-
tioned "Common Statements of Resistance," Bache listed as a source of "Resistance"
investor statements that "one shelter is too risky" and "I can do better on my own." Ex-
hibit 1, Bache Tax Shelter Profile at 5. The Bache answer was that its programs were
diversified for risk, that it had a separate investment department (an office without a
phone, apparently), that "[d]ecisions are often verified by independent consultants," and
"[olut of 500 shelters one may be approved." Id. at 5.
Question: How can one tell if the driller is reputable? Answer: Bache
researches each program. The programs, management, and financial and
technical expertise, are reviewed, along with their track record and proposed
sites. Only one out of five hundred programs is accepted by Bache.
Id. at 9.
Actually, Bache's research was quite an achievement. To have screened 500 companies
only to find one with no proven track record, on the brink of financial collapse, and with
no experience at producing real returns for investors, was a feat indeed. The more likely
truth is that Bache was looking for an operator that would let it collect a very high fee in
return for doing almost nothing. Invoil and Welles-Battlestein may have been the first
companies that came along fitting the bill.
The extraordinary achievement of picking only 1 out of 500 proposals, yet unerringly
finding a sure loser, continued with Graham. This is the way the Prudential's Broker
Guide described the general partners' efforts:
[Vol. 50
1997] PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURE IN THE OILFIELD 703
To maintain its enterprise, Prudential spread false information about its
"track record" and about its cash payouts. No industry standards pre-
vented the distribution of misleading data or required corrective
measures.
Two of the major points used by Prudential and Graham to illustrate
their track record were the number of investors and the funds invested.
The emphasis was on the volume of commitment, not on whether this
activity would make anybody money. 10 5 The message, of course, was that
Prudential never could have raised so much money from so many people
without having a quality project. After all, size is one reward for effi-
Graham Royalty's experts constantly monitor and evaluate potential acquisi-
tions choosing only the best opportunities for further scrutiny. And while
several hundred properties may be reviewed annually, most fail to meet the
Partnerships' strict acquisition standards. In fact, only a scant 4% of the
properties considered to date have passed these strict standards and been
acquired.
BROKER GUIDE, supra note 81, at 7. This is what Prudential was training brokers to tell
their customers. The abysmal results of the programs suggest that Prudential spent the
money as quickly as it came in the door. Prudential and Graham pocketed their front-end
fees and spent their time looking for the next set of investors, not for the next quality
property.
On May 6, 1982, just as the Graham partnerships were getting going, an independent
consultant on the Invoil program determined that only 3 of the 11 Prudential programs had
a chance of being successful. The consultant warned that it was "essential that [Prudential]
develop and maintain a system providing ready availability of information on the opera-
tors' drilling and production performance at all times." Exhibit 4, Petro-Enterprises Re-
port, supra note 21, at 4 Invoil (No. MDL 585). This report was so damning that Bache
would move to exclude it at trial. See Plaintiff's Surrebuttal in Opposition to Prudential-
Bache's Motion in Limine, Invoil (No. MDL 585). The consultant found a predominance
of marginal prospects in projects developed by Welles-Battlestein and that many wells
were "destined to be marginal before the bit was ever put into the ground." Exhibit 4, at
24. There is no sign that Prudential took any of these warnings to heart or did anything to
improve its monitoring before the Graham fiasco.
105. On August 8, 1988, for instance, one of Prudential-Bache Direct Investment
Group's top 10 reasons brokers were to pitch to investors was the partnerships' allegedly
"extensive track record," which turned out to be a recital of program size: "More than 37
Partnerships and 150,000 investors. In excess of $1.5 billion invested in oil and gas
reserves. Nation's largest sponsor of oil and gas direct investment partnerships." DI
SALES ACTION WORKSHEET, supra note 89, at 3. There was not one word about the only
track record that would matter in the end: whether the programs had produced an eco-
nomic return.
The prospectuses were no more accurate. In the March 9, 1984 supplement to the pro-
spectus for the Energy Income Partnerships II, for instance, the section on management
described the number of Prudential oil and gas partnerships and their total $458 million
investment without indicating whether investors would make or lose money. PRUDENTIAL-
BACHE ENERGY PRODUCTIONS, INC., ENERGY INCOME PARTNERSHIPS II PROSPECTUS 43-
44 (Mar. 9, 1984) [hereinafter PRUDENTIAL PROSPECTUS].
The materials did list some quite low returns to date for a few prior Prudential Energy
funds and some Graham funds, but only for projects formed in the past few years. See id.
at 58. Investors were not told the lifetime projections for these projects. Nor did they
learn that Prudential and Graham were having trouble covering distributions in the
projects on the list. Investors had no way to tell whether the low payouts were because the
programs were failures, as they turned out to be, or reflected an initial lag in programs that
had located large volumes of reserves. When the prospectus described "past results," it did
not tell readers whether any of the prior programs were expected to be profitable. See id.
at 58.
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ciency in well-functioning markets. 106 Ironically, in Prudential's case, the
larger the program, the less equipped Prudential and Graham were to
find enough good properties, yet the less likely were investors to suspect
that the investment was not well-conceived. 0 7
The second kind of track record, cash "distributions," was even more
misleading. Prudential and Graham urged investors to compare cash dis-
tributions and to use this "return" on their capital as the benchmark for
measuring success. 10 8 (This interpretation reinforced the comforting
message that partnership interests were like certificates of deposit and
savings accounts.) The partnership documents forbid using borrowed or
investor capital to pay distributions, so production revenue should have
been the only source of distributions.10 9
Every internal training document included the high cash distributions
of early programs as a major selling point." 0 Later programs stressed the
record of the first partnerships, many paying fifteen percent a year."' As
partnerships closed and successors rushed down the chute, investors re-
ceived updated lists of distributions in an impressive twelve-to-fifteen
percent range. By the late eighties, partnership brochures were listing
106. For a discussion of the exit mechanism and a consideration of how much firms that
rely on sales volume alone to measure their success can miss, see ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN,
ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 3-30, 106-26 (1970).
107. Program size was far more likely linked to the scope and effectiveness of Pruden-
tial-Bache's broker network and to the marketability of Prudential's old and respected
name. As one broker wrote after describing how he conducted seminars and one-on-one
meetings, "I think this is one of the main reasons for the Pru-Bache/Graham team's suc-
cess: we reach a large number of people. That's the secret to selling an investment vehicle
like the Energy Income Partnerships and the Energy Growth Partnerships .. " GRAHAM
CIRCULAR, supra note 82, at 5. One can see the overall flaw in the program in these short
remarks: success is success in selling, not finding oil and gas. The general partners' true
efforts were devoted to selling the most interests, not to finding the best properties.
108. The United States attorney, announcing Prudential's agreement to pay a $330 mil-
lion criminal penalty, cited the company's likening these depleting assets to a certificate of
deposit and its using words like "yield," as if the income was a return on specific capital, in
describing why the government sued. Government to Defer Prosecution over PSI Limited
Partnership Sales, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1468 (1994).
The accounting expert in one of the later cases would cite the repeated use of terms like
"distribution," "rate of return," "yield," and "return on investment," as well as marketing
partnership interests as conservative investments that should be considered alternatives to
CDs and bonds, when he described the core misconduct. Report of William F. Jordan 1
(Jan. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Jordan Report].
109. "The prospectuses and sales material consistently stated that the distributions
would come from cash flow." Id. at 3. Some of the provisions prohibiting borrowing in
order to fund distributions are cited on the same page of the Jordan Report.
Jordan concluded that "what was so misleading about publicizing the cash distributions"
is that "they were irrelevant. What was relevant was the profits, which were never dis-
closed in the prospectus format." Id. at 7. Instead profit information was only published,
in later time periods, in 10-K filings which, of course, investors often did not read. Id.
110. One of the recommended selling tactics was to ask the client "for someone else
who might like a 14% return." Sales letter of Graham Resources, supra note 101. The
logical fallacy in pitches like this is that they assume what should be proven, namely, that
the investment will in fact generate the promised return each year.
111. See, e.g., PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY INCOME PARTNERSHIPS, SERIES III, supra
note 83, at 9-10.
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high annual returns from more than a dozen partnerships. 1 2 Naturally,
the payments seemed to confirm all the rosy predictions.113
The general partners knew that their cash payouts concealed the part-
nerships' disintegrating health. As an example of how bad things really
were, in 1988, when Prudential marketed its Series III partnerships, it
listed twelve earlier partnerships as having had distributions in the
twelve-to-fifteen percent range. 114 Yet as early as February and March of
1984, four years before and well under a year after the first partnership," 15
Graham and Prudential already were discussing the problem that the first
five partnerships had not generated enough money to pay distribu-
tions. 16 They made distributions regardless, with their eyes on the crush-
112. See, e.g., id. at the chart following page 8.
113. Id.
114. See id. and supra note 112 and accompanying text.
115. The first partnership listed in the brochure, PB-I, had only been formed in Sep-
tember 1983. PRUDENTIAL PROSPECrus, supra note 105, at 58. The prospectus omitted
the problems of its predecessor Bache organization in earlier investments like its Invoil
projects entirely. See supra note 104.
116. On February 10, 1984, Graham's senior vice-president of finance, Mark W. Files,
was writing to its top officers including chief financial officer Anton H. Rice and senior
vice-president Alfred Dempsey on the problem of paying distributions. Files was worried
that the partnerships were not generating enough money to pay distributions. He claimed
that "one related matter which was never completely discussed was that relating to distri-
bution philosophy; i.e., should we let the chips fall where they will, or should we attempt to
smooth out the distributions, provided, of course, Graham does not have to do any advanc-
ing to achieve that." Memorandum from Mark W. Files, senior vice-president of finance,
to Anton Rice et al. (Feb. 10, 1984) (on file with SMU Law Review).
A year later, in early 1985, Files was documenting the shortfalls of the first three pro-
grams. Graham had decided to keep paying a 15% "distribution," even though the pro-
grams were not generating that kind of cash. Files discussed how to cover Graham's
tracks:
John [Graham] agreed that 15% was the appropriate percentage for the P-
1 distribution. He was, however, concerned about the level of our subsidy to
all those partnerships. He asked that we arrange for bank lines of credit to
those partnerships, and camouflage, to the extent we can, the purpose of the
use of proceeds.
Memorandum from Mark W. Files, senior vice-president of finance, to Anton Rice, chief
financial officer (Jan. 9, 1985) (on file with SMU Law Review).
The same memorandum noted that Graham had to sell at least $16 million in new inter-
ests every month to maintain its overhead payments, which it was having to recover from
the investments. Id. at 2.
On July 3, 1985, Files wrote Matthew J. Chanin, vice president and director of Prudential
Energy Production, a Prudential subsidiary, and a vice president in the Capital Markets
Department of Prudential Insurance Company. Files showed borrowing needs of over six
million dollars to maintain distributions on the first four funds. Letter from Mark W. Files,
senior vice president of finance, to Matthew Chanin, vice president and director of Pruden-
tial Energy Production (July 3, 1985) (on file with SMU Law Review).
Graham and Prudential began to talk (secretly, of course, and not with their investors)
about how to deal with the cash shortage. On September 4,1986, Paul F. Giffin of Graham
told its president and CEO John Graham that for three of the first five programs, "the
bottom line is that there will be no cash available for distribution." In the other two, "a
minimal 1%-2% distribution could be squeezed out." Memorandum from Paul Giffin to
John Graham et al. (Sept. 4, 1986) (on file with SMU Law Review). Yet Prudential and
Graham continued paying distributions in the 12-15% level. In 1988, they still would be
maintaining payouts and citing the early programs as reasons for investors to buy new
ones. Compare the PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY INCOME PARTNERSHIPS, SERIES III,
supra note 83, at the chart following page 8.
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ing impact that low distributions or, worst of all, no distributions, would
have on new sales. 117
Until late 1991, Prudential account statements listed paid-in investor
capital as the "value" of the investment, as if investors had this principal
in the bank. 118 Investors assumed that the distributions were over and
above their principal capital contribution. In fact, the general partners
were merely recycling some of the investors' seed money.
The identification of payouts as "distributions" and as a "return" hid
the fact that far from earning a "return" on principal, investors merely
were getting their money back (after millions had been deducted in fees).
Moreover, the use of paid-in capital to pay distributions contradicted
promises that the general partners would not borrow to pay
distributions.' 19
Investors responded efficiently to the first accurate economic informa-
tion they received. The November-December 31, 1991 "Client State-
ment" indicated that "[b]eginning with this statement, the reported face
value of your direct investments will not be included in the calculation of
Net Worth.' 120 The net worth fell to zero. 12' Investors immediately con-
tacted attorneys and soon sued. 122
117. In 1986, Graham was mulling over how to "begin preparing the market for the
elimination of, or virtual elimination of, distributions on the P-I through P-5 programs."
Memorandum from Paul F. Giffin to John J. Graham et al. (Sept. 4, 1986) (on file with
SMU Law Review). That would have been the honest approach, one based on the actual
performance of the partnerships. But candor would have given the market the information
it needed to value future offerings. That was just the problem, of course. If the market
worked efficiently, the value of new partnerships would have plummeted.
Instead of stopping payments, Graham and Prudential propped up distributions for early
programs and used those payments as selling points to new investors. In 1989, Graham's
Kerry L. Kungel calculated the lifetime partnership results. He concluded that Graham
and Prudential had "a number of partnerships where actual return of original cash invest-
ment will be hard to achieve." Memorandum from Kerry L. Kungel to John Graham (Mar.
13, 1989) (on file with SMU Law Review). Kungel argued that "[w]e need to think through
very carefully the implications on future marketing efforts of having 120,000 investors with
these attendant IRR's and the long-term strategic direction of the Company." Id.
An accounting expert for the investors would claim that "[i]n the first full year of opera-
tion (the second year of existence), 22 partnerships distributed cash in excess of operating
cash flow. On average, the partnerships distributed 50% more than what was produced in
operating cash flow." Jordan Report, supra note 108, at 3. As in any Ponzi scheme, inter-
nal borrowing and new investors funded the positive returns.
Prudential and Graham's fudging of the books was not confined to small rewritings at
month's end or a little trimming here and there. By 1990, they had used at least $18 million
in borrowed funds to pay distributions. In addition, they paid many millions more in distri-
butions by drawing down the investors' capital contributions. Paltrow, supra note 78, at
AI7.
118. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
119. E.g., PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ENERGY INCOME PARTNERSHIPS, SERIES II, at 2, 28
(Mar. 9, 1984).
120. PRUDENTIAL-BACHE ACCOUNT STATEMENT (Nov.-Dec. 1984).
121. Id.
122. Until the November 1, 1991 reporting period, the investor's paid-in capital had
been listed under a column titled "value." See, e.g., October 1991 Client Account State-
ment. This same amount appeared in the upper left-hand corner of the statement as the
security's "net worth." Id. Thus an investor would expect that in addition to cash distribu-
tions, the partnerships were preserving the investment corpus.
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Investors never got some of the most basic, necessary facts to under-
stand their risks. Thus Prudential did not list the results of its at least
twelve other limited partnerships, programs not in the Graham series.
Some of those programs went into bankruptcy. Such a listing would have
revealed severe problems in prior operations. 123
Even worse, the information provided did not give a realistic picture of
the current investments as they proceeded. What was missing was the
expected lifetime rate of return and the present value of the programs. In
an early 1985 brochure, for instance, the earliest program had been
funded at year's-end 1980, the latest at year's-end 1983.124 Revenues may
be delayed by waiting for a connecting pipeline, renegotiation of
purchase agreements, future development drilling, and other factors.
While an investor reading the "summary of ventures-investors" would see
that investors had received little cash return, they would also see pro-
grams paying out between twelve and fifteen percent and that Prudential
was promising returns like this in new ventures. Investors understanda-
bly could believe that Prudential could not have paid such returns unless
it was finding a lot of oil and gas
Investors needed realistic current value calculations. Almost any
knowledge in this area would have raised warning flags. There is no need
to speculate about whether accurate information was available at reason-
able cost, because Prudential's internal documents discussed the impend-
ing disaster clearly from the very beginning.1 25
The absence of a requirement that expected rates of return and present
value be disclosed left the general partners free to say even less about
Graham's unimpressive past. The offering prospectus said that Graham
had organized 12 programs, that it had raised $125,048,000 from 2000 in-
vestors, and that 45% of the 301 wells drilled "have produced or are cur-
rently producing recoverable amounts of oil and gas or are completed
wells which have been shut-in pending construction of, or connection to,
surface production facilities and, in some cases, negotiation and execution
of gas sales contracts. ' ' 126 This volume information was meaningless
without its economic context. Investors needed to know the dollars be-
hind the facade. The reporting concealed a record that one of Graham's
former officers characterized as "as bad a record in the exploration busi-
In the November 1 to December 31, 1991 period, the designation "value" was changed
to "face amount." November 1-December 31, 1991 Client Account Statement. The state-
ment contained the comment that "[b]eginning with this statement, the reported face value
of your direct investments will not be included in the calculation of New Worth. There-
fore, the opening and closing new worth balances have been adjusted to reflect this
change." Id. The reported "net worth" fell to zero. The comments on the change ended
with the ominous reminder that "[f]ace amounts do not represent current market value."
Id.
123. For a discussion of the Wells-Battlestein debacle, see supra note 104.
124. PRUDENTIAL PROSPECrUS, supra note 105, at 58.
125. See supra note 116.
126. See PRUDENTIAL PROSPEcTus, supra note 105, at 59.
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ness as there was in the industry. ' 127
4. The John King Organization: Manipulating Cash Surrender Values
It is child's play for unscrupulous drilling fund operators to manipulate
reports of current earnings, payouts, and completions in the absence of
any requirement that they honestly describe their past economic perform-
ance and provide ongoing economic reports on existing projects. The
John King organization in Denver played a similar game by manipulating
cash surrender values. Some oil and gas programs give investors an ad-
ded level of protection by agreeing to repurchase investor shares after the
project has gotten underway. The offer usually goes into effect a year or
two after commitment and is limited to a set percentage of partnership
funds. The offer should set a fair price for interests in widely held
partnerships.
A program's agreement to repurchase interests can provide significant
protection. The King plaintiffs alleged that "[tlhe cash surrender value as
will be shown was the distinctive selling point of IARF, the item that gave
IARF and RRE a competitive edge over similar drilling funds .... ,128
But this is true only if repurchase prices are based on economic values.
Cash surrender values would become "the source of the biggest prob-
lem for Defendants."'1 29 The prospectus included a formula for surrender
prices that gave investors good reason to view the repurchase price as a
real measure of value. The price was to be determined by adding ninety-
five percent of cash on hand, prepaid expenses, the market value of
proven reserves (set by an independent engineer), and eighty percent of
the net book value of all other assets, after deducting debts. 130 At least
some investors were told that the cash surrender value was only forty
percent of the "anticipated ultimate future net cash receipts," so they
could assume that the price was much less than the value of their
interests.131
It did not take the King group long to abandon this formula. The prob-
lem was that it would produce very low buyback prices (reflecting the low
value of the investor interests). The lower the surrender price, the clearer
the message that this was a really bad investment. Publicizing the failure
probably would have put King out of business.
King instead repurchased interests for more than they were worth.
One adjustment was to increase total reserves automatically by three
127. See supra note 103.
128. Statement of Plaintiffs re Relevancy of Documents at 140, In re King Resources
Co. Sec. Litig. (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 1975) (No. C-3873) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Statement of
Relevancy].
129. Id.
130. Id. at 143-44 (citing Exhibit 1238 (IARF August 1, 1969 Prospectus at 11)),
131. See id. at 165 (citing Exhibit 345 (Letter from James T. Van Norden, Vice-Presi-
dent of Denver Corporation, to David Harris, investor); Exhibit 337 (Letter of James T.
Van Norden, Vice-President of Denver Corporation, to Harry M. Meyers, Jr., investor).
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percent each year.1 32 King's company IARF justified this subterfuge by
telling its board that "[i]t has been shown by two different studies that,
historically, reserves have been understated by approximately 3% each
year for all producing properties in the United States."'1 33 IARF did not
mention that no one had shown that the King companies underestimated
their reserves, that the SEC does not permit this kind of inflation adjust-
ment, and that investors had no way to know that King was adding this
automatic annual increase.
The three percent adjustment was the smaller problem. The bigger one
was the fact that, contrary to engineering standards, King was increasing
its independent estimates "by reason of additional reserves which we
have been informed management believes are present or which might be
obtained by waterflooding or other secondary recovery procedure."'1 34
King did nothing to distribute an accurate economic picture.
5. Petro-Lewis: Concealing Failure Occurring After Periods of Success
The Prudential-Graham and King offerings belong to a larger club of
successfully marketed partnerships that endured in spite of a complete
failure to generate positive returns. One last example of how the partner-
ship structure can shield project failures by making payouts, if uncon-
strained by economic measures of value, is the Petro-Lewis case. Petro-
Lewis is different from the other examples because for many years, it was
successful in the true currency: it produced commercial quantities of oil
and gas. The plaintiffs did not allege that early operations were anything
but above-board. The problems arose when Petro-Lewis decided to sell
new programs after they no longer made economic sense. The example
shows how the lack of an effective continuing reporting requirement can
sustain operators after their market has vanished.
In a fifteen-year period, from 1970 to 1984, Petro-Lewis sold over 150
partnerships, attracting 183,000 investors and 2.6 billion investor dol-
lars.135 It was the largest fund in the peak years of the late seventies and
early eighties.136 Just as Prudential would do later, so Petro-Lewis set out
132. Id. at 177 (citing Exhibit 2695 (Letter of Arthur Young to IARF (Apr. 10, 1970
draft)); for the final letter, see Exhibit 2265).
133. Id. at 180 (citing IARF Sept. 23, 1969 board minutes).
134. Id. at 177 (citing Arthur Young comments in Exhibit 2695).
135. Joint Affidavit Of Plaintiffs' Co-Lead Counsel In Support Of The Proposed Settle-
ment Of The Consolidated Action at 5, In re Petro-Lewis Sec. Litig. (D. Colo. Dec. 13,
1984) (No. 84-C-326) [hereinafter Petro-Lewis Settlement Affidavit].
For some other discussions of the Petro-Lewis disaster, see In re Petro-Lewis Sec. Litig.,
Fed. Sec. L. Rpt. § 91,899 (1984); Sanders v. Robinson Humphrey/American Express, Inc.,
634 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1986), affid in part, rev'd in pertinent part sub nom. Kirkpat-
rick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1987).
136. In the boom years of 1979 and 1980, Petro-Lewis raised more outside investor
money than any of the 93 other public oil and gas programs listed in Resource Programs,
Inc., The RPI Survey: A Report on the Oil and Gas Program Industry, in Mosburg (ed.),
supra note 22, at 6-8. In 1978, Petro-Lewis raised $98.7 million, while number two, Can-
Am Drilling Programs, raised $60.5 million. In 1979, the figures were $239.4 for Petro-
Lewis and $77.2 for Can-Am. In 1980, the respective figures were $338.5 million for Petro-
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to acquire producing properties. 137 For a number of years, it paid hand-
some dividends as oil prices shot up from $1.80 to $34.00 a barrel.138
The company aimed at a broad market by offering "small" investors a
chance to participate. Investment units were as cheap as $2500, and only
$2000 for IRA accounts.139 To maximize the number of investors, the
company enlisted a sales force of over 8500 brokers in 355 "national and
regional broker-dealer organizations."' 140 Sustaining this staff may ex-
plain in part why Petro-Lewis's overhead rose to a debilitating $100 mil-
lion a year.' 41
The programs had structural flaws that would become apparent when
oil prices faltered. First, the investor dollar was heavily burdened. Even
though Petro-Lewis acquired producing properties, it and its brokers col-
lected ten percent as a handling fee, fifteen percent of the remaining pro-
ceeds for operating, plus fifteen percent of the remaining "income and
expenses.' 142 And with the properties already carrying royalty obliga-
tions, the investors could end up having little revenue to show for them-
selves. Precious little of the investment dollar would go to work for
investors.
Second, the partnerships borrowed heavily, using reserves as collateral.
The investors later alleged that "[t]he Company had leveraged nearly
every acquisition with bank debt (between 30 percent and 50 percent of
the purchase price of each property was typically represented by
debt)."'1 43 This kind of heavy borrowing can obscure the true value of a
partnership because it sustains. very high short-term distributions. The
price becomes clear when the principal has to be repaid. This is the point
when failure becomes impossible to hide.
Petro-Lewis's banks imposed tighter borrowing limits after Penn
Square Bank was pushed into bankruptcy in the summer of 1982. Instead
of stopping new fundraising, cutting expenses, and trying to batten down
Lewis and $115.0 million for Can-Am. Id. Petro-Lewis was far and away the leader of the
funds.
The rapid increase in Petro-Lewis funds, coming during a period when many companies
were entering the business and all experienced intense competition, is one reason to sus-
pect that Petro-Lewis never would have been able to maintain quality without careful,
deliberate measures to increase its staff at the same level of quality.
137. In the sometimes small world of oil and gas, this is not the only overlap between
the two partnerships. Prudential purchased millions of dollars in Petro-Lewis properties,
thus putting a little money back into the hands of Petro-Lewis plaintiffs. The dismal results
of the Prudential programs suggests that Prudential probably overpaid for the Petro-Lewis
properties, in essence acquiring another company's problems (and charging the Prudential
investors a fee for the transfer). In addition, Prudential Insurance and Graham singled out
one major purchase from Petro-Lewis for themselves. This property segregation inevitably
suggests that they were cherry-picking among the prospects. Paltrow, supra note 80, at
A12.
138. Petro-Lewis Settlement Affidavit, supra note 135, at 6.
139. Id. at 3.
140. Id. at 3-4.
141. Id. at 5.
142. Id. at 4.
143. Id. at 7.
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the accounting hatches, Petro-Lewis paid more in distributions than it
was earning. In 1982, with receipts of $76 million, the Company paid
$142 million in distributions. 144
Petro-Lewis covered the shortfall with increased borrowing. In early
1983, the company falsely denied a Wall Street Journal report of cash flow
problems. It continued selling units, unloading over $115 million of a
new $450 million offering.145 If the writing was not on the wall now, it
was by year's end. In December, Petro-Lewis had to agree to pay its
banks between eighty-five and ninety-five percent of the "net cash flow of
partnerships formed before November 1982."146 Eleven class action law-
suits quickly followed in the first half of 1984, some on behalf of partner-
ship investors, some on behalf of securities investors who had bought
Petro-Lewis stock. 147
As these examples show, the partnership format can accommodate
widespread fraud and deception. The form facilitates mass marketing be-
cause it is suited to nationwide broker networks with aggressive selling
techniques. The brokers often will know little or nothing about oil and
gas. The speed with which Prudential rose from nowhere is good testa-
ment to the power of this form. Gone are details about particular wells,
gone is the need to enter contracts with rights of consent and audit, gone
is the chance for face-to-face meetings with the operator. At least in the
standard equity format, getting operating agreements and other invest-
ment documents signed is likely to require a meeting with someone who
can explain the drilling process. There is a chance that investors will have
somewhat more knowledge before proceeding.
Each of these large-scale programs suffered the same basic problem.
At their start, neither industry contracts nor standards required accurate
disclosure of the operator's prior results. Thus investors had no counter-
weight to the operator's unrestrained word. As it became clear that the
early projects were losing money, the operators were able to initiate new
programs because they had no obligation to present effective, meaningful
reports on the old programs or on the economics of the new. The con-
cealment injured new investors, but it also damaged existing investors be-
cause they never received notice that their investment was in trouble.
To some extent these problems escaped detection because some of
these operators lied. Prudential borrowed to cover cash distributions,
even though its investor materials promised that it wouldn't. Home-
Stake pretended to drill wells that it never drilled. The John King organi-
zation violated its cash repurchase formula in spite of the clarity of that
standard. Nonetheless, even in the face of willful fraud, investors could
have identified and avoided many of these failing programs if these com-
panies made even half-hearted efforts to comply with the standards pro-
144. Id. at 7-8.
145. Id. at 9-10.
146. Id. at 10.
147. Id. at 11.
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posed here. And even if they faked their disclosure numbers, they would
have provided investors with much clearer proof of fraud, enabling them
to recover their money in litigation.
The ability to operate losing partnerships without detection reflects
substantial flaws in industry requirements. An efficient market should
punish companies whose investors always lose money. Yet for the market
to work, investors must register their economic votes carefully. And to
vote their interests, they need enough information to identify successful
companies. No reporting is going to be meaningful unless the operator
provides the best available information on the projected lifetime results of
the project. Disclosure requirements limited to the last few years of cash
distributions will do little to indicate the true outlook. Completion statis-
tics disguised as "success ratios," cash distributions masquerading as reve-
nue proceeds, occasional discoveries obscuring average losses-each
manipulation flourishes only because there is no requirement to present
the current discounted value of known reserves. This is the test of eco-
nomic viability for an oil and gas investment. Yet it is conspicuously miss-
ing from industry contracts and customs. Operators who point to the
distributions, completions, volumes, and discoveries of their other part-
nerships need to be forced to add the most important data: What is the
real expected economic value of those projects?
Moreover, there is no duty that an operator update investors on their
programs. Oil and gas wells require heavy up-front investments that are
paid out over many years. More is needed here too.
Injecting fresh actuarial air will cure a lot of what ails oilpatch invest-
ing. The next two sections describe the disclosures that can correct this
investor-dependent industry's failure to require basic investment
information.
III. THIS INDUSTRY NEEDS PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURE,
PAST AND PRESENT
In considering rules to improve industry behavior, it is important to
remember that no rule is going to stop all forms of fraud and sharp deal-
ing. And many rules that might reduce misconduct can be so intrusive
that their costs outweigh their benefits. That is why, for instance, when
faced with the trading fraud that sparked the Great Depression, the
Roosevelt administration rejected having the government determine the
merit of stock issues. Instead, it persuaded Congress to make securities
sellers give investors more facts and to punish those who responded with
false and misleading data.
The ease with which certain operators whose investors consistently lost
money nonetheless stayed in business year after year illustrates the price
the oilpatch has paid for failing to develop standards on the basic risks
and likely returns of operator offerings. It is unusual, to say the least, that
such an investor-dependent industry has failed to make operators present
their prior performance. It is time for the oil and gas industry, an indus-
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try whose growth has been fueled by outside money from its earliest days,
to adopt the basic disclosure standards of an investment contract.
Industry companies tend to resist reform because they worry about ad-
ded burdens when they are operators. Another reason for resistance is
the tendency to circle the wagons by treating suggestions for reform as
tests of industry loyalty. This kind of characterization sidelines many new
ideas. Too often serious proposals are derailed by being labeled as opera-
tor-nonoperator, producer-pipeline, or producer-royalty owner issues.
The merits get lost in the process. Narrowing reform proposals to po-
larized classifications prevents rational consideration of measures that
might strengthen the industry. In fact, industry companies would be ma-
jor beneficiaries of performance disclosure.
A. INVESTORS NEED TO KNOW How WELL THE OPERATOR HAS
PERFORMED FOR OTHER INVESTORS
The measure most needed to avoid the problems described in the last
section would be to make operators tell investors how their earlier inves-
tors have done. Operators should have to disclose the prior economic
results of programs they already have conducted.
Disclosure should group programs by year, because variations in drill-
ing costs, acreage availability, and energy prices can produce different
results in different time periods. Like anyone selling an investment, oper-
ators would have to provide other details as needed to make the informa-
tion accurate. The operators should present the discounted present
values of past and ongoing programs and should list their rates of return
to facilitate comparison with other programs and with investments
outside the oilpatch.
Has the operator ever produced the results it is predicting? When and
how often? Does its track record suggest a small chance of a big success
but a big risk of losses, a high probability of a positive return, or almost
no chance at all? Put another way, can the operator prove the expertise
for which it seeks handsome fees?
One of the constants of oilpatch life is how much operators and pro-
moters say about the prospects for success. Whoever is marketing a pros-
pect-the operator, a broker, another investor-one thing never changes:
they virtually always make promises about how the operator has done
before. And investors understandably rely on this information. But the
industry contract is deafeningly silent on the facts that would let investors
test these claims. As a result, what is often the most intense and material
part of the sale is usually anecdotal, oral, and very hard to prove if the
project turns out badly. Those omitting information include many opera-
tors who have long been in the business, have substantial track records,
and could produce the details with a flick of their finger on a computer
keyboard.
Part II described the kind of salesmanship that can mar oilpatch ven-
tures. Those operators sold their programs so easily because they did not
SMU LAW REVIEW
have to give investors readily available facts on their prior records. Oper-
ators disseminate unsupported claims of being ahead of industry stan-
dards, assert that proposed wells are similar to nearby producing wells
(with differences between the wells carefully omitted), prophesy future
returns on too little information, and predict major discoveries from pre-
liminary drill-stem tests. Davis Oil raised its "success" by including com-
pleted wells that lost money. Prudential and Graham, Home-Stake, and
Petro-Lewis perpetuated the market for their partnerships by making dis-
tributions unhinged from reserves and from any expected future discover-
ies. Operators like Nixon compared (and distorted) the results of nearby
wells rather than simply describing their own past history.
It is a bad joke to pretend that items like the number of wells com-
pleted, nearby wells, and prior distributions are meaningful information
without regard to overall economics. Yet operators will continue to play
with this kind of information unless constrained by new industry stan-
dards. For instance, the predecessor to the Prudential entity that so badly
misinformed its investors in the Graham partnerships had been caught
selling earlier programs using a "well activities table" that simply listed
the "productive" versus "dry" wells. These statistics made it look as if the
programs had a roughly forty percent success rate, when in fact they were
near bankruptcy. 148 Unfazed, Prudential did not make any greater effort
to use economic predictors when it built its program with Graham
Energy.
Each kind of bait is likely to work only in the absence of factual
benchmarks. Prudential, John King, and Home-Stake, for instance, were
running money-losing operations (at least as far as their investors were
concerned) for a number of years. A fair listing of their prior results
would have put investors on notice to think twice, and then think again.
The information would not have deterred all investors, but all would have
understood the risks they faced.
It is no accident that the Prudential programs stopped in their tracks as
soon as the general partners admitted that the "value" had fallen below
the initial investment amounts. Investors sued in months. Who would
148. BACHE TAX INVESTMENT GROUP FACT SHEET, INVOIL HORIZON DRILLING FUND,
Exhibit 7, at 6 (Nov. 5, 1981).
While publishing only this largely irrelevant "success ratio" for its investors, Prudential
itself was looking closely at the only data of significance, the economic results of the pro-
gram. An internal memorandum dated three days earlier discussed broker concerns "re-
garding lack of success and poor reporting on previous programs." Memorandum from Ed
Devereaux, Tax Investments Div., Bache, to Dennis Mamon, Tax Investments, Bache
(Nov. 2, 1981) (on file with SMU Law Review). Prudential commissioned an independent
study of its progress. The conclusion, published in May 1982 using much of the data avail-
able at the time Prudential was hawking its well-activity success ratio, was that many of the
wells never should have been drilled. Petro-Enterprises Report, supra note 21, at 24. That
is the difference between a realistic economic measure, one that every oil company con-
ducts or should conduct internally, and such vague data as completion ratios. Completion
statistics are a starting point, as they may pinpoint companies that are far above or below
industry averages (but not always even that), but they must be followed by full economic
analysis to be meaningful.
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have invested had they known that Graham, Prudential's chosen opera-
tor, reported only losses on its prior programs? How many investors
would Marvin Davis have attracted had he claimed, as he did when inves-
tor Aetna sought the information in discovery, that he could not produce
records showing whether his investors had made money or not?
It is fair to expect any regulation to justify itself in terms of its costs.
Yet it should not be hard for an operator to compile its economic record.
In spite of standard morning-after disclaimers, operators can tell easily-
competent operators already know-how many wells they have com-
pleted, how many produced in paying quantities, and how many paid out.
Operators know their investors' total costs (because the operator pre-
pared the bills for those costs), and they should have a monthly record of
production and revenue. Operators must calculate costs, revenues, and
income for tax purposes. In this day of computers, storing this informa-
tion for investors should be simple and inexpensive. Yet this information
is almost never offered.
B. THE OIL BUSINESS IS SUFFICIENTLY PREDICTABLE TO USE PRIOR
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Mandatory disclosure of the operator's economic performance
presumes that average results will not vary wildly from year to year. The
predictive force of past performance is well understood by operators, who
generally rely on some version of their history as they seek new investors.
Demonstrated past skill and experience are variables on which one oil
company should be distinguished from another. Companies in the oil
business learn over time, so more experienced companies should do bet-
ter on average and an operator with a better record should do a better
job on average even among other companies with the same experience.
The industry's failure to make operators list prior economic results lets
operators play the predictability game. When wells come up dry, opera-
tors become infatuated with the supposed unpredictability of drilling. It
becomes a "You-don't-know-what-you've-got-till-it's-gone" business.
The scientific industry in evidence during the solicitation period can dis-
appear overnight.
The careful operator will insert a pro forma warning in its small print
that drilling is risky. Yet to clinch the deal, it will brag about its position
in the industry and, anecdotally, about its prior successes. It has an incen-
tive to increase the level of assurance as much as needed for closure.
In Prudential's broker scripts, for instance, not one word suggests
warning investors that they might lose their money, of the odds that they
would not earn any return at all, or of any other risk. Instead Prudential
looked for investors' "hot button." The oral sales proceeded as if the
disclaimers didn't exist. Later, though, when investors began to lose
money, Prudential discovered the small print in the prospectus never dis-
cussed during solicitation.
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The same contrast between pro forma disclosures and specific, aggres-
sive misrepresentations about past performance-all pitched toward
making investors believe the operator's past is a reason to invest in its
future-marred the King projects,1 49 Longhorn Oil and Gas's de-
fenses, 150 and Home-Stake's partnerships. 151 Because the industry has
avoided meaningful economic measures, virtually every oil and gas pro-
ject is able to exploit the gap between its prior results and its oral sales
representations.
The Davis Oil case shows how quickly the investment benchmark can
shift. When Marvin Davis solicited Aetna, his results were ahead of top
industry performers and his completion record was presented as proof of
what he could do.152 At least when one investor's enthusiasm flagged,
149. King and promotions like his are interesting because they are predictable but in
the worst way: the operators know that investors are on average going to lose money.
Over time they could even calculate average rates of loss. This issue came up in John
King's battles with the IRS. King secured certain tax benefits by classifying his oil and gas
investments as "transactions for profit." King v. United States, 545 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir.
1976). Given King's record of fraud and failure-indeed, the seeming certainty of fail-
ure-the IRS quite understandably argued that by the time King made the challenged
investments, "at that time he must be found to have known that he was purchasing largely
worthless dry holes." Id. at 709.
The court disagreed. It held that the evidence supported the trial court finding that King
made his investments in hopes of profits. To the court, failure did not disprove King's
profit-motive. "The oil and gas business is very speculative" and "[tihe number of unprof-
itable ventures clearly outnumbers the profitable ventures." Id. at 708-09.
This was hardly the government's point. It was arguing that King had to know, from his
past record, that his particular projects were doomed to failure. There was no reasonable
basis to expect a profit even in the industry's ordinary risk-discounted terms. The trial
court had discounted such evidence by noting that while King had access to lease files "and
could perhaps, have obtained advance information with respect to the properties subject to
the tenders, there is no evidence that he did so." Id. at 709 n.3.
The Tenth Circuit is correct that the IRS could not start with a presumption that every
losing oil and gas investment was not entered for profit. But it seems just as surely wrong
to give no weight to the argument that in the King investments, which in their later years
produced quite a record of losses, King had no reasonable basis to expect profits from his
operations, at least, not from the oil and gas portions of those operations.
150. After loading investors with representations about its success and place as one of
the "best in the business," the Longhorn defendants argued on appeal that these state-
ments should be ignored because "each offering circular advised each potential investor
that no person had been authorized to give any information or to make any representa-
tions in connection with the offering" other than those in partnership writings. Defend-
ants' Pretrial Brief, supra note 47, § 9, at 3.
On risk, they had similar claims:
Each prospective investor was advised that oil and gas drilling is highly
speculative and that no assurances could be given that any production would
be obtained .... Due to the extremely high risk in exploring for oil and gas
[one forgets that Longhorn had promised that 75% of its wells would be
development wells], it is impossible to predict 'success in the future,' a fact
fully disclosed in the offering circulars.
Id. at 3, 153 (emphasis added).
151. Home-Stake inflated its past record in a different way. The company drilled so few
wells that there wasn't much it could say about its past drilling experience. The company
hoped to raise new funds from some of its existing investors, so it divided investors into
classes and paid those investors that were more likely to invest again. In addition, it settled
litigation quickly so that new investors would not learn of earlier problems. See supra
notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Davis Oil volunteered how well drilling was going, how much it had dis-
covered, and how much more it knew about oil properties than even
skilled outside petroleum engineers. 153 This was a predictable, scientific
organization, a collection of experts.
When Aetna's program turned out to be a bust, entirely different from
the front-end predictions, Marvin Davis donned his wiser but sadder role.
Now drilling was another matter entirely: "You can't look underground";
"It's like a horserace."'1 54 The belief that skill and experience can reduce
risk and that oil exploration is a professional activity, beliefs Davis used
to market prospects, became the province of fools. Now Davis claimed to
drill by his "gut feeling," guided by his "nose for oil," a matter of "intui-
tiveness."'1 55 This post-operations realism, of course, would not have at-
tracted a single investor. The denial reached the height of absurdity when
the company's lawyers moved to exclude all evidence of the dismal re-
sults of Davis Oil's Aetna programs, results which were exactly the oppo-
site of its predictions, on the ground that the results of an oil and gas
program are of no relevance to the value that oil and gas properties had
before they are drilled.1 56
153. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
154. Marvin Davis Deposition at 50, 55; see also id. at 87, 263, 386. Now Marvin Davis
claimed that his unique ability was his "smell for oil." Id. at 55.
155. Id. at 249-50.
156. If Marvin Davis truly believed that the past has no bearing on the future and his
prior performance no weight in predicting his future achievements, then he had no busi-
ness marketing his programs by urging investors to credit his allegedly above-average suc-
cess rates. What he should have been saying is that, "This business is utterly unpredictable,
so you should ignore the results that any company has achieved in the past."
The "it's-so-risky-that-no-one-can-predict, you-just-never-know" theory permeated Da-
vis's response to Aetna's lawsuit. One of Davis's defenses was that "[p]laintiff was fully
aware of and assumed the risks of investment in its oil and gas ventures." Defendants'
Answer to the Third Amended Complaint, supra note 25, at 3. When Aetna asked for
records on the results Davis had produced for other investors (to test whether he really
was successful), defendants refused because they found the argument that anyone could
believe promises that they would earn a reasonable rate of return on an oilpatch invest-
ment "ludicrous on its face to anyone with even a limited knowledge of the risks inherent
in wildcat drilling." Defendants' Opposition to AEI's Motion to Compel Production of
Documents at 8 n.8. In fact, it was just such a "ludicrous" theory, that a large experienced
operator can generate predictability by its risk spreading and superior experience, that
Davis used to market his prospects.
As defendants got closer to trial, the campaign continued. They tried to exclude evi-
dence one of Aetna's experts had advanced, using Davis's dismal results, to show that
Davis's performance was "far below normal industry standards." They argued that an en-
gineer "cannot determine the quality of these speculative prospects based solely on their
ultimate production." Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's
Supplements to Summaries of Testimony of Donald Hockaday and Preston Moore at 11.
This argument was a reprise of defendants' failed attempt in the prior summer to exclude
all evidence of the poor performance of Aetna's wells. In this Alice-in-Wonderland world,
the failure of properties to produce, by a company that promised it would find production
with its properties, was not a relevant factor. In their motion in limine, the defendants
moved to exclude all evidence "of the ultimate financial or drilling results of AEI's invest-
ments with Davis Oil." Davis Oil Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to Ex-
clude Evidence of the Ultimate Financial or Drilling Results of AEI's Investments with
Davis Oil at 4-5. They argued: "The simple fact is that the value of a prospect changes
dramatically, either upwards or downwards, as a result of the drilling of a well. The actual
outcome of the well is irrelevant to the speculative value that a purchaser would pay for the
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The "risky business" defense is about as relevant to an oil and gas in-
vestment as the tax-deduction defense (you wanted tax benefits, so the
jury should ignore the fact that you lost all your money because the IRS
let you deduct some of your loss) 157 and the rising-price defense (you
thought prices would go up, so it must be falling prices that robbed you of
your expectancy, not, heaven forbid, our worthless properties). 158
opportunity to drill the well . I..." d. (emphasis added). Evidence of the properties' value
after the end of 1982 (barely a year after Aetna's first well was drilled) "is simply too
remote and unfairly prejudicial to be allowed." Id. at 9.
"[W]here the results of drilling have been disappointing, the jury will find it difficult, if
not impossible, to consider the initial opportunity for profit that determines the true value
of an undrilled prospect." Id. at 5.
The defendants did not explain how a superior staff and a company with an above-aver-
age track record could generate such statistically significant, disastrous results. For a com-
parison of Davis's results to overall industry results, see supra note 36.
157. In Davis Oil, the defendants' second defense was that Aetna should be precluded
from suing for rescission because it had failed to tender "the value of any tax deductions or
benefits it has received from any federal, state, local, or foreign [?] taxing authority." De-
fendants' Answer to the Third Amended Complaint, at 1 (Second Defense).
The Longhorn defendants tried this tax argument: "In the case of each and every inves-
tor, the purpose of that person's investment in the separate and distinct opportunities was
fulfilled in all respects. Each investor received tax deductions and credits, the result of
which allowed that party to shelter or defer income." Defendant's Brief at 100, Longhorn
(No. MDL-525). According to the defendants, the venture they had marketed as a means
to finding oil and gas was anything but that:
The limited partnerships were successful in the sense that wealthy investors
who participated in the programs achieved tremendous tax benefits .... The
purchasers of these interests are wealthy individuals who were seeking pri-
marily a tax shelter, and only very secondarily to invest in oil and gas
exploration.
Id. at 100, 153, 227. Putting aside the fact that none of the Longhorn documentation said
anywhere that "we offer a really big tax deduction and a really small chance of ever finding
oil or gas," this defense doesn't make economic sense. Given that only part of the invest-
ment, at best, could have qualified as a tax credit, the most that the rest would have cov-
ered would be a deduction. All a deduction does is allow one to reduce taxes by a
percentage of a qualifying loss. No rational investor would seek out a program "primarily"
for a tax deduction, because this would be like hunting for an opportunity to lose money.
It certainly is true that the opportunity to deduct costs reduces the real cost of a program,
but losses still are losses.
In Home-Stake the same defense cropped up in the argument that the court erred in its
failure to "find that tax benefits, which included intangible drilling cost, were the primary
motivation of investors." Defendants' Brief in Support of J.N.O.V, at 69, Home-Stake (No.
153-R). This argument was particularly misplaced in Home-Stake because the company
had not spent most of the money that investors were encouraged to deduct as costs.
The deductibility problem suggests the next flaw in the argument. If investors prevail on
their claims of fraud, the IRS is going to require them to repay their losses (which have
now been reversed). For this reason it makes no sense to deduct tax benefits from actual
damages. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
158. For instance, Graham Resources' chief executive officer John Graham told the Los
Angeles Times as late as 1993 that "all of the funds' promises to investors would have come
true if-as most in the oil industry expected-prices had revived." Paltrow, supra note 78,
at A17. Of course, an opportunity that "will make you money only if commodity prices
increase steadily" is not exactly the low-risk, sure-high-yield, like-a-CD investment Pru-
dential promised its customers.
The Longhorn Securities Litigation defendants claimed this defense sotto voce when they
plead that their lack of success was due only to their failure to discover enough production
"during a highly competitive period for exploration that was followed by a decline in the
price of oil and gas." Pretrial Order, Final Contentions of the Parties, Defendants' Con-
tentions at 9, Longhorn (No. MDL 525).
1997] PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURE IN.THE OILFIELD 7191
If an operator ever does say, "I don't have any idea what we're going to
find, because I don't think the past predicts the future in this business at
all, so my prior record is irrelevant and I'm not even going to tell you
what it is," it would have a basis to raise the risky-business defense. If an
operator says, "I think we're going to lose money, a lot of money, but I
know you'll really like this project because you can deduct your losses
(thus losing only a percentage of the total loss)," it would have a legiti-
mate gripe if an investor who took deductions later complained. And if a
late-seventies operator said, "There aren't many good properties out
there anymore, the industry is experiencing diminishing returns on its
acreage and both acreage and drilling costs have gone through the roof,
so you should expect to lose money unless prices triple," it could argue
that investors could not prove reliance just because they lost money.
Not a single oil investment has been launched with such warnings. Op-
erators may file risk disclaimers, but they have nothing to do with why
people invest. The disclaimers are too general ("Oil and gas drilling is
inherently risky. Many factors can affect the outcome of a drilling pro-
gram. Prices may change,....-)159 to distinguish between programs or
other investments. In this economy, what industry isn't risky? Even IBM
and U.S. Steel, to say nothing of public utility stocks, have turned out to
carry unexpected long-term risks.
What investors need is specific information about their operator's abil-
ity to conduct business in an environment of general risk. People spend
their money with one company and not another because they believe the
company will be successful. If the operator's statements are truthful but
general risks come to fruition anyway, then these are indeed the risks of
the business. But fraud arises if the operator pretends it has navigated
those risks successfully in the past, though its previous investors actually
did poorly. Before investors make their decision, they are entitled to ac-
curate, truthful disclosure in the currency of importance-project
economics.
A duty of disclosure assumes that past performance is very material
because skill has predictive value. The happy, retrospective disclaimer
that "Oh, you just never know" does not fit the oil business any more
than it fits other businesses. Each well may have a good deal of risk, and
some fields are more risky than others, but risks are diffused as operators
drill more wells. Over time, operators with higher levels of skill do better
than the less skilled.
159. In the Prudential prospectuses, for instance, there were pages of disclaimers. The
"Risk Factors" included, among others, risks of property selection, availability, competi-
tion and regulation, diversification, financial limits, limited liquidity, conflicts of interest,
lack of control over some properties, and a variety of tax risks. PRUDENTIAL PROSPECTUS,
supra note 105, at 4-10. And these were the risks before the prospectus even got to its
express listing of "risks inherent in purchasing producing properties," which included dan-
gers from prices, costs, and deliverabilities, and the fact that "jr]eservoir engineering, geo-
physics and geology are not exact sciences." Id. at 10. Very few investors have any means
of quantifying such risks. It becomes all the more important for investors to have some
way to factually compare how different operators have done before they take their plunge.
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An operator's past record is evidence of its ability to spot productive
acreage; of its care in drilling and maintaining costs; and of its diligence in
protecting investor interests. Each program will have different geologic
aspects and thus different risks, but investors still need to know the oper-
ator's overall level of performance before balancing the particular risks.
The average level of return will drive expected results, supplemented by
the variability of individual wells and fields. It is no accident that oil com-
panies exhibit discernible long-term trends in their finding costs, one sig-
nificant measure of their efficiency. 160 Why publish these costs if the past
does not bear meaningfully on the future?
The industry's failure to develop effective measures of performance
rests, in part, on the widespread view that the industry is unpredictable.
This idea is heavily embedded in industry myth. Even though the indus-
try contains a large international network of experts whose job it is to
pinpoint and narrow the risks of drilling, using several generations of ac-
cumulated scientific knowledge, industry participants often act as if major
companies are farmers dropping a bit a hundred feet or so in the back-
yard. It is not just fringe companies who exhibit this myth.
The idea that the oil business is somehow unknowable, rather than a
business with risk that experts can handicap, is tantamount to saying that
its many layers of experts, from engineers to geologists, from petroleum
accountants to oil executives, do not know what they are doing at the
most fundamental level. This fiction ignores the tens of thousands of pro-
fessionals who narrow and define the risks of drilling. For instance, there
are almost 25,000 United States members of the American Association of
Petroleum Geologists (AAPG). The AAPG devotes itself "to ad-
vanc[ing] the science of geology, especially as it relates to petroleum, nat-
160. The predictability of oil returns is the basis for the most famous civil damage
award in American history, the $11 billion judgment that Pennzoil won against Texaco.
Pennzoil's damage model was simplicity itself. Pennzoil took its own quite low finding
cost, assumed it would do the same in the future, calculated how much cheaper it was per
barrel to acquire the reserves controlled by Getty than to fund new exploration even at its
low costs, and multiplied the billions of reserves it would have owned had the acquisition
gone through times its anticipated savings. The result is history. For a summary of the
damage model, see Texaco v. Pennzoil, 729 S.W.2d 768, 860-61 (Tex. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 994 (1988).
Another example of proper reliance upon the predictability of oil and gas projections is
the over half-a-billion dollar judgment recovered by TransAmerican Natural Gas Corpora-
tion in its take-or-pay litigation against El Paso Natural Gas Company. After the jury
found that El Paso had repudiated its take-or-pay contract, TransAmerican was left with
the job of proving the gas it would have produced in the many remaining years of its
contract. TransAmerican had been engaged in an active drilling program until El Paso
stopped buying its gas, thus drying up the funds used for drilling. TransAmerican showed
the jury the average number of new wells it had planned to drill, and the average reserves,
decline curves, drainage, and success ratio of its past drilling in the same area. Although El
Paso called the wells that TransAmerican projected it would drill "phantom" wells, the jury
awarded the damages sought by TransAmerican to the penny, including damages from
wells not yet drilled. A discussion of the damage model and the predictability of this kind
of reserve evidence can be found in TransAmerican's brief on appeal, Brief of Appellee
§§ Ill.B-C, El Paso Natural Gas (No. 01-88-0847-CV).
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ural gas, other subsurface fluids, and mineral resources. ' 161 Its members,
along with their nearly 7000 overseas counterparts, understand that
"[g]eology is a profession,"'162 not a gambling club. Well logs, seismic
know-how, subsurface mapping, core samples-the many components of
the science of petroleum prediction bespeak a sophisticated activity.
Another 50,000 industry professionals belong to the Society of Petro-
leum Engineers (SPE), an organization whose goal is "to enable today's
energy professionals to do a better job."'1 63 In the SPE's view,
"[t]echnology is the foundation of the international oil and gas indus-
try."'164 The foundation is not a pack of cards or set of dice. To enhance
scientific ability, the SPE publishes technical manuals on everything from
log reading and drilling practices to the reservoir characteristics of many
formations. 165 Since 1982, the SPE has been joined by the Society of Pe-
troleum Evaluation Engineers (SPEE), a body of "specialists in the eval-
uation of petroleum and natural gas properties." 166 One of the "principal
goal[s]" of the SPEE has been the "standardization of oil and gas reserve
definitions."167
COPAS has joined the quest for objective, efficient measures of per-
formance. It has begun a periodic listing of comparative performance
data. 68 The current edition has twenty-one measures of performance. 169
Each measure has advantages and disadvantages, but COPAS spends its
time treating prediction as a reality to be improved. It is not wasting its
time pretending that meaningful information is unavailable or defeated
by something in the nature of the industry.
Operators bill investors for the services of these experts because they
know that their industry rests on a large, accumulated body of knowledge
about where to find oil and gas and how to get it out of the ground. It is
this experience that investors seek when they go looking for an exper-
ienced industry company.
Were the oil business not at all predictable, its instability would doom
such well-accepted ventures as the accounting standards for oil and gas
companies. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), working
with the SEC, developed a set of supplemental disclosure guidelines for
161. AAPG CONST. art. 11 (1993). The membership numbers are taken from the May
1995 membership list, furnished to the author by the AAPG.
162. Id. art. IV.l.(a).
163. SPE, A VITAL LINK FOR THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (undated brochure) (on file
with SMU Law Review).
164. Id.
165. For a sample of the level of scientific detail at large among industry professionals,
if not among operators when hauled into court, see SPE, 1994/1995 ENERGY RESOURCES
CATALOG (listing current publications).
166. SPE BROCHURE (undated) (furnished to author by SPEE) (on file with SMU Law
Review).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., COPAS, OIL & GAS PERFORMANCE MEASURES: A RESEARCH PROJECT
BY THE FINANCIAL REPORTING COMMITTEE (1st ed. May 24, 1994).
169. Id. at 3-4.
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oil and gas companies. 170 The guidelines follow the path one would ex-
pect. On the revenue side, companies list proved reserves, including fac-
tors that could generate unexpected changes. 171 This data has to be
updated at least once a year.172 The company displays reserves at ex-
isting prices, but with adjustments for any contractually-set price
changes. 173 To convert this information into an economic value, the ex-
pected cost of development is netted from the reserves, with the result
being a net discounted value.174 (Unfortunately, the SEC has limited the
supplemental requirements to publicly traded oil and gas companies, thus
excluding most joint-account equity investments, joint ventures, and lim-
ited partnerships, the most common drilling ventures.)' 75
Federal disclosure standards for publicly traded oil and gas companies
rest on the belief that there are reasonable ways to predict the future for
oil and gas programs. 176 Investors still need to apply ordinary principles
of risk discounting. If an operator proposes development drilling where
170. FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 69 (1982) (dis-
closures about oil and gas producing activities) [hereinafter FASB No. 69].
171. Id. paras. 10-17. Paragraph 16 provides that "[i]f important economic factors or
significant uncertainties affect particular components of an enterprise's proved reserves,
explanation shall be provided." It gives as examples unusually high costs, the need for a
pipeline or other major facilities before production can begin, and contract obligations to
sell reserves at below-contract prices. Id. para. 16.
172. Id. paras. 7-8.
173. Id. para. 30. An example would be a long-term contract with a price escalator
clause. If the contract contains a periodic market redetermination provision that moves
with market fluctuations, presumably the company should use the current price and also
discuss the information on expected changes.
174. Id. paras. 30-33. "Additional information necessary to prevent the disclosure of
the standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows and changes therein from
being misleading also shall be provided." Id. para. 34.
175. FASB has "eliminate[d], for enterprises that are not publicly traded," its require-
ments of disclosing cost and reserve information. Id. para. 2.
176. A minority dissented from the FASB standards on grounds that clarify the predict-
ability assumption built into the majority's decision to require future net cash flow valua-
tions. The dissenters were comfortable with disclosing proved reserves, capital and
incurred costs, and results of producing activities by geographic area. Id. at 13. These
measures, they found, "help to fill a void caused by the absence of reliable measurements
of the costs of finding and developing oil and gas reserves and the lack of a relationship
between those costs and the revenues and cash inflows resulting from their disposition in
the normal course of business." Id.
The dissenters parted company over converting this information into a discounted net
cash flow index, a measure that they believed was "completely lacking in reliability." Id.
They feared projections into the future because such projections depend upon "manage-
ment's forecasts of future production quantities, not only for the immediate future but for
the entire period required to exhaust the existing estimated quantity of proved reserves."
Id. at 14. This in turn could depend upon such highly variable factors as future energy
demand, the development of substitute fuels, and the political stability of oil and gas pro-
ducing nations. Id.
It seems obvious that most of these variables are likely to affect future price fluctuations,
a risk that investors knowingly assume. Thus providing the information listed by FASB
No. 69 hardly seems remarkable, even in the face of these objections. Almost any kind of
forecast will have the same problem.
The dissenters seem to have been speaking from a larger philosophical position. In their
view, financial reporting generally should be tied "largely ... [to] the financial effects of
transactions and events that have already happened." Id. As for the future, "it is impossi-
ble to verify the future." Id. Yet this information would have no value if events that "al-
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its drilling is exploratory, investors can consider the difference this makes.
The operator should better its record. Conversely, if it is exploring
outside a formation where it made one great discovery but drilled dozens
of dry holes, that too would have to be disclosed. With the FASB No. 69
data, investors can make such judgments equipped with core investment
data as their guide.
FASB No. 69 does not assume that an operator's results will always be
the same. It merely rests on the belief that past results are a good and
readily available predictor. This is necessary background information
with which investors should be armed. If the current projections deviate
markedly from past results, investors will have the information to ask
why, and to weigh the evidence, before putting their money down.' 77
C. REGULATION THROUGH FULLER INFORMATION IS
CONSERVATIVE REGULATION
Mandatory data disclosure is the primary form of regulation for state
and federal securities markets. The decision to tame market disorder by
ready have happened" were not a guide to the future-if this information lacked predictive
value, investors could leave the past to historians.
To the dissenters, who happily did not carry the day and deprive investors of cash flow
analysis (which is the true economic translation of reserve and cost information), "[tihose
who use the information provided by financial reporting may try to predict the future, but
that is the essence of investment decisionmaking, not the objective of financial reporting."
Id. "Only if a user reflects his or her own set of expectations in predicting future activities
and results of various enterprises is comparability possible .... Predicting the future is the
users' responsibility; it is not an appropriate objective of financial reporting." Id.
The dissenters' position, taken seriously, is that it is not possible to make an objective
comparison of oil and gas investments. Never mind that banks, oil companies, institutional
investors, and everyone else connected with the oilpatch think that they can make rational
decisions. There is no reason to think that oil prediction is more of an exact science than
business investment generally, but this does not mean that investing is a shot in the dark.
The fact that the investment data that can be generated will not fit all investors' needs
exactly is a fact of life in the oil industry, but it is a fact of life in other industries, too. The
solution to information imperfection is not, as the dissenters suggest, to provide no infor-
mation, but to provide the best information in the most meaningful format and make sure
investors are told the limits of what is conveyed.
177. An example of factors to consider is whether the promoter has the same manage-
ment as before.
"Track record" is much like the two sides of the coin. One side says,
"Track record has no bearing on future programs." Frequently, this is pre-
cisely the case. Past performance-generated by different people, in a differ-
ent area with a different drilling philosophy, under a different program
structure, with a different drilling budget-has little or no bearing on a cur-
rent partnership. To the extent that some of these same characteristics are
present, however, prior performance can be an indicator of future
expectations.
Arthur J. King, A Way To Get Rich Quick, Maybe, reprinted in II Mosburg (ed.), supra
note 22, at 575-77.
Another problem is growth in program size. Companies that do well while small may be
unequipped to spend larger volumes of money. Operators often tout size as a sign of suc-
cess. "Bigger is better. More dollars, more diversification." King, supra, at 578. Yet in
fact, "experience tells us that fund raising ability can outrun drilling budgets, and the 'big-
ger pieces of the same pie' (larger interests in the same well) approach can negate the
argument for increased diversity." Id. at 579.
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requiring fuller information is a conservative and limited regulatory inter-
vention. It assumes that the market is providing insufficient information
or information in the wrong form. Part V.B. discusses several reasons
why oil and gas markets may fail to generate enough information. 178
178. Justice Breyer recited the standard reasons for markets not producing accurate
information in STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982). He developed
four reasons. First, market incentives may be skewed, as with nonexcludable information
that is costly to gather but whose distribution cannot be limited once it is published. Id. at
27.
The second reason is fraud. "The rationale for government action to prevent false or
misleading information rests upon the assumption that court remedies and competitive
pressures are not adequate to provide the consumer with the true information he would
willingly pay for." Id. This certainly proved true in many of the oil and gas operations
described in this article, in which the minimal protection generated under existing industry
standards and court remedies failed to prevent the infliction of great harm on
nonoperators.
Third, buyers may not have the ability to evaluate information in the form presented. Id.
at 27-28. To the extent that ability is a function of the presentation of information, this
problem can be partly remedied by specifying a better format for disclosure. The need for
information may be reduced as specialists develop new analytic techniques.
Finally, supply side imperfections, like monopoly power, may prevent firms from receiv-
ing the right incentives to provide information. Id. at 28.
There is a literature trying to prove that markets are as "efficient" in the provision of
information as in the provision of other items and thus should provide as much information
as is desirable without any government intervention. The originating article is George Stig-
ler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Behind Stigler's skepti-
cism about the need for regulation is his belief that markets spontaneously generate the
information they need. As markets grow in size, both dollar size and the number of trad-
ers, "there will appear a set of firms which specialize in collecting and selling information.
They may take the form of trade journals or specialized brokers." Id. at 220. Stigler also
treats advertising as "an immensely powerful instrument for the elimination of ignorance-
comparable in force to the use of the book instead of the oral discourse to communicate
knowledge." Id.
The trouble with Stigler's argument is that it ignores the proof that many markets have
not provided enough information to be self-regulating. Theory, which is always an approx-
imation and simplification, should not blind theorists to reality. The solution to the reality
of fraud-in-the-marketplace is not to close one's eyes and create theories of why the evi-
dence two feet away isn't really there. The Great Crash is exhibit A of the ease with which
"perfect" free markets can succumb to opportunism, bad information, and people's inabil-
ity to demand sufficient information to protect themselves. Louis Loss surely is correct in
noting that Stigler-like microeconomic arguments have "an unreal quality." Loss & SELIG-
MAN, supra note 37, at 28. "Generally, the critics have ignored or underestimated the
evidence concerning securities fraud, excessive underwriters' or insiders' compensation, or
public confidence in the securities markets, all of which persuaded Congress in 1933, 1934,
and 1964 to create the legislative basis for the present mandatory corporate disclosure
system." Id. at 29.
Congress often makes mistakes of course, but there was no mistaking the Great Depres-
sion. Moreover, the history of unregulated markets is full of evidence that they do not
generate enough information to protect buyers from fraud and, in the long run, to protect
the market itself from fraud-fueled booms followed by crashes. The initial damage can
spread rapidly as it reverberates through the larger economy. In the words of public pol-
icy, fraud can have major negative externalities. See, for instance, the collapse brought to
the early French market by the Mississippi Company scheme and the similar English expe-
rience from the South Seas Bubble. CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR
DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS 1-88 (1932). One of the United States'
supreme contributions to market fraud was to serve as the backdrop for the Ponzi scheme.
The entertaining stories of Charles Ponzi's various schemes, tragic stories for his victims,
are told in DONALD H. DUNN, PONZI! THE BOSTON SWINDLER (1975).
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An industry in which operators routinely provide no record of their
prior economic performance invites fraud. Entry is far too easy for the
unscrupulous and the incompetent. Something impedes the flow of basic
facts. It is quite easy to modify the industry contract to ensure that core
facts are disclosed.
The purpose of forcible disclosure is to make sure that sellers, who
have access to a lot of inside information, produce enough inside infor-
mation so that buyers can make informed choices. In this sense, informa-
tion provision is a pro-competitive, not anti-competitive, reform.
[S]ince freely functioning markets require adequate information-
which disclosure helps provide-disclosure, like antitrust, can be
viewed as augmenting the preconditions of a competitive market-
place rather than substituting regulation for competition. 179
Under the federal securities laws,180 Congress requires that sellers
share material information but leaves buyers with the burden of review-
ing the data and assuming the risks of investment. This was Congress's
solution to the fraud and data manipulation that plagued financial mar-
kets in the late twenties and led to the Great Crash of 1929.181 To police
Part of the difference between those who want no regulation and those who accept gov-
ernment intervention seems to be that some market boosters could care less about the
victims of fraud. One would expect that those preaching the virtues of free markets would
lionize investors who enter the economic jungle, take risks, spur innovation, and drive the
economy forward, because entreprenureship is the essence of capitalism's strength. But
look at Stigler's view of securities regulation: "The paramount goal of the regulations in
the security markets is to protect the innocent (but avaricious) investor." Stigler, supra, at
725. It is this "avaricious" investor, the agent of capital activated by Adam Smith's self-
love rather than altruism, who provides the motor for the supposedly efficient capitalist
system.
Charles Mackay in his famous history of the South Sea Bubble is no more sympathetic
with its victims, many of whose lives were ruined by the collapse in shares:
[Niobody blamed the credulity and avarice of the people-the degrading
lust of gain, which had swallowed up every nobler quality in the national
character, or the infatuation which had made the multitude run their heads
with such frantic eagerness into the net held out for them by scheming pro-
jectors. These things were never mentioned. The people were a simple, hon-
est, hard-working people, ruined by a gang of robbers, who were to be
hanged, drawn, and quartered without mercy.
MACKAY, supra, at 72.
Credulous and avaricious people? Avaricious investors? The condemnation has not ad-
vanced much in a century. The fact that securities sellers are able to make false statements
intended to induce buyers' reliance, and succeed in doing so, is no reason for rewarding the
defrauder for its sophistication or punishing the victim for its gullibility. Between the two
parties, the profits of the wrongdoers depend upon their knowing victimization of the
buyer. Fraud damages both the immediate victim and, if repeated and not punished, over
time will subvert the market system which it exploits. Nothing in logic or economics sug-
gests any reason why perpetrators should be rewarded and their victims punished.
179. BREYER, supra note 178, at 161.
180. Another regime of disclosure arises from the duty to produce information under
the good faith bargaining standard in the National Labor Relations Act. This duty recog-
nizes that talking is meaningless if one party refuses to produce facts to discuss.
181. Bowing to political pressure, Congress did exempt state and municipal sellers from
securities regulation, Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 37, at 267-72, and it exempted small
offerings not publicly offered-in essence, trading among groups who should know each
other-from the registration requirements, id. at 307-21.
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the new duty, Congress imposed penalties on those making false and mis-
leading statements.
Disclosure does not restrict individual choice. Investors can assume
any level of risk they prefer. Operators still can offer properties with
hopelessly dismal chances. They still can load programs to the gills with
fees and charges. All disclosure requires is that operators not conceal
what they know. It does not dictate the investor's choice. 182
In spite of the understandably widespread distrust of financial markets
following the Great Crash, in 1933 and 1934 Congress rejected having the
government pass on the merits of proposed stock offerings. President
Roosevelt announced that the federal government would not enter the
business of approving issues (a form of regulation used by some of the
states). Instead, it would ensure that securities were "accompanied by
full publicity and information and that no essentially important element
attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
183
To understand just how moderate this reform was, one need only recall
the devastation of the thirties. Fully half of the $50 billion in securities
issued after the First World War (between 1920 and 1933) became worth-
less.184 The listed value of New York Stock Exchange offerings was $89
billion on September 1, 1929; by 1932 the total value had plummeted to
$15 billion.185 In Kansas, a state that did enter the business of approving
securities, only 100 out of the first 1500 applicants received licenses.1 86
182.
[The] standards governing disclosure, however, do not restrict conduct be-
yond requiring that certain information be provided. The freedom of action
that disclosure allows vastly reduces the cost of deviations from the policy
planner's ideal. At worst, too much information or the wrong information
has been called for.
BREYER, supra note 178, at 163. Disclosure "does ... [not] restrict individual choice as
much as do the other classical forms of regulation." Id. at 161.
While one objection to any regulation is cost, the limited incursion of information disclo-
sure makes this objection less telling for disclosure reforms.
[Dlisclosure regulation does not require regulators to finetune standards as
precisely. The regulators need less information from industry, there are
fewer enforcement problems, there is less risk of anticompetitive harm, and
there is greater probability of surviving judicial review.
Id. at 163.
One very real cost is when disclosure results in the publication of proprietary informa-
tion. In the case of an operator disclosing its economic track record or the accounting
structure of its pending programs, the information is not proprietary information in the
ordinary commercial sense. It may be private, but it is not information that the operator
sells for a profit. The reason some operators keep this information secret is that it would
undercut their sales pitch.
For an example of information that ordinarily is viewed as proprietary but that may fall
under disclosure regulation, see the discussion of dry hole information and Kansas's filing
requirements, infra note 289.
183. James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Acts of 1933, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959).
184. Loss & SELGMAN, supra note 37, at 25; Edward Gadsby, Historical Development
of the SEC-The Government View, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 6, 9 (1959).
185. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 37, at 25.
186. Gadsby, supra note 184, at 8.
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The damage of the Great Depression reminds us that ineffective fraud
enforcement invites costs far greater than the losses to the immediate
buyer and seller. A network of contracts too easily penetrable by fraud
will infect the system of trust that underlies contract exchange. As the
fraud spreads, it will damage the social fabric of exchange as well as the
parties to individual bargains.
The Depression shattered confidence so badly that firms stopped in-
vesting, banks refused to loan, and unemployment rose to the worst levels
in American history. The Gross National Product fell from $182 billion in
1929 to $127 billion by 1933.187 Unemployment jumped from 3.2% in
1929 to 8.7% in 1930, 15.9% in 1931, 23.6% in 1932, and 24.9% in 1933.188
One in four workers was out of work in an economy with far lower labor
force participation than today. The most affected industries, groups, and
regions experienced unemployment rates over fifty percent.189 It would
take World War II to force the "natural" rate below fifteen percent.190
About the only positive results were the regulatory blanket that Congress
imposed on the securities, utility, banking, and labor markets and a some-
what deeper understanding of how markets work and how to control
their excesses. 191
With securities regulation coming as it did during our greatest market
failure, 192 the fact that information regulation was a limited reform was
understood by all. As William Douglas, then an advisor to President
Roosevelt, wrote:
There is nothing in the Act which would control the speculative
craze of the American public, or which would eliminate wholly un-
sound capital structures .... All the Act pretends to do is to require
the "truth about securities" at the time of issue, and to impose a
penalty for failure to tell the truth. Once it is told, the matter is left
to the investor. 193
187. LESTER V. CHANDLER, AMERICAS' GREATEST DEPRESSION 1929-1941 21 (1970).
188. Id. at 34.
189. Id. at 23, 33-47.
190. Id. at 34.
191. The puzzle of why lower wages did not spur businesses to re-employ workers, and
low interest rates did not increase business borrowing, led Keynes to, first, his theory of the
liquidity trap, and, second, to his well-elaborated theory of the need for government inter-
vention to spur demand in times of economic crisis. See JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).
192. John Kenneth Galbraith is correct that the full causes of the Depression remain
uncertain. JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 171 (1979). Galbraith discusses a
variety of economic weaknesses-the "bad distribution" of income, bad corporate and
banking structures, the foreign exchange balance, and the "poor state of economic intelli-
gence" in his list of the reasons for economic decline. Id. at 177-86. Yet the immediate
drop in output and employment following the crash and the crash's effect on business and
consumer confidence put the market fall at the heart of the disaster. To quote Galbraith's
somewhat distancing prose, "any satisfactory explanation of the events of the autumn of
1929 and thereafter must accord a dignified role to the speculative boom and ensuing col-
lapse." Id. at 89-90.193. William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 4 YALE
L.J. 171, 171 (1933); accord Gadsby, supra note 184, at 9 ("Inasmuch as the act is thus
premised upon the principle that full disclosure of all pertinent financial and other material
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The theory behind requiring a full presentation of clear, easily under-
stood information is that investors will learn to make better decisions if
they get the basic facts. The information must be clear yet sufficiently
detailed to give a meaningful picture of the proposed project. As with all
economic indices, the burden of knowing how to use data and the devel-
opment of sophisticated methods of analysis stays with investors.
The effects of this information will not necessarily be uniform (driving
out all bad programs and enhancing all the good ones). Some invest-
ments may be obvious losers if the operator's prior failures are disclosed.
Others, however, will merely appear more risky; some investors will drop
out, others will stick with the program but demand concessions on price
and other terms. Over time, investors and market analysts should be able
to define risks more carefully.
Perceptive observers in the thirties realized that requiring disclosure
would create a market in securities information. The inexpensive availa-
bility of detailed corporate data supported the growth of investment
firms. 1 94 Correspondingly, the stunting of performance measures is one
data should be made to the prospective investor in order that he can make a sound invest-
ment decision, the Commission has no power to evaluate any proposed security offering
nor to prevent the sale of a security under a properly filed and fully truthful and frank
registration statement."); THOMAS HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW i (Federal Judicial
Center 1993) ("After considerable debate, Congress decided not to adopt the merit regula-
tion approach of the state acts, opting instead for a system of full disclosure. The theory
behind the federal regulatory framework is that investors are adequately protected if all
aspects of the securities being marketed are fully and fairly disclosed, leaving no need for
more time-consuming merit analysis.").
As Loss and Seligman state, "there is the recurrent theme throughout these statutes of
disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure. Substantive regulation has its limits.
But '[tihe truth shall make you free."' Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 37, at 8. For Loss
and Seligman's summary of how the Act ended up so predicated upon disclosure, see id. at
22-33. As they note, William Douglas initially was a strong opponent of the limited remedy
of mere disclosure. Id. at 26 & n.12 (citing William Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23
YALE REV. 521 (1934)).
The disclosure model did not spring full-blown from the minds of the New Deal drafters.
The Act built on existing thinking about corporate disclosure. Gadsby, supra note 184, at
6-7. Another influence was Brandeis's widely read argument for disclosure in LEWIS D.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1914). See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 37, at 25
(calling Brandeis "the man who left the greatest mark on the disclosure philosophy of the
initial federal securities regulation in this country ....").
194. Then-Professor Douglas listed these effects in his typically clear prose.
[E]ven the whole truth cannot be told in such simple and direct terms as to
make investors discriminating. A slow educational process must precede
that. Those who need investment guidance will receive small comfort from
the balance sheets, statistics, contracts, and details which the prospectus
reveals. Thus the effects of such an Act, though important, are secondary and
chiefly of two kinds: (1) prevention of excesses and fraudulent transactions,
which will be hampered and deterred merely by the requirement that their
details be revealed; and (2) placing in the market during the early stages of
the life of a security a body of facts which, operating indirectly through in-
vestment services and expert investors, will tend to produce more accurate
appraisal of the worth of the security if it commands a broad enough market.
Douglas & Bates, supra note 193, at 171-72.
Skeptics of regulatory intervention have to argue that markets should develop their own
standards of information flow. See supra note 178. This is because "full" information or
something reasonably close to it is a necessary predicate for an effective market. Theorists
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sign of the oil and gas industry's relative immaturity. As the industry
develops a better sense of how to measure performance, the most compe-
tent operators should benefit. Their projects will come to be seen as less
risky and worth a higher price.1 95
Some will argue that markets would generate this kind of information
if demand was sufficient. The absence of even basic economic informa-
tion, however, suggests that some market failure is preventing that from
occurring. This information has "public good" characteristics that would
make it difficult for an entrepreneur who gathered the data from earning
the return it deserves. The information is non-rival-one party's use does
not limit another's-and largely non-excludable. It is hard to prevent one
buyer from sharing it with others.1 96 (Dry and bottom hole information
seemingly escape this problem because the circle of buyers on any well is
limited, so monitoring unauthorized resales is easier.)197
Not every investor will use more information, and not all who do will
use it well. Over time, however, sophisticated investors will develop bet-
ter methods of analysis. Increased information will stimulate demand for
company measures. This is the same process by which SEC reporting
requirements encouraged development of investing theories based on a
wide variety of profit and asset information.
This Article's emphasis on seeking clear, relatively simple economic in-
formation continues in the same direction as recent SEC reforms. The
Commission recently has recognized that the often contorted risk-empha-
sizing language of many disclosure forms, which can list every possible
thing that could go wrong, may distort more than it enlightens. In the
words of Chairman Arthur Levitt, "the Commission's passion for disclo-
sure has interacted with portfolio managers' thirst for flexibility and law-
like George Stigler do not explain why, if markets should function efficiently to provide
accurate information for investors, so many worthless securities could have been sold
before the Great Crash (investor folly? irrational desire for risk?). Nor does his theory
explain why it should be so easy for companies like Prudential and Home-Stake to defraud
investors. Even if investors are greedy, no one would invest in a program that was consist-
ently generating losses-which was the case in these investments-if they had full informa-
tion. Something in the nature of the product, including the factors listed in Part V.B. infra,
is preventing the oil and gas market from operating as it should.
195. Competent operators are the often unacknowledged victims of an industry that has
failed to develop widely accepted measures of risk. These operators are forced to compete
against less skilled operators who disguise their poor records with loose talk of completion
ratios, investment volume, and cash distributions, all short-term measures that can be hard
to discredit in the absence of more detailed financial information but that often mean little
about the true merit of the venture. Let the market get used to effective measures of
performance. It should begin to differentiate and reward the best operators more effec-
tively than it has in the past.
196. For a discussion of oil and gas market imperfections, see supra Part V.B. The
classic articles on public goods are Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expendi-
tures, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387-89 (1954); Paul A. Samuelson, A Diagrammatic
Exposition of the Theory of Public Expenditures, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350, 350-56
(1955); see also EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALY-
sis 305-08 (1978); HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE ch. 5 (3d. ed. 1992).
197. Cf. infra note 289.
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yers' instinct for ironclad liability protection. 1 98 The unfortunate result
"has been prospectuses that are more redundant than revealing." 199 To
improve disclosure, the SEC has been encouraging prospectuses written
in plainer language, with a better presentation of information, and the
development of "profile prospectuses" that display "a concise summary
of salient points. '200 The recommendations in section IV make the same
emphasis on simple, clear information.
D. DECISION THEORY SUPPORTS THE ARGUMENT THAT INVESTORS
NEED MORE FRONT-END INFORMATION
Research into organizational behavior supports the importance of pro-
viding objective historical information at the start of an investment. Uni-
versity of California psychologist Daniel Kahneman and Professor of
Business Dan Lovallo have summarized the recent research into attitudes
toward business risk.20 1 This research offers several reasons why inves-
tors start out overly optimistic.
Kahneman and Lovallo describe what they term "isolation errors,"
which occur because "forecasts of future outcomes are often anchored on
plans and scenarios of success rather than on past results, and are there-
fore overly optimistic. ' 20 2 Business forecasting tends toward an "inside
view," the approach "overwhelmingly preferred in intuitive forecast-
ing."' 20 3 The inside approach "focus[es] on the case at hand, by consider-
ing the plan and the obstacles to its completion. '204 As they describe it,
An inside view forecast draws on knowledge of the specifics of the
case, the details of the plan that exists, some ideas about likely obsta-
cles and how they might be overcome. In an extreme form, the in-
side view involves an attempt to sketch a representative scenario that
captures the essential elements of the history of the future.20S
The oilfield corollary to the inside view is trying to predict the exact
path-days of drilling, problems encountered, and so on-of each well.
The smarter approach is the outside view, which is "essentially statisti-
cal and comparative, and involves no attempt to divine future history at
any level of detail. '206 In the context of oil and gas, this would involve
looking at the operator's record, or even industry averages in a particular
area. Kahneman and Lovallo argue that the outside view is nearly certain
to be a more accurate predictor.207 The reason lies in the great difficulty
198. Remarks of chairman Arthur Levitt at the Second Annual Symposium for Mutual
Fund Trustees and Directors, at 5, Washington D.C., April 11, 1995.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive
Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. ScI. 17 (1993).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 26.
204. Id. at 25.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 25-27.
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of predicting the exact path on which any complex action will play out.
Even if the inside analysis, the plan that the investor thinks is the most
likely, happens to fix on the single most likely outcome, that will be only
one of a number of possible outcomes.
In an oilwell project, for instance, drilling a producing well may be the
single likeliest result, but the likelihood may be only twenty percent. The
operator might slip up and allow the lease to lapse; drain the joint ac-
count with secret discounts; misread geological information and drill a
dry hole; suffer a blowout; be unable to connect a gas well to a pipeline;
and on and on.
Although some scenarios are more likely or plausible than others,
it is a serious error to assume that the outcomes of the most likely
scenarios are also the most likely, and that outcomes for which no
plausible scenarios come to mind are impossible. In particular, the
scenario of flawless execution of the current plan may be much more
probable a priori than any scenario for a specific sequence of events
that would cause a project to take four times longer than planned.
Nevertheless, the less favorable outcome could be more likely over-
all, because there are so many different ways for things to go
wrong.208
Kahneman and Lovallo offer a number of reasons why businesses in-
cline toward the inside, risk-surmounting view. One is the "massive evi-
dence" in psychological studies that people "are generally overconfident
in their assignments of probability to their beliefs. ' '209 Overconfidence
shows up not only in the inaccuracy of ratings that one's beliefs are accu-
rate, but in studies that entrepreneurs overestimate their probabilities of
success. The tendency to minimize risk is accentuated by the "delusions
of control" among managers who "commonly view risk as a challenge to
be overcome, and believe that risk can be modified by 'managerial wis-
dom and skill.' ' 210 Third, there may be a process of natural selection
within the corporate structure, but with the selection perversely favoring
the least fit. If investments have to survive an adversarial review process,
it may be that only projects with highly exaggerated projections will sur-
vive, even if these are the projects most likely to fail.211 Exaggerating
likely returns and downplaying expected risks are even likelier in corpo-
rate cultures where pessimism is viewed as disloyalty, as a lack of faith in
the corporation's capacity to compete. Finally, corporations may adopt
optimistic plans believing that this is the best way to spur employees to
208. Id. at 25.
209. Id. at 26.
210. Id. at 27 (citations omitted).
211. Id. at 27-28. One irony of this tilt toward riskier projects is that well-considered
projects that have a realistic prospect of a solid return get shoved aside for unrealistic
projects offering very high but implausible returns. Corporations may forego chances for
gradual but consistent growth and waste their capital in projects more likely to result in
losses.
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higher performance. 212
Any tendency to focus on an optimistic inside analysis means that oper-
ators start out with an advantage. Investors need the "outside" data of
their operator's prior drilling record (which incorporates all risks that af-
fected the prior programs, not just those the operator cares to discuss). If
the predicted future is much better than the operator's past, even many of
the dumbest or most optimistic investors will ask more questions.
E. THE LAWS OF FRAUD, FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND SECURITIES
REGULATION Do NOT ADEQUATELY DETER FRAUD
One reason that investors need more contract protection is that tort
remedies have failed to do the job. Tort law has not deterred enough
fraud. The law of fiduciary duty, for instance, appears to have had little
or no deterrent effect on operators. One reason may be that the standard
applied to operators remains unclear. Many courts and some commenta-
tors treat the operator as a fiduciary,213 but others leave the issue to the
212. Id. at 28. Bad faith may be demoralizing, which in turn can reduce performance.
So, too, optimism may increase effort, which can increase productivity.
The same factors may work on an aggregate scale. For instance, assume a society that
can pick among a group of ten $1000 investments, each of which has a 20% chance of
success. Losers are really losers and get nothing, winners make $3000. While the risk dis-
counted expected return is a mere $600 (a 20% chance of $3000 and 80% chance of noth-
ing), all 10 investors may make the investment if each believes that he or she can surmount
those risks by greater skill. If an investor thinks that its skill raises its odds of success to
50%, for instance, it will expect to earn $1500 on its $1000.
The gamble becomes even more interesting with the possibility of technological advance.
If the investments are in a new technology, then the 2 investors of 10 who earn $3000 also
identify which of competing technologies will make a major gain in productivity. In the
next round, unless the new technology is patentable, all 10 investors adopt variants of the
new technology, and they produce $30,000 with their ten $1000 investments. If the tech-
nology earns a higher return because it is three times as productive as prior techniques,
there may be a permanent social gain in efficiency even if the market quickly brings the
short-run 300% return back to the competitive rate of profit.
213. The two major commentators on this area of oil and gas law, and certainly the
dominant theorists in the area, both concluded, a generation apart, that the operator rela-
tionship has fiduciary attributes. See Howard R. Williams, The Fiduciary Principle in the
Law of Oil and Gas, 13 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 201, 274-75 (1962):
Wherever the owner of an interest in oil and gas has a power with respect to
another person's interest in oil and gas, the courts are quick to imply a duty
in connection with the exercise of such power. Power begets responsibilities
and duties. A fiduciary principle becomes applicable .... It appears a safe
prognosis to declare that to an increasing extent we may expect fiduciary
principles to be applied to various relationships involving interests in oil and
gas.
Ernest E. Smith, Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to Nonoperators, Investors,
and Other Interest Owners, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 12-1, 12-14 (1986) (citations
omitted):
One can, I think, safely start with the assumption that in the absence of other
factors modifying the relationship, the operator owes a fiduciary duty to the
nonoperators with respect to the ventures contemplated by their agreement.
This general assumption is justified both by the broad proposition that any-
one who undertakes to act on behalf of another is, in a general sense, a fidu-
ciary for that person and by the joint venture analysis.
Accord Howard L. Boigon, Liabilities and Relationships of Co-Owners Under Agreements
for Joint Development of Oil and Gas Properties, 37 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 8-1,
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8-20 (1986) ("[I]n states other than Texas the conduct of operations under a typical joint
operating agreement or other comparable arrangement will likely lead to findings of fiduci-
ary responsibilities between the co-owners .... "); cf Howard L. Boigon, The Joint Operat-
ing Agreement in a Hostile Environment, 38 INST. ON OIL & GAS. L. & TAX'N 5-1, 5-5
(1987) ("The JOA, even in its unaltered form, has been construed by the courts in most
states-with the notable exception of the Texas courts-to create something more than a
passive cotenancy or a mere service contractor relationship."); Christopher Lane & Cathe-
rine J. Boggs, Duties of Operator or Manager to Its Joint Venturers, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 199, 209 (1983) ("The problem ... that [joint operation] relationships pose is that as
soon as any element of control or voice in operational decisions is shared, all the character-
istics of the joint venture or mining partnership are present: (1) joint ownership; (2) co-
operation/joint operation; and (3) agreement to share profits and losses. Absent a contrac-
tual provision to the contrary, it is highly likely that a court would hold that a joint venture
or mining partnership exists.").
Behind these comments lies a substantial body of law. A number of courts have defined
the operator as a fiduciary as a matter of law using joint venture analysis. See, e.g, Black-
stock Oil Co. v. Caston, 87 P.2d 1087, 1089 (Okla. 1939), followed in Britton v. Green, 325
F.2d 377, 383 (10th Cir. 1963). For other cases finding the operator to be a fiduciary under
joint venture analysis but using a more fact-intensive analysis, see Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc.
v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1098 (5th. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); In re Mahan
& Rowsey, Inc., 35 B.R. 898, 901 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); Oklahoma Co. v. O'Neil, 440
P.2d 978, 984-85 (Okla. 1968). For a "mining partnership" theory that appears identical in
application to the joint venture test in spite of the nominal added requirements of a "com-
munity of interest" and mutual agency, see Sparks Bros. Drilling Co. v. Texas Moran Ex-
ploration Co., 829 P.2d 951, 954 (Okla. 1991); Oklahoma Co., 440 P.2d at 984.
A separate and perhaps even more common route has been to find a fiduciary duty to
the extent of the obligations imposed by the JOA. Here the lead case is Reserve Oil, Inc.
v. Dixon, 711 F.2d 951, 952-53 (10th Cir. 1983). For cases following Reserve Oil in areas
beyond its distribution-of-shares issue, see Doheny v. Wexpro Co., 974 F.2d 130, 134-35
(10th Cir. 1992) (citing Reserve Oil's holding that the "contract created a trustee type rela-
tionship"); Envirogas, Inc. v. Walker Energy Partners, 641 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (W.D.N.Y.
1986) (cautioning against reading Reserve Oil to automatically find operator a trustee,
"since it is based upon the specific operating agreements at issue in that case [ignoring the
standardization of most operating agreements and not discussing whether its agreement
was the standard agreement]," but still finding it a "useful analogy" and concluding in
ruling on injunction that "it appears likely from all of the terms of the contract" as well as
parties' relationship that defendant was a fiduciary); Mahan & Rowsey, 35 B.R. at 898;
Andrau v. Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 712 P.2d 372, 375 (Wyo. 1986) (Reserve Oil
contract created "narrow trustee-type" duty in distribution of shares).
Several other cases read Reserve Oil as applying a separate line of cases that make oper-
ators in unitized properties fiduciaries, although one would go blind before finding a word
in Reserve Oil that depended upon the unitized nature of the properties. (And, in addition,
one would have to ignore the reason the court did give for its decision, namely that the
contract gave rise to the duties the court found.) For such uses of Reserve Oil, see Shearn v.
Ward Petroleum Corp., 808 F. Supp. 1530, 1532 (W.D. Okla. 1992); Leck v. Continental Oil
Co., 800 P.2d 224, 228-29 (Okla. 1989).
Still other courts have read a fiduciary duty into the operating agreement without citing
Reserve Oil or providing much elaboration of their reasoning. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Sidwell Corp., 678 P.2d 118, 120-21 (Kan. 1984) (confirming constructive trust
imposed after trial to court); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 668
S.W.2d 16, 17 (Ark. 1984) (finding relationship of trust and confidence as a result of execu-
tion of joint operating agreement in case over operator's secret acquisition of leases after
learning of failure of title in subject property); Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 944-46
(Tex. 1977)(joint ownership and enterprise created fiduciary duty of "limited joint ventur-
ers" to extent of joint property, but did not extend to operator's acquiring adjoining lease
for another property); Beadle v. Daniels, 362 P.2d 128, 130-31 (Wyo. 1961) (operating
agreement created fiduciary duty that prevented operator from charging investors higher
price on pumping equipment than operator had paid).
In addition to these cases about the general operator relationship, a number of courts
have defined subcategories of operators whom they treat as fiduciaries. For instance, many
jurisdictions define unit operators, operators of properties forcibly combined under state
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jury or impose a lower standard like contract good faith. 214 And even
courts that find a fiduciary duty may limit it to the express terms of the
statutes for conservation or other reasons, as fiduciaries as a matter of law. See Young v.
West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, 275 P.2d 304, 309 (Okla. 1954); Leck, 800 P.2d at 229.
For cases citing Young with approval or at least seemingly accepting the rule that unit
operators are fiduciaries, see Reserve Oil, 711 F.2d at 953 n.4; Shebester v. Triple Crown
Insurers, 974 F.2d 135 (10th Cir. 1992); Garfield v. True Oil Co., 667 F.2d 942, 944 (10th
Cir. 1982); Shearn, 808 F. Supp. at 1532 (citing Young, as well as Reserve Oil, Leck, and
Olansen, for proposition that "a unit operator stands in a fiduciary or trustee-like status as
to the interest owners in a well"); Teel v. Public Serv. Co., 767 P.2d 391, 396 & n.9 (Okla.
1985) (citing Young for general proposition that when cotenants name one of themselves as
operator, "they become coadventurers in the enterprise and stand in a fiduciary relation-
ship to one another"); Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 732 P.2d 1286, 1298 (Okla. 1987)
(citing Young for rule that the unit is "the agent and trustee of all royalty owners" and
finding the duty breached); Pritchett v. Forest Oil Corp., 535 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (describing Young as holding that "the unit organiza-
tion and its operator were held to occupy a position similar to that of a trustee for the
benefit of all those interested in the oil production, either as lessees or royalty owners," but
then blessing operator's concealment of accurate reserve information from royalty owner
who was thinking of selling interest by holding that duty to provide reserve data did not fall
within the operator's fiduciary duty); see also Olansen v. Texaco, Inc., 587 P.2d 976, 984-85
(Okla. 1978); Andrau, 712 P.2d at 373-74.
Many jurisdictions treat an operator who holds "executive rights," the right to control
the mineral development of the property, as a fiduciary. The leading case is Manges v.
Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 181-82 (Tex. 1984). For later cases following Manges, see Dearing,
Inc. v. Spiller, 824 S.W.2d 728, 732-34 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (finding
executive who hid competing offers at time of lease renewal was a fiduciary); Mims v.
Beall, 810 S.W.2d 876, 879-80 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ) (upholding actual and
punitive damages against executive rights holder who accepted unusually low royalty but
also took overriding royalty that it argued did not have to be shared with royalty owners);
Comanche Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Adams, 688 S.W.2d 914, 915-16 (Tex. App.-East-
land 1985, no writ) (executive breached fiduciary obligation by entering joint venture
rather than royalty arrangement so that it could avoid paying royalties).
Two other executive rights cases imposed a fiduciary duty by straightforward application
of agency and trust principles. See Teas v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 178 F. Supp.
742, 749-50 (N.D. Tex. 1959) (executive acts as trustee for royalty owners and could not
enter lease that redefined additional payment just so that nonexecutive would not share it);
Donahue v. Bills, 305 S.E.2d 311, 312-13 (W. Va. 1983) (holding executive power to be an
agency coupled with an interest and concluding that executives "will be held to strict fidu-
ciary standards");
Courts also apply fiduciary duties to operators serving as grubstake holders, a kind of
exploratory operator. See Webster v. Knop, 312 P.2d 557, 560 (Utah 1957); see generally 2
HOWARD WILLIAMS & CHARLES MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 436, at 515 & n.3 (1989).
On top of these formal duties, all operators who use partnership formats are fiduciaries
as a matter of law. See, e.g., In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255, 271 (W.D. Okla.
1983). Another very large group of fiduciary operators are those who have settled rela-
tions of trust and confidence with their investors. This is an "informal" fiduciary relation-
ship, one whose elements of trust and confidence must be proven factually to the jury.
E.g., Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex.
1992).
214. Joint venture or trust-type theories have widest sway in cases decided under
Oklahoma law. Texas courts, in contrast, repeatedly have held that the JOA alone does
not create a fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1023-24 (5th
Cir. 1994); Ayco Dev. Corp. v. G.E.T. Serv. Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 185 (Tex. 1981); Luling
Oil & Gas v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 191 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1945); Crowder v. Tri-C Re-
sources, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 393, 399 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ); Taylor v.
GWR Operating Co., 820 S.W.2d 908, 911-12 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ
denied); Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 320-21 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The cases usually cite but then gingerly distinguish Rankin v.
Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 944-46 (Tex. 1977), a case in which the operator was found to be a
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JOA.215
Moreover, whatever fiduciary duty once existed will be restricted in at
least some courts because in 1989, the AAPL amended the JOA to dis-
claim a fiduciary duty. It is not clear whether this disclaimer will be en-
fiduciary, but only after nonoperators proved all elements, including the shared "control"
element, of a joint venture.
Texas provides by statute that "[o]peration of a mineral property under a joint operating
agreement does not of itself establish a partnership." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art
6132b, § 7(5) (Vernon 1970). This seemingly straightforward clause, however, is not as
sweeping as it may seem. It is designed to limit nonoperator liability to third parties for the
operator's conduct, see Johnston v. American Cometra, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 711, 715 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, writ denied), not to shield the operator from its own investors. The
statute prevents supply companies, drilling contractors, and others who do business with
operators from suing every investor individually if the project goes bad and the operator
does not pay them. It does not settle the level of duty that runs from operator to investor.
The Manges fiduciary rule for executive rights holders cited in note 213 supra has found
dissenters, even within the Texas lower courts, some of whom simply refused to follow
Manges. These courts even include a court in the same jurisdiction that decided Manges.
Just a few years later, a Texas court of appeals tried to redefine Manges as a special case
where the operator engaged in self-dealing and argued that the general rule was one of
good faith, not a broad fiduciary duty. Pickens v. Hope, 764 S.W.2d 256, 265-69 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied). An even stronger authority came out in favor of
the good faith rule when Professor Smith wrote an article arguing that Manges should not
be construed as creating a per se fiduciary rule. Ernest E. Smith, Implications of a Fiduci-
ary Standard of Conduct for the Holder of the Executive Right, 64 TEX. L. REV. 371, 372
(1985). Louisiana has limited the executive holder's duty to one of good faith by statute, a
standard that increases the prior duty but falls short of a tort duty. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31:109 (West 1989). See also Pilcher v. Turner, 530 So.2d 198, 200-01 (Ala. 1988)
(defendants not required to share bonus and delay payments, and no trust relationship);
Schroeder v. Schroeder, 479 N.E.2d 391, 397-99 (II1. App. Ct. 1985) (surveying standards
and adopting rule of "utmost good faith").
Courts that use fact-based tests, whether under a joint venture analysis or another the-
ory, obviously make the precise duty governing the operator more difficult to predict.
Such uncertainty removes much of the deterrence that a clear fiduciary duty would pro-
vide. Consider, for instance, how Professor Smith's concluding summary of the actual state
of the law compares with his initial remarks cited at note 213 supra:
The above examples should, however, demonstrate the problem with at-
tempting to define and apply a single general standard of conduct to all situa-
tions in which a controversy may occur. . . . A court in interpreting an
operator's duties should not lose sight of such customs and usages, including
the reasons underlying the operating agreement in question. Such an ap-
proach suggests that the appropriate standard applicable to the operator may
range from strict compliance with contractual obligations to observance of
strict fiduciary duties, depending upon the language of the operating agree-
ment and the context of the dispute.
Smith, supra note 213, at 12-57. In other words, the supposed rule may be no rule at all.
For three articles opposing a fiduciary duty, see Gary Catron, The Operator's 'Fiduciary'
Duty to Royalty and Working Interest Owners, 64 OKLA. BAR J. 2761 (1993); Henry J.
Eyring, Note, The Oil and Gas Unit Operator's Duty to Nonoperating Working Interest
Owners, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1293 (1987); Sharon K. Schooley, Note, Fiduciary Protection
of Nonoperating Oil and Gas Interests Against the Acts of an Operator, 18 TULSA L.J. 496
(1983).
215. For some cases applying the JOA to limit the fiduciary duty, see Dime Box Petro-
leum Corp. v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 717 F. Supp. 717, 723 (D. Colo. 1989),
affid, 938 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1991); Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 920 (1960); In re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc. 35 B.R. 898 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1983).
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forceable. 216 At a minimum, however, the amendment expands the
confusion in an already troubled area.
Investors who are cheated can fall back on the common law of fraud.
Yet fraud claims are an uncertain route to recovery in these cases. Many
of the crucial representations will be oral. Should a prospect turn out
poorly, the operator will say that the Statute of Frauds bars claims 217 and
will wax philosophic about the risks of the business, while developing am-
nesia about exactly what it said.218 The investor is left with the difficult
job of establishing that the operator made the oral representations and
that they were sufficiently specific to be actionable.
The law of fraud has not proven equal to this task, just as it had not
proven sufficient to deter the abuse that preceded federal securities regu-
lation.219 Some representations are clearly false, as when an operator
216. For arguments that a blanket disclaimer is not likely to be enforced, see Lane &
Boggs, supra note 213, at 228-38 (urging parties wanting to disclaim duty to disclaim spe-
cific duties or acts, because disclaimer of overall duty likely to be ineffective).
217. The defense that "you didn't catch me in writing" is as inevitable in a fraud case as
is "you didn't rely on me," or, better yet, "you should have known." The defenses will
appear as quickly as the defense lawyer can hit the "list defenses" button on the computer.
Thus in the Davis Oil case, the ninth defense was "To the extent that plaintiff seeks relief
on the basis of contracts or agreements that are not in writing, such relief is barred by the
applicable statutes of frauds and the applicable rules governing the proof of obligation."
Defendants' Answer to the Third Amended Complaint, supra note 25, at 3. The four-
teenth defense (out of sixteen) was that "Plaintiff's claims are barred in whole or in part by
those provisions of the Exploration and Operating Agreements between the parties that
govern the statement, payment, audit, and adjustment of bills rendered to non-operators."
Id. at 4.
In Longhorn, the defendants argued that they could be liable only for the written state-
ments in their offering circulars.
As each offering circular explicitly stated, only those statements contained
within the offering circular itself were authorized by the Longhorn defend-
ants. Any statements allegedly made to any plaintiff which were not in-
cluded in the offering statement were not authorized by the Longhorn
defendants. If made, such statements were made without the knowledge and
authorization of those presenting the programs and were not and could not
be relied upon by any of the plaintiffs.
Pretrial Order, Final Contentions of the Parties, Defendants' Contentions, at 7, Longhorn
(No. MDL 525).
The written-document defense can be raised directly by pleading the statute of frauds
and asserting that there can be no liability for statements outside some written document
(and trying to keep the jury from hearing evidence of oral promises). It is also integral to
defenses like waiver, estoppel, or assumption of the risk when they are based on written
warnings. Consider, for instance, Prudential and Graham's position that "all the risks were
fully disclosed to investors" and that their 200-page prospectuses "explicitly warn[ed] that
fluctuating oil prices created significant risk and that 'no assurance can be given that part-
nership payout will be achieved."' Paltrow, supra note 78, at A16. One would not lose any
money betting that had the Prudential case gone to trial, (1) the company would have tried
to exclude all statements that deviated in the slightest from these warnings; and (2) even if
everything came in, it would have argued that the small print was what investors really
relied upon.
218. E.g., supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text (describing one such
metamorphosis).
219. Before the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, "[s]atisfaction of the common-law
requirements of fraud raised almost insurmountable barriers to recovery. The road of in-
vestors has not been an easy one owing to the common-law insistence on scienter, reliance,
and causation." Douglas & Bates, supra note 193, at 174. The common law obviously had
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misstates the location of dry holes or claims false production rates. In
other circumstances, however, as when the operator is projecting what a
well will produce, the law has a harder time. Fraud is a misstatement of
fact or a promise to act that is contrary to present intention. Is it fraud
when an operator, having portrayed itself as an expert, tells investors
what a well "will" or "could" do? Here the common law stumbles into a
vast gray area between representations that are clearly false and those
that are "mere" statements of opinion, with the standard of care increas-
ing as the operator claims more expertise.220 Moreover, the common law
not provided enough protection, because common law torts had not prevented the ener-
getic circulation of worthless securities that fueled the market's downward spiral in 1929.
The same deficiencies in the judgmental nature of common law fraud, with its requirement
of "reasonable" reliance (rather than simple reliance, period) on even the most deliberate
and outrageous lies, have prevented common law fraud from keeping the industry free of
deception. Fraud can even put a premium on making outrageous lies, to lay the predicate
for the defense that "no one would have relied on my crazy statements."
Defendants have nothing to lose by arguing that the investor understood the risks and
decided to take them, but that when the investment fared poorly (the risks occurred), the
investor looked around for an excuse to get its money back. That is the justification for
having a reliance standard-it is not fair to restore the money of someone who would have
invested anyway and would have pocketed the winnings happily if the project turned out
well. Yet if operators believe that investors would not rely on the operator's prior eco-
nomic results, they should just produce this information. Past performance would be use-
ful to those partners who do want to measure the operator's efficiency, and producing that
information (assuming it is reported truthfully) would give the operator (not the investor)
much more protection in the event of litigation.
The next note discusses some of the problems with the common law of fraud as an
oilpatch remedy.
220. For instance, what does it mean when an operator promises that an investment in
its program "could be recovered within two years[?]" Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482
F.2d 1093, 1095 (5th Cir. 1973)(emphasis added). This kind of statement often is dis-
counted under common law fraud as an unactionable statement of opinion. (In Nor-Tex,
the investor apparently sued only under the securities laws, perhaps because it had given
up on fraud, perhaps for limitations reasons, perhaps because it felt certain of proving a
cheaper case under the strict liability sections of those laws.)
Does it make a difference if the operator says that "the engineers advise us that at the
end of ten years the Number Two well should still be producing at seven barrels per
day[?]" Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 113 (10th Cir. 1959) (emphasis added). The
Woodward trial court "left no doubt of his opinion that the claim could not be sustained
under common law fraud and deceit." Id. at 116 n.1. Surely the boundary of fraud lies
somewhere in this neighborhood. It should be crossed under any interpretation when an
operator represents that the value of a well "is" this or that amount.
Under the law of fraud, plaintiffs who received even the most direct misstatements face
the added hurdle of proving that they relied on the statements. See, e.g, Gilbert v. Nixon,
429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970) (remanding the variety of misrepresentations described in
notes 20-21 and accompanying text for the jury, but dismissing damages on every well for
which there was not a specific misrepresentation). Operators will argue that the investor
really was gambling on rising prices, a hedge against inflation, or some other factor that
never came up at the time of sale.
Even in cases involving a clear scam, like the Seventh Circuit lawsuit in which the driller
reported recovered frac oil as production, completed noncommercial wells, and announced
traces of gas as a "commercial gas field" in wells drilled for oil, courts applying aggressive
summary judgment standards may have trouble implementing the dictates of fraud law. In
Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Prod. Corp, 982 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1992), a case
involving these problems and more, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for
two promoters, even though they republished the driller's false reports, because "they were
finance types who did not have the technical skills to evaluate an oil well in the field." Id.
at 1137. The court relied on the dishonest driller, and admitted it.
SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
Under proper legal standards, the promoters still should have had to show that they did
not know the frauds, and were not reckless in not knowing, when they republished the
driller's false statements. What skills were the promoters selling, if they were so ignorant
of the business they were urging on their investors? The Seventh Circuit applied a sum-
mary judgment standard under which "we need only draw reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-movant, not every possible inference." Id. (emphasis added). In other words,
Seventh Circuit judges enjoy sitting in the jury box. Though paid to decide only questions
of law, they sua sponte decide the facts too, for free. (But with the results proving yet
again that there is no such thing as a free lunch.) When judges begin weighing the reasona-
bleness of inferences in circumstantial evidence cases, the rush for docket control has be-
gun taking precedence over the cause of justice.
The fact that investors might have gotten really rich had the promises been true, and
worse yet, at very low cost to themselves if they were able to fund their investment with a
letter of credit, often incites a feeling that somehow many boom-period oil and gas invest-
ments were too good to be true and their investors have little room to complain. In Funny
Money, after documenting the extraordinarily casual and unprofessional banking and drill-
ing practices that led to billions of dollars in disastrous programs, Mark Singer nonetheless
calls the bankruptcy laws "a lawyers' relief fund" and describes the resulting litigation with
sarcastic overtones:
If a Penn Square connection existed, the natural thing to do was to holler
fraud and sue. Everybody and his dog sued Longhorn Oil & Gas, Carl Swan,
and J.D. Allen. If a drilling fund operator-or the FDIC or an upstream
bank that had lent money to a drilling fund operator-tried to call an inves-
tor's letter of credit, the investor rushed to court and demanded a restraining
order. Litigants spread all over the map ....
SINGER, supra note 31, at 149, 171-72.
Tellingly, Singer spends no time describing what Swan and Allen said when they lied to
their investors. It is easy for Singer to poke fun at investor gullibility. Anyone can pretend
with Singer to be smart enough to avoid an investment that has turned out poorly, as long
as he does not have to justify what the to-him likable Carl Swan promised investors who
might be risking their life's savings. It may well be true that, had the world turned out the
way the Carl Swan and J.D. Allen predicted, their investors would have made money in an
unseemly, easy way. And we could all be jealous. But this is irrelevant to the fact that
people like Carl Swan and J.D. Allen held themselves out as experts in an industry with its
own technical knowledge, launched factual predictions that had no basis in fact, and made
those predictions because they knew that investors were relying on them. Indeed, the rep-
resentations were calibrated to induce investor reliance.
Swan and Allen said what they did precisely because they knew they were being be-
lieved and their statements taken as fact. If they want to defend themselves later on the
basis that no one could reasonably have believed the world could be this friendly, and so
investors should not have been so dumb as to trust them, they should have had to make
this factual argument to the jury and to explain why, then, they made their dumb
statements.
While some courts and observers may feel superior to investors whom the wisdom of
hindsight shows made the wrong decision, at least two other arguments should prevent this
kind of rush to judgment. First, it is well established that when the defendant holds itself
out as an expert, even statements of opinion can be actionable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF ToRTs § 542(a) (1977) (fraudulent representation of opinion can be actionable, inter
alia, when maker "purports to have special knowledge of the matter that the recipient does
not have," a description that fairly summarizes many operators' sales approach). Virtually
all of the operators discussed in this Article held themselves out at the moment of invest-
ment as possessing special knowledge, to be received and relied upon. Wearing the cloak
of authority, they issued statements that directly contradict such trite conclusions as no one
can predict well costs, reserves, and future prices. In these cases, the jury should be decid-
ing whether the operator should be held to its earlier promises and whether promotional
literature and oral promises were designed to overwhelm the unmentioned small-print dis-
claimers that doubtless found their way into some nook or cranny of the operator's promo-
tional material.
Second, even if an operator makes a statement of opinion, these statements are still
being presented as well-grounded predictions. The investors should at least be able to
conduct discovery to determine whether there was any basis for the prediction. What did
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can exculpate even successful, intentional frauds if it finds deficiencies in
the victim; tortfeasors get off scot free if the operator shows that reliance
was not "reasonable" (that is, who would be dumb enough to even think I
would tell the truth?). This rule of decision can allow operators to keep
ill-gotten gains from investors that they have cheated very deliberately.
The severity of the doctrine of fraud, applied in an industry that sells
products inherently difficult to measure and compare, makes it important
to force operators to publish realistic information at the outset. The dis-
cord between what some operators say when they are soliciting and their
disclaimers in times of post-mortem can be narrowed by requiring accu-
rate track-record information.
Securities law has its own deficiencies. Unfortunately, securities stan-
dards have not been adopted in a way that would ensure effective report-
ing for most operators. Though securities requirements should apply to
many oil and gas investments, 21 they often are ignored. 222 Worse, the
the operator know but omit? For instance, in Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc.,
989 F.2d 1408, 1418-19 (5th Cir. 1993), the trial court rejected misrepresentation claims that
only wells with a "prospect" of a 3:1 return would be drilled. Surely the outcome for such a
claim should vary depending upon whether the operator had any basis to expect such a
return or had ever achieved it in the past. The same operator's apparently true statement
that prior programs had "yielded annual percentages of successful wells varying from sev-
enty-five to ninety percent" was understandably not viewed as a misrepresentation, id. at
1417, although presumably the investor should be able to prove otherwise if the operator
had shifted drilling to riskier areas or if "successful" meant merely completions rather than
economic successes.
In Calpetco, both the trial court and court of appeals seem to have erred in dismissing
out of hand another alleged misrepresentation, that wells would have average producing
lives of 10 to 20 years. The lower court wrote that "a sophisticated investor should not be
able to rely on somebody telling them how long an oil well is going to produce, if it is going
to produce." Id. at 1418. Why not? Different oil fields have distinct producing characteris-
tics. It can be hard to predict the durability or total production from any given well, but it
is fairly easy for experts to predict the average life or production of wells in a known field.
What should not be lost sight of is that the operator is already making predictions about
success in virtually every oil and gas project. If the operator was willing to predict 10 to 20
year well lives, surely the investors have a right to know the basis for this prediction. If it
was pulled out of the air, such conduct would constitute fraud unless the operator tells
investors that its predictions are pure speculation.
221. In Parvin v. Davis Oil Co., 655 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom.
Davis Oil Co. v. Panin, 455 U.S. 965 (1980), the investor Parvin had fought Marvin Davis
and Davis Oil for a dozen years until finally receiving a ruling that its investment was a
nonexempt security and that Davis had to repay the investor.
The status of oil and gas investments as securities is often ignored, but virtually all undi-
vided interests in oil and gas property-the most common form of equity investment-are
securities. This is also true of drilling partnerships and drilling funds. Thus securities law
principles already should apply directly to many oil and gas investments. Unfortunately,
the special oil and gas disclosure principles apply only to publicly traded oil and gas com-
panies. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
222. Some states have tighter regulations. In 1975-76, the Oklahoma Securities Com-
mission conducted a broad ranging survey of 1171 oil and gas operators who had sold
67,083 prospects over a 25-year period, all involving fractional oil and gas interests. Bruce
Day, Securities Regulation of the Sale of Fractional Interests in Oil and Gas Leases: Is
There an Answer for the Small Producer?, reprinted in II Mosburg (ed.), supra note 22, at
213, 215. It is generally accepted that these interests do fall under securities regulation. Id.
Its finding was that only 44 had used a schedule D filing; 121 tried to comply with the small
offering exemption; 29 registered in the states where they sold interests; 66 relied on the
private offering exemption; and only 16 had been subject to enforcement. Id. at 223. It
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SEC and FASB did not include the most common investment forms, joint
equity ventures and limited partnerships, when they required publicly
traded oil and gas companies to publish discounted-reserve values.223
There are many reasons not to wait for tort standards to grow stronger.
One is that the industry will fight any new tort exposure. Fortunately, the
shortcomings discussed in this Article concern a limited number of basic
facts that investors need for rational decisionmaking. This information
can and should be incorporated into the standard industry contract.
F. DISCLOSURE Is NOT PERFECT, BUT IT WILL IMPROVE
INDUSTRY STANDARDS
Another criticism of disclosure is that the information doesn't matter;
those who invest are too eager to put their money in the oilpatch or with
a particular operator to study the operator's history anyway. One re-
sponse to this argument is that operators would not be so reluctant to
produce their prior results if they thought that the information would not
affect their investors. The reality is that most investors would think again
were they shown an operator whose investors habitually lose money. The
fact that investors may not press for this information today is a product of
an industry that traditionally refuses to provide it anyway.
No requirement of disclosure will be so iron-clad that it will prevent all
operators from lying. Prudential and Graham, for instance, borrowed to
sustain cash distributions even though their prospectuses promised that
they wouldn't. Home-Stake exaggerated reserves when it was not even
drilling the promised wells. John King inflated values by buying back
properties for more than they were worth in violation of its cash surren-
der formula.
If these companies had to project economic returns, they might inflate
reserves to make their programs look good. They could build false values
into net value discounting. But the recommended new standards would
force the operators to make their representations in writing, thus ending
the unfortunate litigation over whether oral promises were made (and
enforceable) and should have been relied on.
Only those willing to tell blatant lies would be able to manipulate in-
vestors. And even if some operators keep cheating under tighter stan-
dards, the presence of an industry standard would ensure fairer treatment
by most companies. Better standards would improve the behavior of the
great majority of industry companies that function honestly, but currently
do not provide any performance data.
seems no exaggeration to conclude that, at least until the early eighties, "ilt appears that
the independent oil and gas industry has in practice, at least insofar as it was represented
by these responses, almost completely ignored the registration requirements, and exemp-
tions therefrom, of both federal and state securities laws." Id. at 224. "The industry has
apparently operated in substantial violation of the law for 35 years with no significant en-
forcement action being maintained until the 1975-1976 onslaught of Schedule D abuses."
Id. at 225.
223. See supra note 175.
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IV. THE MECHANICS OF DISCLOSURE
The frame of reference through which oilpatch fraud should be ana-
lyzed is the existing industry contract. It may seem a contradiction in
terms to discuss a contract as a subject for institutional reform. After all,
the strength of the contract process is its flexibility in each new negotia-
tion. Contracts should be supple tools for the unique, party-specific ne-
gotiated path of future relations. Societies provide contract enforcement
mechanisms to support a flowering of freedom, not further rigidification.
As discussed in Part I, though, form contracts facilitate repetitive trans-
actions at minimal cost. Most parties don't want to blaze their own trail
in the forest of possible outcomes in every negotiation. Standardized
contracts reduce costs because they avoid constant negotiations. Embod-
ying a collective learned experience, industry contracts avoid rehashing
the same issues. Moreover, an industry contract can fix the treatment of
many issues that the parties might never consider until a problem arises,
perhaps years after contracting.224 They store principles for a range of
disputes that never would arise over a single contract or in the life of any
two contracting parties.
Model contracts reflect the underlying balance of power between the
ordinary parties (and for a standard contract to have utility, there must be
repeated exchanges between similar parties). To some extent, if fairly
drafted, form contracts can limit the advantage that a more skilled negoti-
ator might extract if it negotiated each term.225
224. One of the problems that emerges in almost every contract case is that at least one
party, often both, has not read its contract. The parties can end up fighting over clauses
that both might have written differently had they paid attention. Lewis Mosburg has a
characteristically colorful description of this problem:
Far too often in oil and gas transactions, parties will scribble their signa-
tures to a lengthy agreement without bothering to thoroughly and carefully
review the terms of the document .... In addition, even when dealing with a
very legitimate company you will frequently find that the contract contains
"fishhook" clauses: provisions that, upon a quick reading, seem to give you
just the rights and impose just the obligations to which you have agreed, but
which, upon a more careful study, actually say something far different.
Lewis Mosburg, Jr., Basic Principles of Oil and Gas Contracts, in Mosburg (ed.), supra
note 4, at 383. Mosburg believes that "a key reason why so many exploration deals are
poorly structured from the standpoint of both parties is the slavish adherence to 'standard'
deals." Id. at 382.
Mosburg is right that a form like the JOA, infra note 227, is designed as a "plain vanilla"
contract that may need modification for special circumstances. Id. at 434-35. That people
could negotiate better deals if they were more careful, however, does not mean that the
terms of standard contracts are not vitally important. Most people don't negotiate every
deal. In many oilfield investments, the deal will be presented without opportunity to nego-
tiate or sold to nonindustry parties who do not have the knowledge to negotiate effectively.
Thus it is particularly important for the form contract to be fair and to remove as far as
possible the "fishhook" clauses that are certain to defeat the expectations of one party.
225. Assuming that the form contract reflects a fair balance of interests-and this Arti-
cle argues that in critical areas, particularly by omission, the JOA and COPAS favor opera-
tors at the great expense of investors-then a form contract may limit the power of more
skilled and leveraged bargainers in at least two ways. The added gains an experienced
operator might extract in a separate bargain with each investor may not exceed the ex-
pected cost of the bargaining. (This expected cost would be measured not only in time, but
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This section focuses on the model contract for the operator-investor tie.
This contract is not an investment contract by any stretch of the imagina-
tion. It is far closer to a procedural manual, with some sharp limits on
nonoperator rights thrown in to boot. The section explains how to mod-
ify these standards to ensure elementary disclosure of economic results.
A. TODAY'S FORM CONTRACT, THE JOA, NEEDS TIGHTER CONTROLS
The touchstone for reform in oil and gas investing is the JOA, the con-
tract that the industry uses in its standard investment. 226 The successive
versions of this contract have done a lot to standardize oil and gas opera-
tions in the last few decades.227
The JOA is a well-tested operations manual, with provisions that limit
the operator's exposure on many of its decisions.228 But it is not con-
also in opening up areas that the bargainer might prefer never get discussed.) Second, the
form contract begins with a presumption of correctness, as it is an industry pronounce-
ment, and deviations from the form may raise general questions of trustworthiness that the
weaker party otherwise would never think of raising. Too many deviations warn that
something is wrong with the operator and can kill the deal altogether.
226. See MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT (AAPL 1989) [hereinafter 1989
JOA].
227. It is widely recognized that the JOA, which in its standard format includes the
COPAS form as Exhibit C, is the controlling document for oil and gas investments. See,
e.g., ANDREW DERMAN, THE NEW AND IMPROVED 1989 JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT:
A WORKING MANUAL 1 (1991) (the AAPL procedures govern "tens of thousands" of
wells); Boigon, The Joint Operating Agreement in a Hostile Environment, supra note 213, at
5-2 (JOA is "typically used to govern joint exploration and development of oil and gas
properties"); Boigon, Liabilities and Relationships of Co-Owners Under Agreements for
Joint Development of Oil and Gas Properties, supra note 213, at 8-3 to -4 (The JOA is "the
instrument which both attorney and client ordinarily anticipate utilizing to conduct joint
development operations."); William Keefe, The Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreement:
Unraveling Some Knots, 36 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18-1, 18-2 (1990) ("[The] model
form is used in nearly every domestic, multiple party venture for the onshore drilling of oil
and gas; ERNEST E. SMITH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS (1993).
No other instrument employed in the exploration and production business receives accept-
ance even approaching that accorded the A.A.P.L. paradigm."); Patricia Moore, Joint Op-
erating Agreements-Is There Really a Standard that Can Be Relied Upon?, 5 E. MIN. L.
INST. 15-I (1984) ("As complex as the oil and gas industry appears to be, and as diverse as
arrangements between oil and gas companies tend to be when dealing with the drilling of a
joint interest well, it is amazing that for over a quarter of a century the industry (majors
and independents alike) has relied upon a Model Form Operating Agreement to cover the
drilling and subsequent operation of joint venture wells."); J.O. Young, Oil and Gas Oper-
ating Agreements: Producers 88 Operating Agreements, Selected Problems, and Suggested
Solutions, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 197, 199 (1975) (A.A.P.L. Form 610 "has gained
such general acceptance, even by major companies, that it may be considered a Standard
Operating Agreement.")
Even as drilling shifts overseas, these forms retain their significance because of the con-
tinuing lead of American companies in the world industry and their propagation of con-
tract forms that have proven valuable in domestic operations. Consider, for instance, the
grounding of the model form that Andrew Derman proposes for international operations
in the standard domestic form. See ANDREW DERMAN, INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS
JOINT VENTURES: A DISCUSSION WITH ASSOCIATED FORMS (1992).
228. There are four major liability limitations in the JOA, all protecting operators at the
expense of their investors.
First, the operator is exculpated from liability "for losses sustained or liabilities incurred
except such as may result from gross negligence or willful misconduct" 1989 JOA, supra
note 226, art. V.A.
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structed to protect nonoperators, particularly not nonindustry nonoper-
ators. It remains primarily a repository of solutions for technical drilling
problems.
The longest article in the JOA, article VI, establishes procedures under
which participants vote on major well operations (for instance, complet-
ing, reworking, and abandoning a well) and going nonconsent. 229 This
article absorbs seven pages, over a third of the JOA. The second longest
provision, article VII, is about "expenditures and liability of parties."
This article consumes four more pages (so together these two articles fill
two-thirds of the JOA) and deals with payment details like liens, security,
cash advances, defaults, rental and other payments, and taxes. Article
VII does have one of the few provisions defining the general operator-
investor relationship, but it tries to disclaim every relationship that might
create a fiduciary obligation.230
Article V defines the operator's general duty. It makes the operator
the parties' expert, giving it "full control of all operations on the Contract
Area. '231 In addition, it imposes a standard of reasonable prudence that
exculpates the operator from liability unless it acts with gross negligence
or willful misconduct.232
Second, beginning with the 1989 JOA, the operator is relieved of a fiduciary duty under
any of the variety of relationships that might give rise to such a duty. The JOA provides
that in "their relations with each other under this agreement, the parties shall not be con-
sidered fiduciaries or to have established a confidential relationship." Id. art. VILA.
Third, again effective in 1989, any liability for overrunning cost estimates is limited to
violations of a good faith standard; barring bad faith, the "[olperator shall not be held
liable for errors in such estimates." Id. art. V.D.8.
Finally, in the COPAS exhibit, billings receive far more protection than statutes of limi-
tation would provide, as they will "conclusively be presumed to be true and correct" unless
the investor takes exception within two years of the end of the calendar year on the invoice
date. COUNCIL OF PETROLEUM ACCOUNTANT SOCIETIES, ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE
JOINT OPERATIONS art. 1.4 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 COPAS].
The JOA's operator-orientation is evident in other places too. For instance, the first
draft of the 1989 amendment to the JOA proposed defining operators as "a trustee of any
funds of the Non-Operators advanced or paid to him" and that "such funds shall not be
deemed the funds of Operator for any purpose but shall be applied strictly to their in-
tended purpose," DRAFT JOA, art. V.D.4 (Nov. 19, 1987); that operators escrow funds
separately for each program if agreed by a majority of nonoperating interest owners, id.
art. VIII.B.3; that the operator act as trustee when it spends program funds; id. art. V.D.4;
that it disclose affiliate use, id. art. V.D.1; and that investors have more liberal operator-
removal provisions (allowing removal of operator owning less than 50% interest without
cause by majority vote), id. art. V.B.1. Each of these amendments was rejected after indus-
try members objected. See generally note 248 infra.
229. After a brief space to identify the initial well, the remainder of pages 5 through 9
define procedures for approving a subsequent well or deepening or sidetracking an existing
well. The provisions include portions on who pays what costs and the order of operations.
Next come sections on completion, reworking and plugging back, "other" operations, and
abandonment. Page 11 has space for the parties to elect their gas balancing treatment. See
1989 JOA, supra note 226, art. VI.
230. See id. art. VII.
231. Id. art. V.
232. Id. art. V.B.1. The rest of this section puts some limits on the just-defined operator
power, including creating a right of removal, endowing investors with a right of reasonable
access, making operators provide cost estimates when asked for them, and limiting billing
for affiliate services. Id. art. V.B., D.1, D.5-6.
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The rest of the JOA contains more technical provisions. Many are rou-
tine clauses like the force majeure clause and the successor clause. The
only other substantive limitation on operator privileges in the JOA is one
that requires sharing acreage or cash contributed to owners in the Con-
tract Area.233
The COPAS (Council of Petroleum Accountancy Societies) "exhibit" is
appendix C to the JOA. COPAS is the industry's standard accounting
form, though the JOA controls in cases of conflict. 234
Many oil and gas investments include a third agreement, an exploration
agreement. The industry has not developed a standard exploration agree-
ment to counterbalance the JOA and COPAS.235 Exploration agree-
ments may list the cost of acreage, how the operator tabulated the cost,
and other acreage information. They may describe the drilling area and
the handling of geological data and other threshold issues. Exploration
agreements probably will become less common as the JOA incorporates
more acreage detail.236
These are the standard forms for equity investors in one or a group of
wells. They have been constructed with a heavy emphasis on operator
concerns. The contracts betray the fact that none arose as efforts to pro-
vide full investor protection. Fundamental investor problems stay un-
touched. The operator does not have to show how well it did finding oil
and gas in the past. The JOA does not list the operator's finding cost
history, how investors did in its prior programs, or any other measure of
how well the operator can perform the job it seeks.
Investors in oil and gas partnerships tend to receive, if anything, even
less information than equity investors. Partnership investors ordinarily
233. The JOA has a standard "Acreage or Cash Contribution" clause requiring anyone
receiving a "contribution" to share it with the other well participants. Id. art. VIII.C. Arti-
cle VIII.C provides that "if any party contracts for a contribution of cash toward the drill-
ing of a well or any other operation on the Contract Area, such contribution shall be paid
to the party who conducted the drilling or other operation and shall be applied by it against
the cost of such drilling or other operation." For acreage, "[i]f the contribution be in the
form of acreage, the party to whom the contribution is made shall promptly tender an
assignment ... in proportion said Drilling Parties shared the cost of drilling the well." Id.
234. Id. art. II.
235. Exploration agreements are sufficiently less common and less standard that they
are not defined in WILLIAMS AND MEYERS' MANUAL, supra note 1. One reason is that
when a group of property owners is ready to develop acreage, they often will define their
rights in the operating agreement. Exploration agreements are more commonly entered to
drill a well if needed to develop geologic information before tying down the terms of devel-
opment, or to take steps toward development before all of the participants are known.
CARLOS SALAZAR, HANDBOOK ON DRAFTING OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AGREEMENTS
2-4 (ABA Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law Section Monograph No. 14
1991); see also id. at 33-40 (discussing issues surrounding when operating agreement may
become effective).
236. For a detailed discussion of these and other common provisions in exploration
agreements, see SALAZAR, supra note 235.
The JOA has incorporated more acreage information by requiring disclosure of burdens
on the subject properties; it has room to go because it does not require disclosure of the
acreage economics. For an explanation of this argument, see McArthur, supra note 2, at
1483.
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sign a contract that almost certainly won't include a COPAS exhibit.
They may receive a prospectus or brochure describing the purpose of the
investment, saying something about risk, and outlining the investment's
structure in very general terms. The contract rarely describes how inves-
tors fared in prior partnerships. They may never know the names and
locations of their wells. They will not receive information on bills and
charges to particular wells. There is no standard Uniform Limited Part-
nership agreement for oil and gas wells.
Operators may incorporate large programs or structure them as drilling
funds instead of as limited partnerships. Shareholder agreements will not
have accounting provisions with the level of detail of the JOA and CO-
PAS. As in the case of large partnerships, the agreements will give very
little information on specific wells. Part II.B. already has shown how vul-
nerable drilling funds can be to wide-scale frauds that injure thousands of
investors.
Though the JOA as the industry contract does devote many pages to
items operators want for smooth operations, including limits on their lia-
bility, it has done little for investor concerns. The JOA has remained
incomplete for at least two reasons. One is immaturity. The JOA is a
relatively youthful legal form. The AAPL issued the first JOA in 1956.
The current JOA is the 1989 Rocky Mountain Model Form, recom-
mended for wells drilled in the continental United States.237
The more fundamental cause of incompleteness, however, is the limited
pool of drafters and their industry orientation. The JOA is a product of
the AAPL, one of the oilpatch's core organizations. The first JOA was
tied directly to industry concerns. This 1956 form was a composite cre-
ated by twenty-six oil companies as a "synthesis" of seventeen compa-
nies' existing forms.238
The AAPL's "mission is to promote the highest standards of perform-
ance for all land professionals, to advance their stature and to encourage
sound stewardship of energy and mineral resources. ' 239 Landmen are
professionals engaged in "landwork," a range of activities whose common
denominator is some relation to the properties on which the operator
drilled. 240 Virtually all landmen work for industry companies.
237. For the history of the JOA, see Young, supra note 227, at 199-202.
238. Mosburg, supra note 4, at 408.
239. AAPL SERVICES FOR MEMBERS, AAPL MISSION STATEMENT (undated brochure)
(on file with SMU Law Review).
240. The current AAPL brochure titled The Choice Of Land Professionals lists six ma-
jor activities encompassed by "landwork":
" Negotiating for the acquisition or divestiture of mineral rights.
" Negotiating business agreements that provide for the exploration for and/
or development of minerals.
* Determining ownership in minerals through the research of public and pri-
vate records.
* Reviewing the status of title, curing title defects, and otherwise reducing
title risk associated with ownership in minerals.
- Managing rights and/or obligations derived from ownership of interests in
minerals.
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The AAPL is not a group with primary loyalty to investors. Landmen
have many obligations, but serving investors is not chief among them.
The publication of "model form contracts and leases," of which the JOA
is but one, is just one of twenty-three services the AAPL performs for its
members.241 Most of its activities develop and police professional stan-
dards.2 42 Its Standards of Practice confirm that landmen's "primary" ob-
ligation is to serve their employers' interest.243 The same primacy of
* Unitizing or pooling of interests in minerals.
AAPL, THE CHOICE OF LAND PROFESSIONALS (undated brochure) (on file with SMU Law
Review).
241. AAPL SERVICES FOR MEMBERS, supra note 239.
242. Id. Like most professional organizations, the landmen have as at least one of their
purposes narrowing the supply of landmen. The AAPL hopes to develop higher levels of
practice. Raising landmen productivity while also reducing the supply of qualified profes-
sionals will enhance job security and income. The first 23 functions listed in the AAPL's
roster of services are full of talk about higher standards, with the vital "higher salaries/day
rates for CPLs" in a section titled "Additional member benefits." Id.
Income protection is precisely what classical and neoclassical economists would predict
as the reason for a profession to close the drawbridge behind its current members. This
certainly was Adam Smith's view:
It is to prevent this reduction of price, and consequently of wages and
profit, by restraining that free competition which would most certainly occa-
sion it, that all corporations, and the greater part of corporation laws, have
been established. ... The government of towns corporate was altogether in
the hands of traders and artificers; and it was the manifest interest of every
particular class of them, to prevent the market from being over-stocked, as
they commonly express it, with their own particular species of industry;
which is in reality to keep it always under-stocked.
ADAM SMITH, AN INOUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
140-41 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds, Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776); see generally MILTON
FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: A PROVISIONAL TEXT (1962) ("Whenever there is licensure, it
is almost invariably in the hands of the existing members of the occupation, who almost as
invariably seek to use it to limit entry." Id. at 161. "In particular, differences in return
between such broad classes of occupations as professional and nonprofessional seem con-
siderably larger than can be explained in terms of differences in costs, non-pecuniary ad-
vantages or disadvantages, and the like." Id. at 222).
Professional organizations also need to promote group cohesion by defining and provid-
ing meaning for the group. Thus at times their vision may float far from the island of group
self-interest into the sea of the larger culture. The AAPL is no exception to this broader
quest for meaning: "Under all is the land. Upon its wise utilization and widely allocated
ownership depend the survival and growth of free institutions and of our civilization."
AAPL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE (undated brochure) (on file with SMU Law Review)
[hereinafter AAPL STANDARDS].
While one can question whether our civilization truly depends upon the "wise utilization
and widely allocated ownership" of land-and, for that matter, whether ownership is
wisely allocated in a society in which the top one percent of the population owns over 36%
of the wealth, EDWARD N. LUTWAK, THE ENDANGERED AMERICAN DREAM 163 (1993)-
this kind of functionalism with blinders helps maintain social order. It lets a wide variety
of professional groups view their contributions as essential to the survival and direction of
society. (There apparently can be unending differentiation of critical functions. Civiliza-
tion would not last long if garbage piled up, so garbage collection is essential to the survival
of the civilization.).
243. AAPL Standard of Practice No. 3 embodies this primacy:
In accepting employment, the land professional pledges himself to protect
and promote the interests of his employer or client. This obligation of abso-
lute fidelity to the employer's or client's interest is primary, but it does not
relieve the land professional of his obligation to treat fairly all parties to any
transaction, or act in an ethical manner.
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representing the industry shows up in the AAPL Code of Ethic's pro-
nouncement that "It shall be the duty of the Land Professional at all
times to promote and, in a fair and honest manner, represent the industry
to the public at large."244 This duty has the purpose of "establishing and
maintaining the good will between the industry and the public and among
industry parties. '2 45
To state the obvious, that the JOA does not give investors the protec-
tion they need in undertaking an oil and gas investment, is not to depre-
cate the many benefits the JOA brings to investors as well as to
operators. This standard contract, the product of thousands of hours of
unpaid labor by industry volunteers, has produced substantial order out
of the chaos that would exist without it. The JOA establishes a basic
actual-cost framework for the standard investment. It creates a package
of accounting procedures to help nonoperators monitor their investment.
And it identifies key decisions on which operators must get investor per-
mission before proceeding. The world that would exist without the JOA
would be far, far less investor friendly.
Yet even though the AAPL has an incentive not to produce a form that
is anti-investor on its face, one so pro-operator that only crazy or truly
ignorant investors would agree to use it, the organization does not have
an incentive to insert clauses whose sole purpose is investor protection.
Nor does it have an incentive to side with investors when the two sides
have conflicting interests, for instance, on such questions as whether op-
erators should be bound by the cost estimates they prepare (as opposed
to the current standard, under which they may be exculpated for even the
wildest inaccuracies as long as they prepare the estimate in "good
faith"), 246 should have to escrow joint account funds, and should have to
describe their past performance no matter how bad.
The difficulty in getting the AAPL to adopt investor-protecting meas-
ures is demonstrated by the reaction to some quite narrow reforms pro-
AAPL STANDARDS, supra note 242, No. 3 (emphasis added). Standard No. 2 does impose
a duty "to protect the members of the public with whom he deals against fraud, misrepre-
sentation, and unethical practices. He shall eliminate any practices which could be damag-
ing to the public or bring discredit to the petroleum or mining industries." Id. No. 2.
One can argue that this fraud-avoiding standard should be enough to ensure that land-
men act in the interests of investors, whenever investors could be at risk for fraud. Yet that
this duty to the public is not a fully effective duty is demonstrated by the fact that the
AAPL-generated industry contract, the JOA, ignores the threshold investment issue of the
disclosure investors deserve to know before they invest-the information needed to mea-
sure the operator's likely performance and test its statements, and the need for an overall
disclosure of the sources of operator profit and incentives in the joint project. As one
would expect, the general exhortation to make sure the public is not cheated, like an attor-
ney's general duty to serve as an officer of the court and further certain judicial-system
purposes, does not in practice overcome the more specific duty to the employer-client. In
addition, rules do not equal behavior, and the fact that landmen's incentives push them
toward employers and against investors only makes the problem worse.
244. AAPL CODE OF ETHics § 1 (undated brochure) (emphasis added) (on file with
SMU Law Review).
245. Id.
246. AAPL, JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT (1987); see also 1989 JOA, supra note 226.
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posed for the 1989 JOA. The first draft included a number of measures
that would have made life safer for nonoperators. Among these were
easier removal of operators (removal without cause by majority vote);
disclosure of affiliate use; escrow accounts for each investment; a trustee-
like duty in spending joint account money; a requirement that the opera-
tor pay its share of joint costs when investor advances were due; and
more stringent AFE provisions with an AFE on every well, apparently
including the first well.247
Major industry companies reacted sharply to these proposals. A
number refused to use the new form.248 As a result, not one of these
247. See supra note 228.
248. For a sample of these comments, see the following letters:
Letter from Thomas Furtwangler, Land Manager, Arco, to AAPL (Jan. 27, 1988) (on file
with SMU Law Review):
From a review of the agreement there appears to be broad based modifica-
tions to the 1982 form which significantly alter long-standing relationships
and traditions, and reach far beyond ARCO's understanding for the scope of
the 1988 Agreement.
Based upon ARCO's internal reviews, the proposed agreement is inconsis-
tent with our basic business strategies and philosophies. If the final agree-
ment remains substantially similar to the existing proposal, ARCO will make
every effort to avoid its use and will continue using the 1982 form.
Letter from Omer Humble, Land Coordinator, Exxon, to AAPL (Jan. 27, 1988) (on file
with SMU Law Review):
The proposed 1988 610 form contains many provisions which would greatly
increase the administrative burden on Operators. Many of these changes are
incompatible with Exxon Company, U.S.A.'s preferred operating practices.
As a whole, we believe the new form adds too many additional administra-
tive burdens on the Operator and changes too many current industry operat-
ing practices. This proposed form would necessitate the negotiation of so
many modifications that it is unlikely that our company would adopt it for
standard use.
Letter from George Potter, Senior Counsel, Hunt Co., to AAPL (Jan. 29, 1988) (on file
with SMU Law Review):
The consensus of the Hunt personnel reviewing the draft of the proposed
form, however, is that the form seems somewhat biased in favor of the Non-
Operator party. We are afraid that adoption of a form biased in this direc-
tion will not be well received in the industry and may restrict the utility of the
1988 Form.
Letter from C.M. Van Zandt, Land Manager, Louisiana Land & Exploration, to AAPL
(Jan. 26, 1988) (on file with SMU Law Review):
This form appears to us to introduce many new concepts which we do not
feel fall within the general definition of industry standard practice.
Since we view the primary purpose of the model form Operating Agree-
ment as being to provide a standard which basically enjoys universal accept-
ance, we believe the current proposal containing all its conceptual
modifications will not be readily adopted by the industry as an improvement
to the AAPL.
Letter from J.K. Bramwell, Land Manager, Phillips Petroleum Co., to AAPL (Mar. 8,
1988) (on file with SMU Law Review): "After an extensive review by numerous disciplines
within Phillips Petroleum Company, we regret to inform the association that Phillips can-
not support the far-reaching changes proposed for the Model Form AAPL 610 Operating
Agreement."
Letter from Thomas Lynch, Chief Counsel, Sun, to AAPL (Jan. 27, 1988) (on file with
SMU Law Review): "Sun will be unable to use the revised form and we will resist the
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efforts of others to use it when we are a party. Accordingly, we urge the AAPL not to
approve the proposed changes." [To make sure it applied pressure where pressure was
needed, Sun copied its comments to many of the most powerful members of the AAPL:
Exxon, Amoco, Chevron, Arco, Conoco, Mobil, Phillips, Shell, and Texaco.]
Letter from A.R. Kuhn, Regional Land Manager, Union Pacific Resources, to AAPL (Jan.
28, 1988) (on file with SMU Law Review):
[Ilt is our opinion that the product is much too complex and very unwieldy,
and we urge that publication in the present form not occur.
It is my own belief that most of the major revisions being proposed will be
unacceptable to at least one owner in nearly all of our deals so that negotia-
tions will be more complicated and lengthened. I am afraid too that costs of
legal representation will rise as few operators will be comfortable with these
proposals or variations of these proposals without special advice.
The Kilroy Company submitted comments through a landman who had been a member
of the 1982 committee. Letter from Winston Davis, Land Manager, Kilroy Co., to Council
on Petroleum Accounting Standards (Dec. 16, 1987) (on file with SMU Law Review). It
argued that in prior revisions, the AAPL had "attempted to retain the fundamental con-
cepts and basic intent of John H. Folks and the other drafters of the original 1956 form."
Id. It dismissed the many new proposals for the 1989 JOA as proposals that had been
either "analyzed at length, debated, and rejected by both the 1977 and 1982 Committees as
being beyond the intended, general scope of the form" or, if not hashed over before, as
being "so totally foreign to the fundamental concepts inherent in all prior AAPL-endorsed
Operating Agreements as to have never been considered for adoption." Id.
The Company then gave what is probably a fairly representative definition of the indus-
try's view of the purpose of the JOA:
For 31 years the AAPL Form 610 has retained its general form and charac-
ter and, in so doing, has made an immeasurable contribution to the industry.
The form has been refined and updated by committees and subcommittees
composed of AAPL members from both majors and independents, repre-
senting each geographic area of industry activity. Each such revision has re-
flected what was considered by clear committee consensus to be the then
existing practices of "industry" in general. The form has never created "new"
industry practices or served as a vehicle for company or personal prefer-
ences, "pet" provisions, or regional bias.
Id. (emphasis added).
Amerada Hess submitted its comments through the former chair of the 1982 Special
Forms Committee, Mr. Charles Sanford. Letter from Charles Sanford, Land Manager On-
shore, Amerada Hess, to AAPL (Jan. 27, 1988) (on file with SMU Law Review) [hereinaf-
ter Sanford Letter].
As a Land Manager, I would not propose or accept the 1988 O/A as now
drafted. The 1988 O/A has many new provisions which are detrimental to
the Operator (and maybe even administratively and operationally impossible
to abide by as Operator), including but not limited to ease by which an Oper-
ator could be removed.
By comparison, Sanford praised the 1982 Committee and its deliberations, in which he
claimed that "only serious consideration and discussions were given to those proposals
which appeared to have wide industry support." Id. at 2.
Sanford, too, was offended by many parts of the new form. He traced its deficiencies to
a failure in the process used for revision. As he recounted the way amendments were
made in 1982, that committee began with a representative membership "of six (6) working
landmen who then averaged well over 20 years of experience from Denver, Midland,
Houston, Fort Worth, New Orleans, and Tulsa." Id. That committee solicited industry
comments by word of mouth and by publishing an article in Landman, the AAPL's
periodical.
Mr. Sanford claimed that of the comments received during the 1982 revisions, "only
serious consideration and discussions were given to those proposals which appeared to
have wide industry support and which (without regional connotation and for special situa-
tions) could be included in a Model Form Agreement." Id. The form accrued legitimacy
because "[o]ver the years, the Model Form Operating Agreements have been used
thousands of times, passed the test of time, are widely understood by the users and, consid-
ering their widespread use, have provoked a minimum of litigation." Id. To enjoy the
SMU LAW REVIEW
changes was adopted. Many companies said that the JOA should docu-
ment only common industry practices, meaning those of operators. Such
an approach, of course, leaves out improvements that might help
investors.
One can tell from comments like these that the AAPL is not likely to
adopt disclosure rules just because nonindustry investors would benefit
from more information. The organization has not found an effective way
to give voice to nonindustry investors. If the AAPL fears a few added
accounting restrictions, it will be much more offended at a broad-based
requirement of disclosing prior economic results. Yet this disclosure is
necessary to restore the proper level of nonindustry funding to the indus-
try. Many experienced industry companies also would benefit from more
information. It is only insularity and short-sightedness that prevents in-
dustry companies from admitting that they too could use more knowl-
edge about the past performance of the companies in whose projects they
invest.
B. OPERATORS MUST DISCLOSE RETURN-BASED MEASURES OF
PRIOR INVESTOR RESULTS
Establishing that oil companies should disclose their economic history,
though a big step, is not the only step on the path to meaningful disclo-
sure. The industry also must decide the kind of disclosure that investors
need.
The industry's failure to make companies publish their results has
stunted the growth of performance measures, but there are some starting
points. One is the disclosure already required of publicly traded oil and
gas companies.
The securities laws require publicly traded oil and gas companies to
distribute two kinds of information: general economic information and
reserve-based information. Sellers of oil and gas securities must give buy-
ers a current balance sheet and their profits and losses for the prior two
years and list their distributions and payments to the security holders for
the prior three years.249 This standard presumes that investors deserve
clear information about the offeror's economic track record before they
make their investment. It treats past performance as necessary, material
data for current decisions.
In addition to general securities requirements, some securities sellers
face FASB No. 69, requiring that they give a more complete picture of
company performance. These standards recognize the need to provide
more company-specific data.
value inherent in a widely accepted form, he suggested that "the final 1988 Agreement
contain as few changes as possible in order to adhere to the historical acceptance of an
agreement which has proved to be widely understood, successful, useful, practical, and
appreciated." Id. at 3. The form most fully satisfying under an "as few changes as possi-
ble" standard would, of course, be the prior form.
249. 15 U.S.C. § 7711 (1994) (Schedules A(25) and (26)).
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COPAS provides an alternative source of disclosure requirements in its
"evergreen" report of "performance measures. ' 250 This new report, first
issued in 1994, surveys the major performance indices available to the
industry. 251 The report will be updated and reissued periodically.
Thus far, COPAS has identified two primary sources for performance
information: data published by major oil companies and an array of per-
formance measures used by eighteen different sources of comparative
oilfield information. These sources range from Arthur Andersen to
Forbes and Fortune, from Standard and Poor's and Value Line to market
analysts like John Herold and McDep Associates. 252
The first COPAS listing includes over a dozen performance measures.
Most fall into one of two categories: measures of return on investment or
measures based on reserve value. Like the SEC requirements, the CO-
PAS measures are oriented toward publicly traded oil and gas companies.
They exploit the market in information made available by federal securi-
ties requirements. The same information is not available on many joint
equity oil and gas investments and many limited partnerships. Thus these
measures require adjustment to fit prospect and drilling fund projects. A
few measures, like the ratio of the market price of stock to appraised
value, do not have any obvious application to programs that ordinarily
are not widely traded.
Drilling programs also need a different form of disclosure than ordi-
nary securities programs because drilling programs have different timing
than many corporate business cycles. Assuming that long-term trends are
capitalized into stock prices, a few prior years' costs, revenues, and profits
may be a good starting place for analyzing a publicly traded company
with continuous operations. The purchase and sale of stock ties perform-
ance to the price of market securities. All of the risks converge on the
stock price.
There is no similar measure for most drilling programs. Most oil and
gas projects are sold once. If an exchange market exists for the shares, it
is likely to be the nonmarket cash surrender value offered by the opera-
tor. Operators can manipulate prices in this captive market easily.253
250. OIL AND GAS PERFORMANCE MEASURES, supra note 168.
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. At one extreme, Home-Stake Production provided a grudging market as it bought
out investors unhappy enough to have sued. A federal court had certified a class action for
99 purchasers in the Home-Stake 1960 program and 173 purchasers in the 1961 program.
Geo. H. McFadden & Bro., Inc. v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 295 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Okla.
1968). Home-Stake quickly settled with the class representative without providing notice
to class members. The company's president, Trippet, said that, to the best of his recollec-
tion, he "just paid money to the representative plaintiff and nobody else heard about the
case or got anything .... to the best of my recollection." Robert Tippett Trial Transcript at
1554, Home-Stake Prod. (No. MDL 153-R).
The King companies executed a more formalized buyback in their cash surrender pro-
gram, which they used to inflate the apparent value of their programs. The Article de-
scribes the way this repurchase worked supra in notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
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Accurate information faces another hurdle because there can be such a
long lead time between drilling and the final result. Even large oil and
gas programs with fixed terms do not have the continuous adjustment
that characterizes stock prices. A program reaches its first moment of
truth when the formation is tested, but still can require a number of years
to confirm the true results, as evidenced by Prudential's ability to sustain
the appearance of success in seventeen woefully failing programs for
years.
Because of timing variations in the life of many oil and gas programs,
an uncertainty compounded in drilling fund investments when the opera-
tor markets a group of wells scattered across various areas, the standard
securities disclosure of a few prior years' results will mean little. Early
returns can appear high but disguise a quickly depleted reservoir. Alter-
natively, slow returns may hide a lucrative program just waiting connec-
tion to a gathering system or a field. Or initial drilling may discover
marginal wells but development wells then reach the heart of the field.
This kind of timing problem led to FASB No. 69's requirement of project-
ing discounted net cash flows. 254 This information gives a better estimate
of an oil and gas company's achievements. It just needs to be adjusted to
joint account and drilling fund formats.
Most of the performance measures listed by COPAS use return-based
measures. The measures include "total" return and return on appraised
assets, on assets, on investment, on capital, and on stockholders' eq-
uity.255 Of these measures, the return on equity may be most easily fitted
to the standard oilfield format. Return on equity is a measure of "man-
agement's performance in earning a return on the resources the owners
have committed. '256 "For an owner (stockholder) of a company, ROE is
one of the most widely used measures of economic effectiveness on how
management is utilizing their invested capital. ' 257 The "Senior Manage-
ment of many companies use ROE as a primary measure of performance
for a company. '258
Equity investors want to know the average return on the investor dol-
lar. The important return is the net to investors. Investors considering an
oil company's next project need to know what they are likely to make on
their money.
ROE measures can be fitted to programs by requiring operators to re-
port the return they have paid prior investors. Operators need to show
how the investors did in prior programs, rather than how the operator did
or just the total, 8/8ths results, because the profits reaped by an operator
254. FASB No. 69, supra note 170, 30.
255. See generally COPAS, OIL & GAS PERFORMANCE MEASURES, supra note 168.
These measures are explained, and their relative values discussed, at pages 22-43 (total
return), 44-50 (total appraised return), 88-92 (return on assets), 93-95 (return on invest-
ment), 96-103 (return on capital employed), and 104-11 (return on equity).
256. Id. at 104.
257. Id. at 110.
258. Id.
[Vol. 50
1997] PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURE IN THE OILFIELD 753
may merely reflect its skill at exploiting investors. Gross costs and reve-
nues ordinarily will include these operator returns. Success at the 8/8ths
level can include fees that maximize only the operator's profits. What is
relevant are the investors' returns in prior programs.
Moreover, just as oil and gas companies have to update their projec-
tions under FASB No. 69, so too the operator should have to update its
projections on prior programs. Downward revisions may be the best
warning that something is wrong in today's project too.
Operators should not be heard to complain about having to calculate
this information. If they cannot tell investors how their predecessors
have done, they have no business claiming the ability to generate
profits. 259
The "return" to investors should be calculated as an annual rate of re-
turn, because even dismally poor oil and gas programs may return several
times their costs over twenty or thirty year lives. Total undiscounted re-
turns that include revenues paid over many years may disguise abject fail-
ure when the investor considers the time cost of money. Moreover,
annual rates-of-return are easy to match to investments outside the indus-
try. Operators should provide this information so that their offerings can
be compared to benchmarks like certificates of deposit and bank ac-
counts. The quickest way for investors, particularly nonindustry inves-
tors, to understand how a project has done is to put its results in the same
form as the other investments competing for their money.
A common response to arguments for disclosure is that oil and gas pro-
grams are so varied that it is misleading to compare them. Programs
drilled in the eighties will not look like those in the nineties. Wildcat
programs have different economics than development programs and ex-
ploration in well-mapped areas. Taken literally, the argument is that the
oil business is not sufficiently comparable for investors to choose between
projects. The arguments are disproven every day as companies rank pro-
grams and choose the ones they prefer.
Energy pricing, drilling costs, technology, and the availability of acre-
age can vary with the position in the energy cycle. Thus companies may
need to group results by year, or in certain multi-year periods, so that
investors can separate uncharacteristic periods from the rest. Of course
risks and returns vary by geology and political factors as well. Financial
accounting standards handle such problems by requiring additional dis-
closure of the division of reserves between the home country and foreign
259. In the Davis Oil case, for instance, in spite of Marvin Davis' many representations
about how well he could do for investors, he and his Company refused to identify any
investor in Davis Oil wells who "received a net positive return in cash of [sic] otherwise" in
the years 1978 through 1983, and would not even discuss the rate of return that Davis Oil
or its partners had made on their investment. Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's Second
Set of Interrogatories, Specific Objections to Interrogatories Nos. 24 and 32, Davis Oil
(No. 85-M-1821). Had Marvin Davis had a successful, money-making business for even a
minority of his investors, he should have been eager to identify partners who made money
in order to rebut Aetna's claim that Davis Oil was grossly unsuccessful.
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countries, and of other factors affecting risks.260 While not a simple prob-
lem, this is the kind of comparability issue that accountants and invest-
ment advisors already face. It is no reason to provide no information.
The requirement of accurate economic information will not supplant
other disclosure. Investors in single prospects still need to know the geol-
ogy of the surrounding wells, not just the operator's prior economic out-
put. Omitting such detailed information may be actionable under the law
of fraud, of fiduciary duty, or securities fraud.261 These new economic
disclosures are not to replace current requirements, but would supple-
ment them where they are so clearly defective.
No one would argue that past results mean the same thing for every
company, any more than the same earnings would mean the same thing
260. FASB No. 69, supra note 170, 9 12 and Appendix C, 9 92. The need for separate
listings of foreign reserves makes sense because foreign drilling contains risks of expropria-
tion, arbitrary taxation, and war and insurrection to a degree that (one hopes) does not
exist for domestic production.
The topic of foreign risk encompasses what must be one of the funniest nondisclosures in
the industry's history. One of the John King companies, Royal Resources, issued a pro-
spectus indicating that it intended to drill primarily in the United States and Canada, but
that it "reserves the right to conduct operations in any other countries." Plaintiffs' State-
ment of Relevancy, supra note 128, at 267. King did not disclose that the Royal partner-
ships would invest almost six million dollars in another King entity, Midbar, which was
created as a joint venture between King and the Israeli government to drill in and around
the Sinai and the Gulf of Suez. Id. A minor concealed problem was that Royal picked up
interests in certain wells that were known to be dry holes. Id. The major problem, how-
ever, was the failure to disclose the risk of joining an Israeli venture drilling on Egypt's
doorstep. As the plaintiffs put it in telling understatement, "the risks involved in Jews, or
anyone connected with Jews, drilling in the Suez Canal or in the Sinai Peninsula, are much
higher than the average wildcat." Id. at 266.
The risk was not merely theoretical. The Egyptians sent frogmen to attack the drilling
rig while it was being towed into location in the Gulf of Suez. They damaged it and the
barge so severely that the operator never drilled any of the proposed wells. Id. at 268, 278.
Even peace would have had unique risks that the investors deserved to know. If a peace
treaty ceded the drilling area to Egypt, it would be an open question whether the venture
had a legal right to its wells. See id. at 270.
The sale of known dry holes to the Royal partnerships also raised a series of accounting
red flags, id. at 292-93, as well as a plaintive memorandum from the president of Royal in
which he lamented that "I cannot figure out what this partnership would be buying." Id. at
293.
261. Perhaps the most painstaking analysis of an operator who systematically cheated
his investors by omitting information on nearby projects is Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348
(10th Cir. 1970). Operator Nixon both omitted nearby dry holes or moved them when they
fell too close to his proposed properties and misstated a wide variety of characteristics of
nearby producing wells (for instance, not mentioning declines in production or water in the
production) to make his project appear better than it really was. Id. at 359-63.
Another example comes from Anderson v. Vinson Exploration, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 657,
663 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied). In Anderson, the operator allegedly exagger-
ated the per-well production in the field, doubled average expected production by includ-
ing results from an adjoining field, and omitted the fact that only 3 of 13 wells in the field
had achieved projected production. The operator also neglected to mention that an offset-
ting field had all wells plugged and abandoned, that it had drilled a dry well between the
only two good wells in field, and that four or five oil companies had rejected the project.
Id.
Cf Cowles v. Dow Keith Oil & Gas, Inc., 752 F.2d 508, 512 (10th Cir. 1985) (upholding
trial court's finding that omitting geological information was not "material" for small oper-
ator drilling very shallow, 1000-foot wells, but agreeing that "geological and similar data
might be 'material' if Dow Keith were a 'big operator drilling deeper holes"').
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for different companies on the New York Stock Exchange, or that past
results will exactly match the same company's future performance. But
the fact that other variables affect results and that basic disclosure may
require additional information in no way disproves the point that past
economic results are the foundation for careful investment analysis. This
is very important information that the operator can distribute cheaply.
Investors deserve to have this information before deciding whether to
proceed.
The financial reporting of the securities laws can be relevant to oil and
gas investing, too. For instance, if the operator is not earning a profit
from new reserves but only from drilling, it is running a churning enter-
prise. Investors would be well-advised to stay away from this company.
Or the company may be so precarious that it is unlikely to finish the pro-
ject.262 Thus if the industry ultimately falls in line with ordinary securities
practices, it may make operators produce pro forma balance sheets for a
few prior years. Or it may not; after all, investors in equity and partner-
ship programs are not buying a share in the operator itself. At a mini-
mum, however, whatever the ultimate decision on additional
performance measures, the operator should have to publish its own eco-
nomics, including total-life projections based on current prices of the
overall success of programs that are not yet completed.
Even if the mandatory disclosure is limited to (1) the economics the
operator has produced for other investors and (2) the economics of the
current investment, the information necessitated by this standard will
vary with the operator's investment structure. For Prudential, this would
have meant listing its results in its earlier oil and gas programs, as well as
the returns in the new partnerships. For Davis Oil, it would have meant
producing results for hundreds of separately marketed prospects. 263 For
Doc Joiner, it presumably would have included the East Texas field and
his unsuccessful projects. The information needs to be presented in
enough detail that investors can see the average return and the variability
of the returns.
A flow of economic evidence will not arm investors with all the infor-
mation they need to make a rational decision. A rational investor also
will consider how oil has done against other industries. Oil and gas inves-
tors risk changes in energy supply and demand (both variables that are
likely to show major discontinuities in coming years). This is part of the
oilpatch gamble. Here the operator has less advantage in gathering infor-
262. Had Prudential produced the balance sheet of operator Welles-Battelstein in its
Invoil programs, the ledger would have shown an operator on the brink of financial ruin.
Sure enough, not long after the investment the operator went into bankruptcy, dragging
with it a pool of commingled, unescrowed funds. See supra note 104. Investors would have
had clear warning of this risk had they received financial statements.
263. What should concern investors most is the overall average (their likeliest expected
return) and the variation among programs (the degree of risk that they will achieve that
average). Davis might propose an overall average rather than individual well results, but it
should have to get nonoperators to amend the COPAS form after explaining why it will not
provide detailed information.
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mation, however, and there is no reason to require the operator rather
than its investors to collect the information.
C. OPERATORS MUST DISCLOSE THE PRIOR PERFORMANCE OF EACH
"OPERATING" ENTITY
Many heavily promoted projects like the Prudential partnerships suffer
from layers of promoters. It can be very hard to tell whose experience
and decisions are setting the direction of the business. An experienced
marketer like Prudential may take a cut of the earnings, but arrange for
another company to run day-to-day affairs, including locating the proper-
ties to be drilled. With both companies general partners, no one knows
who is minding the store. (The answer in the Prudential-Graham part-
nerships seems to have been no one.)
To protect investors, both the promoter and the operator should have
to reveal their economic information. For a promoter like Prudential,
disclosure will mean listing the results of investors in the other programs
it has marketed. For an operator like Graham Energy, the information
will cover the other programs it has run.
Multiple disclosure is needed for several reasons. First, more than one
company will be taking fees from the project. The investors have a right
to see how each operator has performed.
Second, a project with two or more general partners, one the promoter
and one the field operator, relies on the skill and expertise of each. Each
should add value to the final product. The promoter presumably is inves-
tigating many operators and using its expertise to select the best compa-
nies. This is the kind of screening that Prudential had promised for its
five percent fee when, in an early program, it claimed to have chosen only
1 in 500 operators.264 (Prudential never explained how the company in
the top 0.2% of its 500 companies wound up being one that never had
produced money for its investors.) If the promoter has chosen only pro-
grams that lost money, that is highly relevant information. If the pro-
moter's financial disclosure shows it is earning money regardless of what
happens to the project, that too says something about its likely level of
care.
At the same time, information on the field company is as necessary as
information on the promoter. Even assuming that Prudential in the early
eighties had a perfect record of identifying the best operators, investors
still would want to know that by choosing Graham, Prudential had se-
lected a company with no record of success. Graham might ruin even
good properties with bad field decisions. Its record still would say, stay
away. Had investors known that Graham was a company whom a former
executive described as having one of the worst records in the industry, far
fewer people would have lost their money.265
264. See supra note 104.
265. See supra note 103.
[Vol. 50
1997] PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURE IN THE OILFIELD 757
D. INVESTORS NEED TIMELY ECONOMIC UPDATES
It is not enough to give investors a detailed history before their invest-
ment begins, although that is the most important reform. In addition,
they need ongoing, truthful economic information about their project.
One of the major risks of oil and gas investing is that a successful oper-
ator may grow complacent and let quality slide. In periods of great de-
mand, for instance, with funds surging into the industry, operators may
exhaust the best properties. Standard economic thinking predicts that re-
turns will decline as operators are forced to turn to increasingly poor
leases. Companies will experience decreasing returns as they advance on
the margin of production for a given technology.
Alternatively, even in a time of ample properties, an operator who en-
joys striking success may expand its marketing and attract more money
than it can invest efficiently. Or a good company may find its employees
bid away by wealthier rivals and lose the staff that produced its good
results. The skills needed to create a going concern can be very different
from the skills needed to drill one good well. Success can breed its own
curse, or rather, a curse for investors but sometimes easy pickings for the
operator. Even legitimate companies may decay over time and turn into
operations that churn investor dollars. Thus ongoing information is nec-
essary; the returns in the first few years will be only the first indication of
whether the promoter can live up to its promises.
The programs discussed in Part II illustrate some of these problems.
Home-Stake and Prudential never ran a profitable business. Ongoing re-
porting would have picked up their failure within, at worst, a few report-
ing periods. Moreover, both operators capitalized on the appearance of
success, an appearance supported solely by the size of their operations,
without having any means to find enough quality prospects. Because the
industry left it free to pick the information it would give investors, Pru-
dential increased cash distributions and presented its inflated payments as
signs of success. The Petro-Lewis programs started out well, but dis-
integrated when prices fell. Davis Oil never produced a record of overall
returns on its projects, but it seemed to keep shifting to a new group of
savior wells.
In order to let investors monitor their interests, operators should be
required to update their economic analysis of each prior venture at least
annually, and include an economic summary of the current investment.
The projections should include total project economics, calculated for the
investors' interests, at existing prices and at projected prices. Similar an-
nual updating of prior cash flow estimates is required under FASB No. 69
for publicly traded oil and gas companies.266
266. FASB No. 69, supra note 170, 7. While FASB No. 69 does not require interim
financial statements, if those statements are issued they "shall include information about a
major discovery or other favorable or adverse event that causes a significant change from
the information presented in the most recent annual financial report concerning oil and gas
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Had Prudential and Home-Stake provided this kind of update, they
would have had to show that none of their projects were likely to pay
returns. Even if the general partners provided no information on failed
earlier projects and exaggerated hopes for the first year or so on their
new ones, any reasonable estimate of future returns would have fallen
once there was a little production. The failures were obvious quickly. It
is telling that investment stopped, and litigation began, as soon as Pru-
dential corrected its account statements to show investors that they would
take a loss on their investments. The same medicine could have balanced
Davis Oil's emphasis on completions instead of on economically viable
wells and on optimistic early projections rather than long-term results.
Operators should have to prepare reports using existing prices as well
as expected prices because investors have a right to know how they will
fare if prices do not change. One of the most popular defenses raised by
operators who sold programs during the boom years was that their inves-
tors counted on rising prices. The subtext was that investors didn't care
about prospect quality or whether the operator lifted some extra fees be-
cause they relied on such a dramatic price increase. Some investors may
indeed be willing to gamble on $90 a barrel oil or $10 an mcf gas, but they
deserve to know what will happen if prices do not rise. The SEC has
adopted this approach and requires economic results to be published us-
ing current prices. 267
E. COPAS SHOULD BE A CLEARINGHOUSE FOR
OPERATOR PERFORMANCE
One reason federal securities regulation has been effective is that the
economic reports of publicly held companies are inexpensively available
through the SEC's offices in Washington, D.C. These reports now can be
accessed on the Internet through the SEC's Edgar system. This detailed
corporate information has been a necessary ingredient in the growth of
the investment analysis industry.
For the oil and gas industry to develop effective measures of perform-
ance, investors need the tools to compare operators cheaply and easily.
The JOA should make operators file annual reports on each program,
including discounted lifetime economic projections, at a central location
maintained by COPAS. They should have to give this information to
reserve quantities." Id. $ 9. In other words, when companies talk, they have a duty to
make sure that what they say is accurate.
267. FASB No. 69 requires oil and gas companies to use year-end prices in calculating
future cash flows. Id. T 30. These prices shall be adjusted so that "[fluture price changes
shall be considered only to the extent provided by contractual arrangements in existence at
year-end." Id. $ 30(a). While this paragraph may seem to prohibit making projections that
incorporate expected price trends not already embodied in contracts, FASB No. 69 adds
that "[a]dditional information necessary to prevent the disclosure of the standardized mea-
sure of discounted future net cash flows and changes therein from being misleading also
shall be provided." Id. 34. This provision would not permit a company to replace year-
end prices with expected price trends, but it should require operators to supplement calcu-
lations when they expect a significant variation in prices.
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their investors at the same time. Operators who refuse would have to
delete the clause from their JOAs, thus giving notice that they cannot or
will not meet a simple industry standard. The deletion may lead investors
to pursue the information more avidly or to switch companies.
Some operators will refuse to participate, but those with good records
have every incentive to publicize their success. They should want to
spread accurate measures of performance. If investors could compare
companies more accurately, the pattern of spending would track patterns
of performance more closely. Good operators would find it easier to
raise money. Bad operators would lose investors or be forced to lower
prices and profits to a level that reflects the riskier nature of their prod-
uct. The industry's high achievers have an incentive to publicize their re-
sults and to educate investors about the importance of a company's
economic bona fides.
Once this kind of information becomes available, the industry should
uncover more precise ways to relate past performance to future out-
comes. COPAS should experiment with a variety of additional measures
to supplement economic returns, including completion ratios and finding
costs. For instance, properly used completion ratios do measure effi-
ciency, but only of operators who generally complete wells that are likely
to make money. The catch, of course, is that the operator must not be
completing wells simply to pump up its record.
Another widely used performance measure is finding cost. Finding cost
is the cost incurred to discover each barrel of oil and mcf of gas. The SEC
does not require companies to disclose finding costs, but publicly traded
companies have to provide the reserve estimates and accrued costs that
are needed to make this calculation. One accepted source of finding-cost
data is the annual reserve report co-published by Arthur Andersen & Co.
and Cambridge Energy Research Associates, which lists an annual indus-
try average for publicly traded oil and gas companies.2 68 Unfortunately,
not only is the Andersen report limited to publicly traded companies, but
268. FASB No. 69 disclosures do not require companies to distinguish between evalu-
ated and unevaluated properties, or between additions from exploration and from
purchase, making it very difficult to compare efficiencies between companies. ARTHUR
ANDERSON & Co., OIL AND GAS RESERVE DISCLOSURES 1982-1986 S-38-40 (1987). One
sign of the difficulty is the way that Arthur Andersen carefully stays away from direct
comparisons: "For these reasons and the deficiencies in public disclosure of cost and re-
serve data, despite the need for relevant finding cost information on specific companies for
specific years, we have elected to not publish surrogate finding cost on a company-by-
company basis in the survey." Id. at S-40. One suspects that Arthur Andersen, like any
major company, might be afraid of litigation from companies disgruntled with their rank-
ing, although the solution to that problem would seem to be for Andersen to publicize its
analytic method and invite companies to provide better information. Then its report,
which would simply be making a mathematical calculation from each operator's published
data, would involve little risk.
Even without company-specific finding costs, the Andersen data does offer the begin-
ning of a meaningful performance measure. And one hopes it is the beginning of things to
come, as is suggested by Andersen's defense of the concept of such performance rankings:
"[b]ecause of these complexities, attempts to relate costs with discoveries are considered
by some to be futile. Experience indicates, however, that analysts and companies will con-
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concerns over data integrity persuaded Andersen to limit its report to a
single industry-wide statistic. It does not publish company-by-company
finding costs. Thus its numbers have limited use, even though they let
investors see how their company stacks up to the average company.2 69
Finding costs can be a good way to compare efficiency, even though
costs will vary with the period of discovery and must be treated carefully
for this reason. Historical costs may be the best measure of long-term
relative performance. Recent costs may provide the best estimate of the
likely outcome of today's new project.270 Arthur Andersen separates
tinue to develop comparative finding cost statistics in assessing the relative efficiency of
companies in this important aspect of the industry's operations." Id. at S-39.
For the most famous use of finding costs, see the discussion of Texaco v. Pennzoil, supra
note 160.
269. Two other measures of performance in the Andersen reserve report, "ploughback"
ratios (which measure how much money a company reinvests to find new reserves), and
reserve replacement (how well a company is replacing its reserves), are not really relevant
to the fixed-expenditure programs in drilling fund and general partner formats. See gener-
ally, ARTHUR ANDERSON, supra note 268, at S-34 to S-37.
If one is comparing ongoing oil and gas companies, it can make some sense to look at
these measures, all well-suited to organizations like major oil companies that in essence
run a continually replenished drilling program. These ratios test whether a company is
reinvesting enough money to maintain its historical level of performance. The risk is that it
may be milking short-term returns while failing to maintain the base upon which the stock
value is based.
In contrast, in the ordinary equity project, in which one exploratory well is drilled and
then, if the venture strikes oil or gas, development wells follow, the "ploughback" will be
limited to the wells necessary to develop any discovery. It is contemplated by all parties
that their venture will end with a narrowly defined project. So too with drilling funds and
drilling partnerships, which often have either a dollar limit or a set time for accepting
investors and are closed at the end of a fixed term. Here, too, it would not make sense to
continually measure a reinvestment that the parties never planned to undertake. For the
same reason, the Arthur Andersen reserve replacement ratio, which shows whether a com-
pany is maintaining its reserve base, is not as relevant to this kind of investment.
Most drilling projects are designed to drill in certain geographical areas or, as is the case
of many drilling partnerships, to invest a set amount of money. While there may be devel-
opmental drilling beyond the initial activity, it usually is limited to developing the fields
discovered in the initial project. The parties expect each investment to be depleted over
time as reserves are produced. These programs are not comparable to oil and gas compa-
nies, which in essence earn their rate of return by balancing new exploration and develop-
ment with reserve sales and by trying to maintain a large current inventory of reserves at
all times.
270. Variations in finding cost can be quite great even if all companies are operating
efficiently. One expects costs to vary with demand, which in turn varies with the expected
price in the period when reserves will be produced. If prices are high and expected to
remain high, input costs will rise as drilling increases and demand rises in the input mar-
kets. In addition, higher output prices lead operators to drill prospects with lower reserve
potential, as the increase in price extends the margin of potentially profitable properties.
The average output per dollar spent should fall. Thus it is quite to be expected (and in
theory could have been a sign of market efficiency in both periods) that the median finding
cost for additions to reserves was $18.22 per barrel in 1982, had fallen to $10.34 in 1986,
ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., supra note 268, at S-40, and fell even more to a weighted
average cost of just $6.28 by 1993, ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO., OIL AND GAS RESERVE
DISCLOSURES 13 (1994).
An efficient operator that was active during the boom years but has not been doing
much drilling recently would appear to have very high costs, yet it might be far more effi-
cient than the average company. On the other hand, a company that only began business a
few years ago in this time of low costs might have lower finding costs than its average
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new reserves from the cumulative cost to let readers measure efficiency at
current prices as well as historical efficiency.
COPAS has experience as an information clearinghouse. It developed
a computerized equipment pricing database for operators to use as a
baseline for equipment pricing. "To achieve an acceptable industry
guideline for pricing material by standardizing and simplifying material
pricing, it is recommended that the GEISCO/COPAS Computerized
Equipment Pricing System (CEPS) be used as a basis for pricing mate-
rial."'271 Though CEPS has generated disputes over its selection of
prices, 272 COPAS's role in providing standard information does suggest
that it can play a primary role in promulgating industry standards.
The absence of information on company performance is far greater
than it ever was on equipment pricing. As a result, COPAS will perform
a far greater service if it builds a database for comparing company
performance.
COPAS has taken a first step with its publication of current perform-
ance measures. Whether the organization will have the courage to actu-
ally rank companies remains to be seen. The industry orientation of prior
COPAS and JOA reforms does not make one optimistic. Yet the industry
should welcome COPAS's involvement because it ensures that industry
companies will keep control over the measures.
V. CONCLUDING POINTS: SCOPE, THE USE OF CASE
METHOD DIAGNOSIS
This section deals with two questions that flow naturally from this kind
of discussion of performance standards. First, who besides ordinary eq-
uity investors needs protection? Second, is the case method of diagnos-
ing problems a legitimate method of analysis?
A. DRILLING FUNDS AND INDUSTRY COMPANIES NEED
PROTECTION Too
The financial and reserve portions of the standard industry contract
should apply to large partnerships and drilling funds. These programs dif-
fer from joint-equity programs primarily because their investors do not
competitors, even though the newcomer is less successful at finding reserves economically.
Such a company is just lucky not to have high-cost older reserves on its books.
271. Computerized Equipment Pricing System, COPAS Interpretation No. 15 (May 20,
1986). The goal in developing the CEPS pricing system, stated most optimistically, is "to
increase pricing accuracy, audit efficiency and to provide for a consistent and equitable
pricing method as it adapts itself at all times and to all situations." JOLLY & BUCK, supra
note 4, at 144.
272. The CEPS system has come under fire lately, but not because COPAS has assumed
a role of trying to publicize information needed for rational decisions in the industry. The
attack is that the pricing system does not accurately reflect market prices, a criticism of the
specific measure used rather than of COPAS's centralized role. See Susan Richardson &
Corby Considine, Revolutions in the Oil Patch, TEX. LAW., Oct. 9, 1995, at 32 (citing two
Texas cases over CEPS prices that "appear to be in excess of the prevailing price of tubular
goods" and may be more than operators actually paid).
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make well-by-well decisions on whether to complete wells or to drill de-
velopment wells.
A high level of protection is important in partnership and drilling fund
investments because these investors are less likely to be industry inves-
tors and tend to have less structural protection. Operators like Pruden-
tial, Petro-Lewis, and Longhorn used these investment packages to raise
millions of dollars rapidly. Direct regulation of these investments is very
difficult. It is impractical to have face-to-face meetings, contract negotia-
tions, and individual consents in programs with so many investors.2 73 Op-
erators wanting to solicit pools of private capital nationally would find it
very difficult to conduct broad fundraising in the equity form. The lack of
detail attracts operators to partnership and fund formats.
Partnership and drilling programs also are harder to regulate because
each program will drill multiple wells, yet investors will not receive infor-
mation on each well. Nor is there ordinarily any well-by-well audit
power. The longer a program, the more the wells, the wider their disper-
sal, and the more their investors, then the fewer opportunities to scruti-
nize the investment and the greater the difficulty of organizing investors
to conduct such scrutiny. The opportunity to uncover fraud is lower than
in the equity format.
Cases like Prudential and Petro-Lewis show that an accurate track rec-
ord and a fair description of the operator's past performance are at least
as essential to the health of these investments as they are to equity inves-
tors. Otherwise operators could easily portray a "success ratio" or level
of distributions that is not justified by drilling results.
In partnership investments, the general partner selects the mix of pros-
pects and makes completion and development decisions. Investors par-
ticipating as limited partners face no choice comparable to the consent
and nonconsent decisions of equity investors and so do not need the
JOA's shelter in these areas.274 Clauses about the operator's controlling
wellsite activity, the completion decisions, the penalties for going noncon-
sent, and the procedures for drilling subsequent wells are not relevant.
The other areas of the standard agreement, however, are as vital to the
well-being of drilling fund and partnership investors as to equity owners.
273. There is a countervailing concern, namely, that the fiduciary duties of partnership
forms will restrict the operator's freedom to strike special deals. This may be the reason
that Marvin Davis, who attracted hundreds of investors and drilled hundreds of wells,
stuck to the equity format for his projects. See also Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating &
Prod. Corp., 982 F.2d 1130, 1140 (7th Cir. 1992) (refusing to find equity investments "inte-
grated" securities, and so upholding exemption from registration requirements).
274. One of the standard clauses in the JOA gives investors the right to decide whether
to "consent" to completing a well once it has reached the target depth, and whether to
consent to participate in development wells after the operator drills the test well. The
customary provision for going nonconsent is to lose one's right to any revenue until the
participating investors collect several times the costs attributable to the interest, a forfei-
ture that can be as much as 300% of the cost. DERMAN, supra note 227, at 51, 53. Some
forfeiture provisions are higher, 500% or even 800% of costs. Id. at 53. Or the agreement
may be drafted so that those who choose not to participate in certain decisions relinquish
their interest entirely. For sample provisions, see id. at 143-45.
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The AAPL should issue a condensed form to meet the needs of these
investors. With luck, the effort to adapt the JOA to all forms of industry
investment will encourage many parties who currently invest under
sketchy contracts to demand the shelter of the standard forms.
Another issue of scope is somewhat ironic. It can be difficult to discuss
reforming the industry contract rationally because too many industry par-
ticipants take any suggestion for reform, as well as any claim that particu-
lar clauses need reshaping, as an attack on the industry. They convert
narrow questions into the broader, different, and emotional issue of in-
dustry loyalty. The tendency to turn proposals into loyalty tests lay be-
hind the proclivity of many participants in take-or-pay disputes to define
all related issues as pipeline-producer fights. The same approach would
try to fit the proposals in this Article to an industry (meaning "opera-
tor")-nonindustry dichotomy. Such divisions blind many experienced
participants to the fact that their own companies would benefit from
more information. They could use accurate cost and performance data
just as much as nonindustry companies.
A common response to reform proposals is that maybe nonindustry
investors need more protection, but industry companies know how to
protect themselves.2 75 They do not need help or want the expense of new
standards. The theme that industry companies act at their own peril, ca-
275. This is the reaction from many established industry hands. See, e.g., Letter from
Donald J. Silberman to John McArthur 1 (Aug. 10, 1994) (on file with SMU Law Review):
[The JOA and COPAS] are the models, almost always modified, designed
to be used by and between industry partners who are all assumed to possess
the expertise necessary to function with less-than-perfect disclosure guide-
lines. Neither set of documents demands full and adequate disclosure which
may be necessary for the nonindustry investor, nor does either set adequately
restrict the latitude for chicanery by a larcenous operator.
See also Letter from Robert J. Green to John McArthur (Mar. 27, 1995) (on file with SMU
Law Review) ("I can sense a distinct dichotomy between Operator/Promoter-Investor
deals and "Industry Partner" deals.... Perhaps we need two JOA forms!").
The same emphasis on the JOA as an agreement among industry parties characterizes
the work of Ernest Smith, who in several influential writings has urged courts to use a
"good faith" rather than fiduciary standard in deciding cases that involve the operator-
nonoperator relationship. See generally Ernest Smith, Joint Operating Agreement Jurispru-
dence, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 832 (1994); see also Smith articles cited in supra notes 213-14. In
Smith's view:
Nonoperators are never marginal farmers and ranchers and are rarely lack-
ing either in financial resources or in formal education. With possible excep-
tion of some "promoted" prospects, such as those in the late seventies and
early eighties, the parties to an operating agreement are either oil or gas
companies or experienced investors.
Smith, supra, at 840.
Though not addressing the fiduciary question, this Article urges a higher standard of
disclosure by contract and industry practice for several reasons. First, it assumes that the
number of investors who do not have real oil and gas expertise is higher than Smith sug-
gests, and includes a number of generally sophisticated investors and companies that lack
experience with oilfield practices. This is a very specialized industry, and it should not be a
trap for the unwary. Second, the operator has easy and often exclusive access to a lot of
information unavailable to nonoperators, so that it has effective control over relevant in-
formation even when dealing with industry companies. Third, industry companies them-
selves would benefit from more information. The industry company that assumes it
already knows all it needs to know about an operator is likely to be its own worst enemy.
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veat emptor above all, appears repeatedly in cases as well.276
Most industry hands balk at the idea of requiring disclosure. They tend
to admit that the industry might need a few special rules for nonindustry
investors, but that's all. Why would an experienced oil company, a com-
pany that has decided to invest in a prospect, need an Exxon, a Chevron,
or an Apache to tell it about its past performance? After all, hasn't the
industry investor already determined the merits of the property?
The treatment of industry companies has become more important as
joint ventures among various industry companies have become more
common. Cooperation among industry companies is one of the defining
characteristics of the oil and gas industry. Joint ventures by industry par-
ticipants have a long history.277 The joint project can be structured to
share expertise and services or as a way for a single operator to raise a
large pool of funds. As private funds drifted away from the oilfield, ser-
vice companies joined more industry projects too.278
Proponents of take-your-lumps theories never explain what interest is
served by allowing frauds that can be defeated by inexpensive disclosure,
even if the victims are long-established companies.2 79 It may be true that
276. One of the best examples of lower protection for industry companies arose in an
accounting dispute. In the LL&E litigation, one of the reasons the court gave for absolv-
ing LL&E for its buyback agreements was that the management of the investing victim
were "sophisticated and experienced oil and gas people" and so "knew or should have
known" of LL&L's inventory practices. Dime Box Petroleum Corp. v. Louisiana Land &
Exploration Co., 717 F. Supp. 717, 723 (D. Colo. 1989), aftd, 938 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir.
1991). The court used the plaintiff's "position as a corporation sophisticated in oil and gas
matters" as a reason to reject a fiduciary duty and to limit the operator's obligation nar-
rowly to the JOA. Id. at 722 (citing Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 920 (1960)).
Operators often use a variant of this argument by claiming that "industry practice" justi-
fies what they have done. When used to shield improper activity, this defense is one of the
classic techniques of "neutralization" or rationalization identified by students of white-
collar crime. One such technique "involves transfer of responsibility from the offender to a
large and often vaguely defined group to which he or she belongs." James Coleman, To-
ward an Integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime, 93 AM. J. Soc. 406,413 (1987). The way
the excuse works, when challenged a perpetrator claims that "'everybody else is doing it
too."' Id.
The other excuses will ring just as familiar to anyone who has done much commercial
fraud litigation, in or out of the oilpatch. They are: (1) claiming that the fraud did not hurt
anyone; (2) shifting attention by arguing that the rule or law violated is unjust or unneces-
sary; (3) arguing that the practice is necessary to survive in the industry; (4) the everybody-
does-it defense already mentioned; and (5) asserting that the perpetrator deserves the
money. See id. at 411-14.
277. As Irish and Romanov note, "[tihe oil and gas industry has long relied on joint
ventures with other industry partners to conduct exploration and development activities.
Typically, each partner to the venture contributes what he uniquely possesses, whether it
be acreage, cash, or technical skills." Romanov & Irish, supra note 38, at 13-26.
"In the typical industry joint venture, the parties agree to the sharing of costs of explora-
tion, development, and operations in exchange for an interest in the proceeds of produc-
tion .... Typically, one party may contribute acreage while another provides technical and
operating expertise and/or capital." Id. at 13-26 to 13-27.
278. Id. at 13-28.
279. A number of economists would argue that companies in long-term relations have
an incentive not to cheat each other, and tend to develop means of avoiding the problems
that might afflict those with less frequent contact. E.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 70-
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industry investors are likelier to perform their own geologic analysis, to
ask questions, to uncover the true facts, and to customize their contracts.
Industry companies are likelier to be repeat customers, thus justifying
maintaining professional staffs and giving them more leverage (because
they pose a realistic threat of switching to another company). Yet the
operator still can amass performance and cost information much more
easily than industry investors and the information is just as material to
that investor as to a nonindustry investor.
There are two reasons why industry companies would be better served
by full performance disclosure. First, there are some industry deals in
which the nonoperating companies do not thoroughly research the pro-
posed investment. Too often industry companies assume that all major
players drill and develop properties with the same high level of compe-
tence. Past performance data would help check hasty investment
decisions.
Second, the geology of a field is only one factor in prospect success.
Success still depends on the operator's skill in drilling and developing as
well as the property's characteristics, and upon the operator's honesty.
An unsuccessful record is one indicator that the operator may be cheating
on accounting or that it just may not be competent enough to carry out
the joint program.
To the extent that industry companies need to know how the operator
has done in the past, that information is primarily in the operator's pos-
session. It is easier and cheaper for the operator to compile its record
than for the industry partner to try to estimate this information.
B. THE CASE METHOD CAN DIAGNOSE STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS
This Article has based its recommendations on problems that appeared
in some large, well-known oil and gas programs. It has derived its re-
forms from these examples. The case method is a solution to the familiar
problem that the incidence of fraud is impossible to document precisely.
Case method studies are familiar to lawyers because they are the
method of the common law. Common law reasoning assumes that good
rules of law can be developed by detailed study of the cases that come
before courts.280 These are by definition "pathological cases"-they are
cases where a severe problem exists that the parties have been unable to
solve. Yet presumably unresolved disputes are places where rules of law
72. Experienced companies should have the means, personal contacts, and leverage (be-
cause they can threaten to remove future business) to raise their level of protection. All
this may be true, but it does not explain why they, too, should not be protected by the
simple steps of disclosure discussed in this Article, which would give them better informa-
tion at the start of their investment.
280. While not exactly discussing the problem of law as a mode of forming public poli-
cies, the most recent thorough defense of case-based pictures as a legitimate method of
social decisionmaking is ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993). The classic de-
fense in American law is that great but flawed attempt to prove that judges are not really
making policy, BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 15 (1921).
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are needed most. Decided cases are one way to determine the kind of
problem that exists and at least the direction of the need for reform.
While this kind of thinking is easy to criticize as a way of formulating
social rules,281 it can be a rational way to isolate the dynamics of
problems that do not lend themselves to wide surveying and
documentation.
Moreover, while it is popular to object that the oilpatch remains an
honest, handshake deal industry, 282 the cases are certain to understate,
not overstate, the true extent of fraud. Litigated cases will understate the
number of deceptive practices because the problems are hidden. Nor will
281. For some discussion of the limits of the traditional case-method approach of law-
yers, see Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94
YALE L.J. 1643 (1985). Newman notes that "[a]s lawyers we are taught to consider the
dispute at hand and not the operation of the legal system in which the dispute arises and is
resolved." Id. at 1650. Maurice Rosenberg quite similarly complains that the "tendency of
legally-trained minds to prefer thinking to counting is legendary. So is the lawyer's prefer-
ence for learning by watching for the vivid case rather than tabulating the mine-run cases."
Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2211 (1989). Accord, HAROLD ROTHWAX, GUILTY 47 (1996)
("One of the problems with the way law is made is that rules are announced piecemeal as
each case arises, but each particular case does not necessarily give us much guidance re-
garding the multiple types of situations that can arise," and finding a "patchwork quality to
the law, [so that] future cases simply add weight to the same faulty premises." Id. at 64,
72.).
Thurman Arnold attacked the case-narrowed focus of common law courts with charac-
teristic eloquence a generation ago. Thurman Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal,
47 HARV. L. REV. 913, 918-19 (criticizing incompleteness of rules that emerge "only from
contests," without court having investigatory function); 920-22 (challenging adversary
model as means for social planning and mocking idea that courts can design good rules "if
only a small section of that conduct is considered at a time"); 937 (complaining about
individual lawsuits as occasion for testing regulatory schemes)( 1934); see generally Paul
Brest, Plus Ca Change, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1945, 1946, 1951 (1995) ("Law and society.., has
not flourished to nearly the same degree as scholarship that can be done without ever
leaving one's office. . . . The legal academy seems especially uninterested in empirically
based research designed to improve the systems for administering civil and criminal jus-
tice"); Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline 1962-1987, 100
HARV. L. REV. 761, 769 (1987) ("Some fields that had once seemed to promise important
applications to law, such as psychology, linguistics, and sociology, have not made much
recent progress toward improving our understanding of law.").
282. DERMAN, supra note 227, at 75. In his discussion of whether the operator should
be treated as a fiduciary, Derman muses that this issue may have arisen so rarely owing to
the trust that once joined operator and partner:
Perhaps this is because the parties in the oil industry realize that due to the
nature of the business, they will have to work together in the future and,
consequently, they generally conduct their affairs in a fair, equitable manner.
As business gets tougher, will industry alter its course of conduct? The
"good old boy" syndrome has begun to erode. Consequently it is more criti-
cal now to carefully structure expected behavior and, whenever possible, this
should be done in writing.
Id. at 75; accord, Silberman, supra note 275, at 1 ("Unfortunately you are right to state that
oil and gas exploration and development activities can no longer be carried out with a
verbal commitment. I think this is a reflection of our present society in general. Not only
are ethics more loosely interpreted in business, but everyone has become more litigious.").
It is hard to find anyone with much experience in the oilpatch who doesn't lament the
passing of the old days. Scratch a true oilman, and a longing for the past nearly always
comes to the surface. JOLLY & BUCK, supra note 4, at 1 ("These informal agreements quite
often consisted of little more than a pat on the back and a handshake.").
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litigation examples prove the relative incidence of different types of fraud
and sharp dealing. Fraud is, after all, secret by its very nature. Cheating
sees the light of day only if it is discovered and is not resolved pri-
vately.2 83 The fraud that will appear most common will be the practices
that are hardest to hide. Many frauds are not discovered. In other cases,
a violation may be so egregious (if discovered) that operators will settle
all claims in that category quickly. They will refund the complaining in-
vestors' money, but at a price. The settlement is hush money. The set-
tlors have to agree to maintain the veil of secrecy that blinds less vigilant
investors (so the operator gets to keep the secret profits earned on their
money).28 4
The point of analyzing the structure of investor problems from exam-
ples is not to suggest that fraud characterizes the majority of this industry,
with its hundreds of operators and billions of dollars in annual drilling.
Legitimate companies are themselves victims of too-loose standards.
Loose regulation invites cheaters and degrades the industry. If better dis-
closure were required, legitimate companies would get more business and
incompetent and venal operators less. Driving out the unscrupulous
would benefit the many companies that are not in the business of fraud.
283. The first reason that the litigated cases understate the scope of true disputes is that
most businessmen prefer to resolve problems short of litigation. The classic statement of
this factor is Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963). The fact that organizations and their formal rules sit in
the midst of a larger structure of informal patterns of behavior that must be understood is a
commonplace of organizational analysis. See, e.g., Mark Granovetter, Economic Action
and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481 (1985) (criticizing
both undersocialized model of neoclassical economics and oversocialized model of certain
sociological theorists for ignoring concrete social patterning within which interactions oc-
cur); John Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as
Myth and Ceremony, in WALTER POWELL & PAUL DIMAGGIo, THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL.
ISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 41 (1991) (note especially pages 42-44, discussing dif-
ferences between social action and rational structures assumed in many theories).
The second reason that the cited cases are sure to understate the incidence of fraud is
that there is no reason to believe that more than a small minority of frauds are discovered.
Given the damage to business reputation that accrues to a company known to do business
by fraudulent means, and the availability of punitive damages for the various intentional
torts that can be based upon clear cases of fraud, a fraudulent scheme is most likely to be a
"rational" business strategy only if the perpetrator expects the scheme to remain secret.
One can devise a number of rules that fraudulent operators should follow. They should
prefer to draw investors from different geographic regions, as long as the benefit from
lowering the risk of shared information exceeds the logistics cost. They should prefer in-
vestment forms like the traditional prospect equity investment over funds that pool all
investors together, as long as the reduction in shared information exceeds the marketing
economy of scale available to large partnerships. Their attraction to fraud should rise the
larger the pool of potential investors (increasing the likelihood that victims can be dis-
carded and replaced with new blood) and the more difficult they think it is for investors to
communicate with each other.
284. During the long-running fraud perpetrated by Home-Stake Production Company
of ThIsa, for instance, the company was sued twice before finally being put out of business.
The first litigation was settled quickly before the company had to submit a class action
notice to its investors; the second, involving the SEC, was also settled without Home-Stake
ever having to disclose the absolutely dismal results of its operations. See In re Home-
Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76 F.R.D. 337, 342 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
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Yet any industry offering great power and wealth will attract fraud.
Fraudulent and deceptive oil and gas sales practices were so common by
the late twenties that they were one of the major concerns leading to the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In the
words of the Supreme Court, oil and gas investments "were notorious
subjects of speculation and fraud. '285 That notoriety led Congress to in-
clude undivided interests in oil and gas, "that form of splitting up a min-
eral interest which had been most utilized for speculative purposes," in its
definition of a "security. '286
Even without complete measures of fraud, it is clear that industry stan-
dards and contracts have proven too easily penetrable by companies in-
tent upon fraud and deception. The abuses have not been limited to
fringe operators: violators have included some of the largest and most
prominent companies in the industry. The industry's vulnerability in-
cludes its openness to the rapid growth and to the prolonged operation of
programs that consistently lose money. Operators who want to cheat
have had a relatively easy time doing so.
Part II demonstrated, both by the dollars at stake and by the promi-
nence of some of the companies involved (which include some industry
leaders by any measure), that bad information has been a real problem in
the industry. As a result, whatever its precise incidence, cheating is not
rare enough. The ease of commission, depth of injury, and the relative
cheapness of disclosure justify reform even in the absence of more precise
knowledge about the scope of injury.
Moreover, the oil and gas industry is susceptible to fraud and deceit for
a number of structural reasons: low barriers to entry; infrequent invest-
ments; high uncertainty; and the lack of a viable market to foster compet-
itive pressures. The first factor reducing industry stability is its market
structure. The exploration end of the industry has relatively low barriers
to entry and permits rapid entry and exit. Many fortunes have been built
upon a few mineral interests or a drilling rig or two.287 The common use
of contracts like farmout agreements, leases, and executive rights con-
tracts, in which mineral owners find others to share the risk of loss (or
assume it entirely), reduces barriers to entry. Such risk spreading devices
have allowed thousands of people to enter the business with little or no
capital. 288 Similarly, an agreement selling dry hole and bottom hole in-
285. SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352 (1943).
286. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1)).
287. The path of some of the earliest and most famous oilmen, like Doc Joiner and the
Hunt dynasty described by Daniel Yergin, supra note 15, at 244-48, were repeated in the
late seventies as drillers like Carl Swan, who began working at the very bottom as a field
hand, and J.D. Allen, who spent his formative oilpatch years living in his car and dealing
leases on the road, see SINGER, supra note 31, ch. 5, became major figures in the industry.
The mythology of the oil millionaire is no myth. Uncounted, of course, are the greater
number of oilfield gamblers who never had a successful strike and whose histories never
get written.
288. This is how Robert Heffner, the Oklahoma oilman, bootstrapped capital for his
series of deep Oklahoma gas wells. Heffner traded pieces of acreage for drilling commit-
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formation has risk-spreading effects.289 Industry cost and risk-shifting
provisions can produce very fine divisions of risk. For an industry that
ments from such companies as Lone Star Gas Company, El Paso Natural Gas Company,
and Apache Corporation. Id. at 76-77. He peaked when Mobil agreed to undertake $200
million in drilling and pay another $32 million into Heffner's company GHK, in return for
half of his interest in a 135,000-acre project. Id. at 81.
The luxurious variety of oilpatch investment forms defies the transactions cost prediction
that a single dominant form will emerge as the market rewards and handicaps the various
forms for their efficiency properties. The farmout creates what is called a "carried inter-
est," an interest whose owner is "carried" by others as they pay to drill the well. There are
at least three standard forms of carried interest: (1) the Manahan interest, under which the
landowner assigns all of its property but gets back half (or some other percentage) under a
right of reversion after drilling costs are recouped; (2) the Herndon type, in which the
owner assigns a portion of its mineral interest, plus a production payment covering the cost
attributable to its retained interest, with the latter assigned back after the driller recoups its
costs; and (3) the Abercrombie type, in which a party assigns part of its interest and gives a
mortgage against development costs on the rest of its interest. See generally United States
v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 436-37 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 922 (1969); Estate of
Weinert v. Comm'r, 294 F.2d 750, 750 n.1 (5th Cir. 1961); 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra
note 213, § 424.1, at 439-44. The interests are named for the lucky taxpayers whose cases
defined the tax treatment of their respective tax vehicles.
The farmout is only the first place where a division of interest occurs. Upon receiving a
farmout, the recipient can drill and pay for all costs or, as is quite common, find new
investors to pay for them. For instance, if the operator persuades investors to sign up on a
third-for-quarter deal, the operator will receive a quarter interest but neither it nor the
original landowner will pay any part of the drilling cost. Alternatively, the operator may
assign its interest to another operator, merely keeping a royalty as the price of its transac-
tions service.
289. A dry hole agreement is one in which adjoining landowners or other interested
parties agree to pay a fixed amount (there is no reason the agreement could not be for a
percentage of well costs, although presumably that would involve landowners more in the
affairs of the operator than they would like) in return for the geologic information learned
while drilling the well. 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 213, §§ 612-14. The less fre-
quent bottom hole agreement requires payment, and information sharing, whether the well
is dry or not.
Presumably there are two reasons why it is common to limit this information to dry
holes: (1) if the operator completes a producer, it is easy to determine the depth and pro-
duction from state records, causing the information to lose some of its value; and (2) if the
well is a producer, the operator is more willing to take its risk on recouping well costs from
production. Thus the dry hole agreement limits, but does not extinguish, certain kinds of
risk. One also expects the agreements to be more common on wildcat wells, the first wells
drilled in new formations, than in drilled areas where other information is already avail-
able. For instance, in the Hartman case discussed below, the driller was able to secure an
agreement just on the first well and two others among more than 50 wells he drilled in the
same Kansas field.
While dry hole payments tend to be less than the cost of drilling (if adjoining landowners
had to pay more than a well cost, they might as well drill instead of buying this informa-
tion), the value of the information should depend on the information publicly available,
the cost of drilling alternative wells, the likelihood that the test well might be pooled or
unitized with the landowners if successful, how much acreage adjoins the well, and the
expected geology of that acreage. The payments can be substantial. See, e.g., Stone v. W.G.
Nelson Exploration Co., 51 So. 2d 279, 281 (Miss. 1951), in which the operator had been
"reimbursed" $25,700 on a $45,000 well; $50,000 on a $130,000 well, $44,000 on a $65,000
well; and $67,500 on a $103,000 well.
One of the interesting things about dry hole agreements is that the information retains
value only if it remains private. Many states require fairly extensive reporting of drilling
results. One might justify this on grounds of ensuring competition. The benefits to sur-
rounding landowners and to drillers of the new geologic data generally will outweigh the
driller's loss from having to give up this information, The conflict between drillers' desire
for confidentiality and the State's interest in sharing information should increase as states
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has not existed for much more than a century, it is extraordinary how
many legal forms the oilfield has developed to spread the risk and cost of
operations.2 90 And whether cause or effect, the low level of vertical inte-
expand reporting requirements for environmental reasons. This conflict flared into the
open in Hartman v. State Corp. Comm'n, 529 P.2d 134 (Kan. 1974).
Hartman drilled the first well in the Damme field in Kansas in 1951. He drilled 49 more
wells in the same field by the time of his litigation. Id. at 137. Kansas passed a law requir-
ing anyone drilling oil or gas wells to file formation samples, electric logs, and driller's logs.
Id. at 136-37. The information would be confidential for a year, with an option to extend
that period by one more year, and with exceptions for "economic hardship," lack of neces-
sity, or if "[t]he length of the period of confidential custody is not sufficient to satisfy the
needs of the developing operator." Id. at 137.
Over the years Hartman spent $125,000 for the wells and $200,000 on seismographic
testing. Id. at 138. He refused to enter some dry hole agreements because he did not want
to disclose some of his drilling results. Id. Hartman objected to the Kansas filing because
"the information obtained by applicant in drilling was paid for by him, it belongs to him, he
expects to use it and does not want to give it to competitors in the area; to do so would be
an economic disadvantage." Id. (He also attacked aspects of the filing and disclosure pro-
cedures.) Predictably, four major oil companies with interests in the area intervened to
urge the Kansas Supreme Court to uphold the state rule. They wanted something for noth-
ing. A year after Hartman's filing, Kansas would release information for which they might
have otherwise paid Hartman and other operators.
The Corporation Commission and the Kansas Supreme Court rejected Hartman's bid to
keep his information secret. The record contained testimony that the regulations were "an
excellent compromise which satisfied the state's need for information and yet did not un-
duly add to the cost of doing business." Id. The supreme court listed some of the environ-
mental reasons why such information was needed, reasons that are likely to be treated with
increasing seriousness in the coming years:
[A]nyone who drills a well to extract minerals not only gains mineral re-
sources and information, he also produces a hole which under certain circum-
stances can be detrimental to the public health and safety; blowouts related
to the oil and gas industry have occurred in recent years in Kansas; informa-
tion from holes in the particular areas was inadequate to determine the
source of the problems or the solutions; at least seven major surface collapses
have occurred which resulted from corrosion of casing caused by underlying
salt solutions; where information is inadequate new holes have to be drilled
in the area to secure adequate knowledge; such information is necessary for
the protection of fresh water resources and for correction of and protection
from blowouts and surface collapses; electric logs are used with other geolog-
ical data to acquire knowledge of rock pathology and changes in fluids, which
is essential to the study of blowouts.
Id. at 139.
Both dry hole and bottom hole agreements understandably need to be quite specific about
the depths covered, the zones to be tested, and even about what testing means. E.g., Ar-
kansas La. Gas Co. v. Sears, 400 S.W.2d 595, 597-98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, no
writ) (rejecting effort to avoid paying $5000 dry hole contribution on "8000 feet Granite
Wash Test" well because a Hamm Zone at 5000 feet was not tested: the Hamm Zone was
not mentioned in the contract; operator had not supplied information but never refused to
supply it and the plaintiff never asked for it); Humphrey v. Placid Oil Co., 142 F. Supp. 246,
248-56 (E.D. Tex. 1956), affd, 244 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1957) (purchaser agreed to pay
$25,000 for "testing," in contract specifying logs and other materials to be furnished, 142 F.
Supp. at 258, but refused to pay when operator would not agree to set pipe, perforate it,
and sand frac eight zones at expected cost of an additional $75,000 on a well that had cost
$121,000 to drill to agreed depth; payment required even though well was completed as a
producer (because of buyer's anticipatory repudiation before production began). 244 F.2d
at 187. For a harsh dissent condemning requirement of dry hole payments on apparently
producing well, see id. at 190 (Hutcheson, J., dissenting)).
290. While there are a number of ways to demonstrate the richness with which the
industry has learned to split risks, one example is the minuteness of the divisions. Con-
sider, for instance, just how far risks had been spread in a class action in which the repre-
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gration in this industry, which at its peak had thousands of independent
contractors who drilled wells and provided every variety of well service,
reduces further the capital needed to enter the business.
The industry's vulnerability is exacerbated because the gains can be so
disproportionate to the cost. Ease of entry can only be measured relative
to expected profits. Whenever vast wealth is available and so dependent
on chance, fraud will not be far behind. And oil and gas drilling is a
gambler's business on a worldwide scale.291 Drilling probably has been
this century's most frequently played high-stakes industrial game. The va-
riability of risk may fall in large programs, but each well is a ticket to an
enchantingly speculative journey. The jackpot nature of drilling and the
lure of huge profits always have attracted a fair share of hucksters, con
artists, and careless promoters-all circulating within the larger ranks of
legitimate operators.292 The chance at life-altering riches has been incen-
tive enough to produce a steady stream of new oilmen, willing to risk all
for a chance at fortune.
With entry so easy relative to potential profits, it is no surprise that the
industry experiences a turnover among independent operators. Their
turnover is a counterweight to the stability of the major oil companies.
Independents do most of the drilling and take most of the risk, but when
successful often sell their production to the majors. One easy indication
of the ease of penetration is the number of new companies in the boom
years of the late seventies and early eighties who had not been substantial
participants in prior years.293 The rise of new companies without track
sentative's overriding royalties formed, respectively, 0.00092024, 0.00130200, 0.0225000,
0.01968700, 0.00229500, and 0.000862 in certain wells. Vinson v. Texas Commerce Bank,
880 S.W.2d 820, 822-23 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
291. If reserves were fully predictable, one would expect any premium of expected life-
time returns from a mineral interest over national market averages to be capitalized into
the cost of acreage. Because given wells can be quite risky (with the risk varying with the
nature of the formation, the amount of prior drilling, the skill of the operator, and other
factors), the history of independent drilling-often by companies without enough capital to
spread risk by drilling a lot of wells-is a story of many marginal and bankrupt operators
and the survivors who leave their mark.
292. An interesting question of industrial organization is whether the industry would
have its current structure if drilling yielded exactly the same gains, but with reserves spread
evenly over drilling projects, and each well likely to yield a rate of return roughly similar to
a market interest rate, rather than many wells being dry holes but others coming in as
gushers that had to pay for a multitude of failures.
293. It is striking how quickly some companies have been able to attract investors in the
oilpatch without a substantial track record. Many would not have raised funds so quickly if
the industry had even minimal standards of relative performance. Longhorn Oil and Gas,
for instance, was just a few years old at its peak. Its principals had worked in the industry
for a number of years, but results vary significantly with organizational structure and pur-
pose, so it was therefore important that Longhorn itself was a new company.
The rise of Prudential was even more abrupt. Until these partnerships, Graham's lim-
ited industry involvement had not been successful. Prudential had some oilfield involve-
ment, including some extremely unsuccessful ventures like its Invoil project, but nothing to
suggest that it could produce a successful billion-dollar program.
The oilfield has a number of companies that can make money spending over a billion
dollars. These companies should have been collecting and spending these dollars. Had the
industry developed effective performance measures, the investors who had to bail out of
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records makes it harder for investors to uncover accurate information
before investing.
The nature of oilfield investing suggests other reasons why it will be
hard to protect investors from fraud. Transactions-cost economists trying
to measure how well private contracting can provide goods and services
(instead of vertically integrated firms doing the work) focus on three as-
pects of exchange as of particular importance: frequency, uncertainty, and
"asset specificity. '2 94 Infrequent and uncertain purchases with little li-
quidity are high-risk propositions. Oil and gas investments suffer from
each risk.
Frequency is important because a free market relies on frequent
purchases to steer companies away from incompetent and unreliable
companies and toward those that deliver what they promise. Every
purchase is a vote in a market election. Not surprisingly, those who vote
often have more to say about their leaders. Small, frequent purchases
give buyers more control than large, infrequent investments. 295 In the-
ory, free markets should drive unsuccessful companies out of business. In
practice, this application of buyer sovereignty works only if buyers make
enough purchases to learn to discriminate between good and bad
companies.
A number of oilpatch investors are infrequent buyers, particularly in
boom periods. A substantial number buy one or just a few investments in
a lifetime. Major oil companies on the other hand may make hundreds of
investments each year, but the presence of a significant number of inves-
tors who only make a few major purchases means that the industry has a
pool of investors who are unlikely to choose among operators effectively.
Most of their experience will be with a few operators. They will be com-
mitted before they have a chance to learn much about the industry.
The high turnover of independent operators makes repeat purchases
from the same operator less frequent and, combined with infrequent-
purchase investors, has helped unscrupulous companies feather their
nests. One might expect that having a number of companies without es-
tablished reputations or good will would put a premium on operators who
do have good track records. Yet Part II illustrated how easily other oper-
ators have flourished.
High uncertainty is a second contract factor that facilitates decep-
Prudential might still be putting money with the country's leading oil and gas companies,
who in turn could be operating on a larger scale within the continental United States.
294. WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 52-63.
295. "Sharp dealing is far more likely when the contractual partners never expect to see
each other again than when they have an interest in continuing to trade." COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 11, at 244. If contact is rare, it becomes harder to monitor a relationship
and, accordingly, to prevent fraud.
Of course, at least some level of trust is necessary for a fraud to succeed. Some would
argue that trust is necessary for the most efficient frauds. See Granovetter, supra note 283,
at 491-93. It certainly is true that people are at their most vulnerable when their guard is
down. The law offers a whole body of cases, the fiduciary duty cases, in which a tort viola-
tion is predicated upon a closer than usual relation between the parties.
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tion.296 When there is great uncertainty, there are few anchors on the
truth. At the outset of an oil and gas investment, it is very hard to evalu-
ate what the seller is offering. One of the most important ingredients is
going to be the operator's skill and honesty, yet most investors have to
take these variables on faith. Lacking information on the operator's his-
tory, they have little choice.
Another ingredient, expected reserves, will be excruciatingly difficult
to estimate. Investors cannot line up undivided, undrilled mineral inter-
ests and compare them to other properties like stereos on a shelf or cars
on a lot. Moreover, expected costs, which if too high will kill even the
most prolific well, are hard to predict and easy to distort. In the standard
investment, few of the project's costs are known at the time of invest-
ment.297 The final bill will depend on geologic and engineering factors
and the operator's skill. 298
Uncertainty increases because of the separation of ownership. When
operators sell working interests by well or by groups of wells, each well
may have a separate joint account with different investors. In theory,
296. Judged by the tests of frequency, complexity, and certainty, oilwell drilling would
appear to be a good candidate to keep in house. Characterizing investments on a contract-
firm scale, however, obscures the more complex world in which many long-term relation-
ships remain market-based contractual relationships. Outside financing and contracting
serve interests beyond avoiding fraud, including diffusing risk and increasing flexibility to
shift the point of investment to different regions of the country and world.
297. An exception from the investor's perspective is the turnkey contract, in which the
investor's bill does not depend on actual cost but is a predetermined amount. Yet even the
turnkey amount is ordinarily based on a projection of expected drilling costs, plus a risk
premium for the operator. Conceptually, the turnkey price should be actual cost adjusted
(upward) for the risk of overruns.
Many costs will be known if the operator has firm bids on all major drilling expenses.
Even here, however, unexpected engineering problems can multiply the cost of the well
several times over. Furthermore, unless the investment carries a turnkey price, each inves-
tor will be obligated to pay its proportionate share of the increased cost.
A partnership in which limited partners contribute a set amount or a public corporation
with an annual budget may stop drilling wells when costs absorb the total budget. Here
too, however, overruns reduce the economic potential of the project. Overruns result in
fewer wells than expected being drilled, rather than additional bills for the investors. This
lost opportunity is just as much a real cost as is a bill for more money.
298. Costs are even more complicated because so many service companies are involved.
The operator has to buy goods and services from many companies on each well. Even
large independents and majors rarely run their own drilling rigs; instead, they routinely
hire other companies to do most of the work. Parts and equipment can be supplied by
major parts houses or by smaller regional parts houses. Services as diverse as well logging,
mud supplies, and trucking and road clearing are traditionally contracted separately. Each
service can vary sharply in price and quality. Hundreds of vendors and contractors can
work on a single well. The operator may make thousands of accounting decisions. This
complex marketplace creates wide-ranging freedom to strike unusual and secret deals.
One result of the diffusion of service companies is that major oil companies can shift
operations rapidly from one section of the country to another or around the world. The
majors minimize their sunk investment in the drilling process. They use the market to
externalize the risk of regional and cyclical decline. Such market reliance also appears if
operators find that the market regulates cost and efficiency more reliably than they can
duplicate in-house. The industry's striking lack of integration and its reliance on outside
contracting has meant that a substantial part of industry cycles, including the decade-long
depression from which the industry still suffers, has fallen on supply houses and drillers,
many of whom are out of business.
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each of a large operator's dozens or hundreds of wells can have different
investors. The operator may bury a complex self-dealing pattern in the
arrangement of individual wells. The investors may not know each other
because operators often keep investor names as secret as possible. More-
over, investors have no easy way to combine their resources and
knowledge.
In other large programs, investors will be jumbled into a single annual
program. In boom years, the program might drill dozens or even hun-
dreds of wells. Each investor becomes the working interest owner in a
tiny fraction of each well. Alternatively, the program may retain title to
the wells and each investor gets a small stock or partnership share in the
whole. These nonoperators probably will not have any operating agree-
ment. They never see invoices or other detailed accounting on the wells
in which they invest. They almost certainly will not know the reserves or
costs attributable to specific wells, even though the operator may use de-
tails on a few of the best wells as marketing devices. Finally, they are
unlikely to audit their investment or to have an express right to audit
specific well expenditures. In these cases there is no oversight to limit the
operator's decisions.
The reason the investors' lack of control is so damaging is that informa-
tion and power is "asymimetric" 299-it is tilted toward the operator. The
operator knows a lot more than its investors. It ordinarily has more geo-
logic and engineering expertise; it alone knows its past record in finding
reserves and meeting its drilling-cost estimates; only it knows its internal
procedures; and only it knows just how honestly it will act. This asymme-
try is magnified by the control the standard industry contract gives the
operator. The JOA provides that the operator "shall conduct and direct
and have full control of all operations on the Contract Area. ' 300 The
operator must determine the expenditures that are prudent and must per-
form in a "good and workmanlike manner. '30 1 The operator enjoys the
choice of which operations to perform on the well, when, with which ven-
dors, and at what price. It can do whatever it likes as long as it is not
reckless or grossly negligent; investors are not allowed to sue for mere
negligence. 302
299. In Williamson's thinking, "[it is generally conceded that if information is asym-
metrically distributed between the parties to an exchange, then the exchange is subject to
hazards." OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTI-
TRUST IMPLICATIONS 31 (1975). Williamson forges on and argues that not asymmetry
alone, but asymmetry with "the high costs of achieving information parity" and "the pro-
clivity of parties to behave opportunistically" is the problem. Id. Problems of opportu-
nism, which give rise to the need for detailed contract protections in the first place, are
accentuated if asymmetry exists. Id. at 32.
300. 1989 JOA, supra note 226, art. V.A.
301. Article V.A. requires the operator to conform to the standard of a "reasonable
prudent operator" and to perform in a "good and workmanlike manner." Id. In addition,
COPAS traditionally defined joint operators as including "necessary and proper" activities.
1994 COPAS, art. 1. This portion of the definition has been removed in the 1995 COPAS.
See 1995 COPAS, art. 1.
302. 1989 JOA, supra note 226, art. V.A.
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A final factor is "asset specificity." Economists stress this factor be-
cause they understand that investments that are not readily marketable
bring higher risk.303 Someone owning an untradable asset has very little
leverage when dealing with the others involved in the investment. While
the marketability of oil and gas investments varies greatly, many are not
very liquid. The traditional equity interest is shared by a small number of
coventurers. There is no active market for these properties. Once an
investor has put its money down, it depends largely upon the operator to
make or break the investment.
These factors-ease of entry, infrequent purchases for many players,
turnover among operators, uncertainty and complexity, and lack of li-
quidity-raise the industry's susceptibility to fraud and deception. Each
makes it more important that operators be forced to give a full descrip-
tion of their wares up front. Transaction-cost economists predict that in-
vestments with these features will be hard to regulate. The examples in
this Article show that prediction is right.
VI. PROTECTION IS LONG OVERDUE
The point of contract reform is not to restrict the operator's freedom.
It is to inject full information into the investment bargain, making sure
the operator bargains fairly. This is particularly important because the
operator has such better access to information. Additionally, its shield
from ordinary negligence liability widens its sphere of protected action.
These changes will make life harder for some operators. In the long
run, though, they will help restore investor confidence and pave the way
for the return of outside capital. The changes should not hurt honest,
competent operators. To the contrary: the changes will benefit honest
companies because they will provide investors with a better understand-
ing of their investment and make legitimate claims of fraud less frequent.
In the long run, higher standards can enhance the industry's image,
provide stability, and increase its ability to raise funds. Many investors,
including sophisticated institutional investors, were hurt badly by sharp
practices during the boom years of the late seventies and early eighties.
These investors left the industry. Adoption of clear, investor-oriented
standards can help restore their confidence and with it the flow of invest-
ment capital.
303. Williamson claims that asset specificity is the most critical of the three drivers in
his system for determining whether goods and services are located in the market or
through internal, firm provision: "[t]hus it is the condition of asset specificity that distin-
guishes the competitive and governance contracting models." WILLIAMSON, supra note 4,
at 42. The asset specificity that the firm faces does not translate precisely into the decisions
facing parties who have decided to enter a contract, but the analogy would seem to be to
the "sunk" nature of the investment-once an investor commits its money, there is no
going back and little market in which to transfer its risk to others. Thus the initial ex-
change brings the focus of all risks throughout the contract period to bear on the initial
contract formation. Id. at 90-96.
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The development of a fair, effective industry investment contract has
an importance beyond national boundaries. The same contracts will be
exported by American companies as they manage their operations in the
rest of the world.304 And they will be imported by foreign courts that
look to American common law in developing their law of oil and gas,
particularly oil producing, common-law jurisdictions like Canada and
Australia. Moreover, oil and gas precedent often sets standards that ap-
ply to other extractive industries, just as early oil and gas law often bor-
rowed from the longer-established law of mining.
Even left to itself, however, the domestic American industry has a vital
interest in adopting proper levels of investor protection. The direct costs
of fraud and self-dealing have fallen on hundreds of thousands of inves-
tors, even if one considers only the examples given here. The rapid drill-
ing decline of the mid and late eighties, caused in part by the withdrawal
of unhappy investors, threw hundreds of thousands of people out of
work305 and dismantled a substantial part of a leading industry in our
economy. The industry still employs many people. It is the primary de-
terminant of heating costs and transportation patterns and a major factor
in the national standard of living. Each of these interests offers an added
reason for concern with development of a proper investment standard.
The industry needs to tell investors more about their expected returns.
Investors should get fair information on the operator's prior history
before the investment begins. The investor should have enough informa-
tion to determine how the operator has done for other investors in the
currency of commercial oil and gas reserves. The investment should be
"transparent." Its inner workings should be clear to all who are invited to
join.
The improvements discussed here would put operators on the right
track. They confirm and renew the industry's focus on the efficient dis-
covery and production of oil and gas. Creating liquid wealth is the real
business of oilmen.
304. In an interesting part of the process of formalizing exchange patterns, Andrew
Derman, one of the foremost commentators on the model JOA for domestic use, has ap-
plied his experience to develop a JOA for international oil and gas investments. DERMAN,
supra note 227. For another sign of the export of oilpatch legal forms as evidenced by the
shift in attention among oilfield experts, see the international focus in Ernest E. Smith,
From Concessions to Service Contracts, 27 TULSA L.J. 493 (1992). This spread of American
oilpatch patterns seems to fit a theory of organizational change in which successful institu-
tions spread as participants in an industry "mimic" the patterns of pre-existing institutions
that are perceived to function successfully. See generally Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W.
Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in
Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 147 (1983).
305. TWo authors cite congressional testimony that the oil and gas industry lost 400,000
jobs in recent years, "more jobs than were lost in the automobile, textile, steel and elec-
tronics industries." Donald F. Santa, Jr. & Patricia J. Beneke, Federal Natural Gas Policy
and the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 14 ENERGY L.J. 1, 13-14 (1993).
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